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ABSTRACT
A PRODUCTIVE FAILURE: EXISTENTIALISM IN FIN DE SIÈCLE ENGLAND

Maxwell Patchet, B.A., M.A.
Marquette University, 2020

In my dissertation, I argue that Thomas Hardy’s Tess of the d’Urbervilles, Joseph
Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, and G. K. Chesterton’s The Man Who Was Thursday belong
to a broader, transnational tradition of existential novelists. I discuss how recognizing
their novels as existential explains why these authors exist in a liminal space in literary
criticism, caught between Victorianism and modernism. My dissertation historicizes their
existential contribution by placing it within the context of late-Victorian optimism. While
their contemporaries celebrated Britain’s technological, imperial, and philosophical
strides, Hardy, Conrad, and Chesterton wrote novels that warned against too firm a faith
in the merits of progress. Their warnings about the human cost of Victorian progress
appears in the novels’ dramatization of failure: the failure of representation in Tess of the
d’Urbervilles, the failure of communication in Heart of Darkness, and the failure of
understanding in The Man Who Was Thursday.
In addition to arguing Hardy, Conrad, and Chesterton belong to a broader
existential tradition, I argue that the novel form has been overlooked in accounts of the
development of existential thought. The British existentialists’ use of their novel’s formal
features speaks to the way in which the novel form itself becomes a productive means of
philosophical inquiry. Instead of viewing the novel as merely an useful illustration for
philosophic concepts, I argue that the novel is capable of developing ideas in ways
unavailable to philosophic discourse. My dissertation shows that the intersection of
literature and philosophy demands critical attention be given to the individual
characteristics of a novel’s form. In my chapters, I discuss how Hardy theorizes
existential absence, Conrad theorizes existential horror, and Chesterton theorizes
existential joy through their novel’s distinctive formal features. For each of these authors,
the concept emerges out of the failure of the novel’s form. Hence, failure for the British
existentialists was productive. Their incompleteness creates possibility, and possibility
creates freedom.
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1
Introduction: Existentialism and the Novel Form

The British fin de siècle was marked not merely by the end of a century, but also
by the nearing end of the long reign of Queen Victoria. The jubilee celebrations of 1887
and 1897 inspired the British public to indulge in patriotic and nationalistic fervor. Not
only was Victoria a popular queen, but her reign witnessed huge advancements in
technology and science (King 2, 17). When the British press began to reflect on where
the nation was and where it had come from over the course of the nineteenth century,
they were struck by the rapidity and scope of the changes technology, science, and
empire had wrought on Britain’s place in the world. As Greg King writes, “No other
monarch presided over such dramatic changes as did Victoria. From her birth in 1819 to
her death in 1901, she witnessed an extraordinary transformation, not just in England but
also in the world as a whole” (4).
The attitude of British subjects towards these dramatic transformations was
generally positive. Victoria was destined “to preside over the greatest period of British
prosperity and growth in the modern era” (5) and on her death The Times summed her
reign:
To write the life of Queen Victoria is to relate the history of Great Britain
during a period of great events, manifold changes, and unexampled
national prosperity. No reign in the annals of any country can compare
with that of the late Sovereign; and to her, whose personal influence
helped in a large measure to make this epoch one that will be ever
gratefully remembered, we owe more than to any of our former kings and
Queens. (3)
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The Times obituary does not merely show respect to a beloved Queen but reflects the
Victorians’ optimism and faith in progress. In The Invention of Progress Peter Bowler
writes of Victorians: “The idea of progress became central to their thinking precisely
because it offered the hope that current changes might be part of a meaningful historical
pattern” (3). Bowler observes that theories of social development “enabled the
commercial and professional classes of Victorian Britain to maintain that the society they
were creating represented the goal to which all other nations must aspire” (18). This
belief is reflected in fin de siècle writings. Elisée Reclus observed in 1896 “it would be
absurd to deny” the progress of humanity in general (783), while contemporary historian
R. H. Gretton described the 1887 Jubilee as “an occasion which prompted retrospects”
and England’s progress during the 50 years of Victoria’s reign “provided ground for
almost unmitigated satisfaction” (212).
Given these attitudes, English national pride was extraordinarily high during this
time. In 1896 Edward Dicey, commenting on England’s purported unpopularity
(probably in some measure connected to the expansive empire), wrote, “England is more
honest, more truthful, animated by a higher sense of duty, better fitted to govern herself,
and to govern others also, than the rest of the world” (668). Two years later F. E.
Younghusband wrote, “The history of mankind shows a succession of emigrations from
new and higher centres of civilisation by which superior races have effected a control
over inferior” (457). In the same year Chambers’s Journal proclaimed the Diamond
Jubilee “kindled afresh in the minds of Englishmen the flame of a lofty patriotism and
roused the nation to a deeper sense of the glorious heritage bequeathed by those whose
dauntless courage and amazing enterprise stand forth as not the least that is admirable in
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the history of the past” (277). As Bowler describes, “Since Britain was the purest
expression of European development, it was her duty to lead the way in controlling as
much of the world’s population as possible” (57). Britain’s dominance over a quarter of
the globe was all the proof needed of the superiority of the British people.
This was joined by a view of the past century as emblematic of historical
progression. H. D. Traill began his article on the Diamond Jubilee with the words, “We
live in a century whose praise as an ‘age of progress’ has been in all the newspapers for
the last fifty years” and that we ought to recognize that “tributes of respectful
congratulation” are in fact “compliments to address of the Victorian Era. For that is the
actual fact” (825). Ebenezer E. Jenkins wrote, “We are looking back over sixty years, and
can produce a record of progress and of triumph to which neither ancient nor modern
history can find a parallel” (447). Another journalist wrote, “I have now been engaged
more or less continuously in journalistic work for a quarter of a century, and during the
whole of that time I do not remember one month which on the whole, looking at it all
round, has brought with it much greater gifts from the Destinies for the English-speaking
man” (“The Progress of the World” 102). C. De Thierry writes that should England “as
she will do, keep on in the light by which she has hitherto been guided, a new era will
open out before her, eclipsing all others in moral and material grandeur” (317).
Into this context enter Thomas Hardy’s Tess of the D’Urbervilles (1890), Joseph
Conrad’s Heart of Darkness (1899), and G. K. Chesterton’s The Man Who Was Thursday
(1908). These novels find themselves ill at ease with the general optimism of the day. As
late Victorians looked back on a century of progress and looked forward to a future that
seemed to hold no end of promise, these authors strike a discordant note. These authors
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rejected the sense of superiority that marked Victorian self-image, whether that be
technological superiority, imperialism, or a faith in human progress.
Later generations noticed a difference between these novelists and their literary
contemporaries. Hardy and Conrad’s place as liminal figures is seen in Virginia Woolf’s
“Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown” and “Modern Fiction” where she excepts them from her
criticisms of the Edwardian novelists. In these essays Virginia Woolf reflects on the
novel, drawing a clear distinction between the Edwardian and Georgian novelists in an
earlier focus on the material versus a modern focus on the psychological. The exception
Woolf makes for Hardy and Conrad in her dismissal of earlier novelists is motivated by
these authors’ focus on subjective experience and the collision of mind and matter,
prioritizing neither the materialism of their contemporaries nor the innovative
psychological explorations of the modernists. As a result, these works and their authors
resist traditional literary categorization. Neither truly Victorian nor truly Modern, they
are liminal figures in literary history. Conrad and Hardy get read in survey courses, but
they are placed oddly between Tennyson, Arnold and company and Eliot, Woolf, Joyce
and the other modernists. Writing later than the other two, Chesterton’s work can be seen
as a direct rebuttal to the cynicism and ennui taking hold of fin de siècle art.
My project proposes these authors are best understood as part of the existential
tradition. While some novels, like Notes from Underground and those written by Jean
Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, Simone de Beauvoir and Franz Kafka get included in
collections of existential writings, the importance of the novel form to existentialism has
been neglected. It is my contention that by making fiction peripheral we are ignoring
important contributions to the development of existentialism. The typical tradition traced
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in accounts of existentialism draws a line from Soren Kierkegaard and Friedrich
Nietzsche to Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger before finishing with Sartre, de
Beauvoir, and Camus. The development is one from Germany to France. In this
movement England is forgotten or ignored, mostly because English philosophers did not
embrace existentialism.
However, if we recognize the contributions of literature to the development of
existential thought we can discern a forgotten emergence of existentialism in the
literature of fin de siècle England. As the British press around them celebrated the
progress and accomplishments of the nation during Queen Victoria’s reign, these authors
wrote literature that wrestled with the themes of existential philosophy.
There are two driving questions that form this introduction. The first of these
questions is, what is existentialism? The second of these questions is, why novels?
Related to these questions are two other questions: what is an existential novel, and can
we retroactively define novels as existential that were written before the movement got
its name? The answers to the latter questions are best provided in the form of a case
study. For this reason, we will look at critical commentary and treatment of Dostoevsky’s
novella Notes from Underground. In the midst of this reckoning I will offer my own
interpretation of the underground man that establishes what I argue is the through-line for
the novelists Thomas Hardy, Joseph Conrad, and G. K. Chesterton: namely the existential
preoccupation with failure.
Definitions of Existentialism
Histories of existentialism generally acknowledge that there is no singular
definition of existentialism, but rather existentialism is best understood as a cluster of
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related themes. The exact understanding and analysis of these themes might differ—
sometimes radically, as in the atheist Camus and the Christian Kierkegaard—but these
themes overlap between the writers generally considered existential. Nevertheless, any
definition of existentialism must take into account the lack of cohesion among the
writers.
Most accounts of existentialism find it necessary to establish the difficulty or
impossibility of defining it. Felicity Joseph, Jack Reynolds, and Ashley Woodward
acknowledge there is no straightforward answer to the question, what is existentialism?
(3). In the introduction to Existentialism: Basic Writings Charles Guignon and Derk
Pereboom admit, “The term is notoriously difficult to define, and no single definition will
be adequate to fit all the works usually labeled ‘existentialist’” (v). Fernando Molina
agrees, writing “It is not easy to define existentialism; moreover, it is probably
impossible to provide a definition with which all students and members of the
existentialist movement would agree” (2). Davis McElroy observes, “it is impossible to
reduce” existentialism to a simple one- or two-sentence definition (xi). This apparent
impossibility prompts L. Nathan Oaklander to choose not to define existentialism. He
asserts “any attempt to define it would inevitably lose sight of it” (ix).
Many of these commentators explain that the difficulty of providing a definition is
a feature of existential thought. Wesley Barnes explains, “We cannot define
existentialism in the forms found in our current dictionaries” (9). He goes further, “the
phenomenon of definition would be entirely alien to the existentialist. He would see
defining as the fatal process of setting up standards which he would have to consider,
admit, deny, or modify” (5). Jonathan Judaken agrees: “existentialism, in principle rejects
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a neat dictionary definition or formulation” (1). Mark Tanzer affirms this understanding:
“existentialists maintain that no one definition can capture the essence of existential
philosophy” (2).
It is not enough for critics to recognize the difficulties in offering a definition of
existentialism. A number of them also point out that there is little similarity between the
figures we consider existential. Walter Kaufmann claims, “Existentialism is not a
philosophy but a label for several widely different revolts against traditional philosophy”
(11), adding that many people we consider existentialists reject the label. It is not, he
argues, “a school of thought nor reducible to any set up tenets” and that the writers
considered existential do not agree “on essentials” (11). Robert C. Solomon begins his
introduction by stating, “there is no set of doctrines common” to existentialists (3). Kevin
Aho reflects, “One of the difficulties in writing a book about ‘existentialism’ is the word
itself. It is an ‘ism’ that gives the misleading impression of a coherent and unified
philosophical school” (ix). Mary Warnock asserts, “It does not designate a system or a
school” (1) and Richard Gill echoes when he confirms existentialism is “neither a system,
nor a school, nor a creed” (4).
Like a definition, having a “system”, “school”, or “creed” would go against the
existentialist project. Mark Tanzer writes, “[T]he existentialists rejected the idea of a
philosophical system. That is, existentialist philosophers typically deny that the age-old
philosophical ambition of articulating a rational systematic account of the world and the
human beings inhabiting it is anything but a misguided project” (2). Ernst Breisach
explains:
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Nobody has yet or will ever put down ‘the’ tenets of existentialism in any
systematic work of so many volumes, nor will there at any time appear an
‘Existentialist Manifesto’ which would neatly spell out easy-to-grasp
maxims. Even the word existentialism itself must be used with great
caution, since it refers not to a rigid set of propositions but rather to a
number of themes which recur in the works of existentialist writers...they
dwell on the eternal tensions present in the human condition and shared by
men of all ages. (4)
What is it about existentialism that resists definitions and creeds? The lack of
clarity and unity is the result of the existentialists’ emphasis on the individual and her
intensely personal struggle with philosophic thought. Solomon calls existentialism “a
development of a number of themes which each existentialist stamps with his or her own
personal approach” (3). Kaufmann observes a shared “perfervid individualism” and calls
“the heart of existentialism” the “refusal to belong to any school of thought, the
repudiation of the adequacy of any body of beliefs whatever, and especially of systems,
and a marked dissatisfaction with traditional philosophy as superficial, academic, and
remote from life” (12). The result of the existential insistence of personal engagement
with philosophic questions, the answers individuals give to these questions will reflect
their unique subjectivity. To expect a neat definition or a set of beliefs is to expect of
existentialism a rigorous academic approach against which existentialism rebels due to its
impersonal and abstracted character.
The rejection of distant, academic approaches to philosophy is a through-line in
existential thought. Joseph, Reynolds and Woodward see “a general insistence on
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philosophy being more than merely an abstract intellectual pursuit” (2). Thomas R. Flynn
describes the existential approach as one that views philosophy as a way of life and care
for the self. Eugene B. Borowitz explains, “It demands the whole self, not just the mind.
It wants the thinker to participate in the thinking. It is satisfied to appeal to him mentally
only as a means of engaging him heart and soul as well” (15). H. J. Blackham adds, “The
main business of this philosophy therefore is not to answer the questions which are raised
but to drive home the questions themselves until they engage the whole man and are
made personal, urgent, and anguished” (151-152). The focus on the individual and the
rejection of abstract, academic philosophy emerge from the same emphasis on what
William Barrett calls “the unique experience of the single one, the individual, who
chooses to place himself on trial before the gravest question of his civilization” (13). To
the existentialist, philosophy is not an object of study but rather a subjective wrestling
with the questions of meaning, purpose, and truth that existentialists felt had been lost in
the abstractions of their philosophical contemporaries.
Existentialism emerged out of a sense that academic philosophies had lost sight of
the human element. Paul Roubiczek observes existentialism “insists that philosophy
should be connected with the individual’s own life and experience, with the historical
situation in which he finds himself, and that it should be, not interesting abstract
speculation, but a way of life. It should be a philosophy capable of being lived” (10). He
continues, “Philosophy, therefore, should start from one’s own experience, one’s own
inner knowledge, and it is inner knowledge which should be qualified, enlarged, and in
this way enriched” (10). It is difficult in our day to realize how radical this approach is,
but when existentialism was being established it went emphatically against philosophical
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tradition. For many years the pursuit of philosophy went hand in hand with the belief that
truth transcends humanity. Existentialists assert instead that truth is human and thus must
wrestle with the realities of human experience.
Thus, one of the features that existentialists share is an insistence that no universal
answer to philosophic questions is possible. Instead, existentialism is built around the
individual and his approach to his particular, specific, and concrete situation. William
Barrett argues, “No concept or system of concepts lies at the center of their philosophies,
but rather the individual human personality itself struggling for self-realization” (13). L.
Nathan Oaklander similarly insists “the fundamental or ultimate subject matter of
existentialism is the existing, concrete, living individual. Existentialists are not primarily
concerned with human life in general, but with the life of particular existing individuals”
(3). And so Ernst Breisach discusses the existential project in terms of “the central
existentialist concern, the actually existing individual” (6). This approach explains the
differences between existentialist thinkers, the lack of a clear and specific definition, and
the resistance to a creed. Because existentialists insist on an individual response to the
existential questions, it is inevitable that these answers would be different.
A number of critics find it useful to invoke Wittgenstein and argue that
existentialism is best understood in terms of family resemblance, and so while there is no
universal existentialism, they share overlapping concerns. While the lists commentators
compile bear differences, they tend to agree that existentialists share a concern with
concepts like freedom, anxiety, choice, dread, death, absurdity, individual subjectivity,
contingency, and finitude. While no existentialist is concerned with all of these concepts,
and there is occasionally significant difference in how existentialists understand these
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concerns, there emerges a certain sensibility, a certain approach to existence that we can
understand as “existentialist.” The distinctions between Kierkegaard, Nietzsche,
Heidegger, Jaspers, Sartre, Camus, de Beauvoir and the other existentialists result from
each existentialist’s individual struggle with these concepts, the individual priorities that
mark their philosophic approach. Kierkegaard might emphasize faith, Heidegger might
emphasize being, and Camus might emphasize the absurd, but their philosophies overlap,
and in that overlap we can begin to gain an understanding of existentialism.
Existential Themes
As has been noted already, existentialism begins with the individual human
subject.1 Existentialism challenged the assumption that our personal experiences, the
emotions, desires, and moods humans are saddled with are not appropriate subjects of
philosophy. This theme defines much of Kierkegaard’s work, with Either/Or and Fear
and Trembling asserting everyone has a choice in life, while The Sickness Unto Death is
a meditation on the subjective experience of despair. Later existentialists continue the
emphasis on the individual, whether through Nietzsche’s concept of the Übermensch, de
Beauvoir’s emphasis on reciprocity, or in Sartre’s concern with freedom, responsibility,
and bad faith. While the emphasis might be on strength, on equality, or on authenticity
the origin point is a concern with the individual.
Many of the other themes identified by writers emerge from the focus on the
individual and his or her existence. The first of these themes is a concern with the nature
of being. Two of the major existential works, Heidegger’s Being and Time and Sartre’s

1

See Davis McElroy, xi; Kevin Aho, x-xi; Richard Appignanesi, xi; Felicity Joseph, Jack Reynolds, and
Ashley Woodward, 3; Richard Gill, 22; L. Nathan Oaklander, 3, Ernst Breisach, 6; Paul Roubiczek, 10;
Steven Crowell, 22; Steven Earnshaw, 1; and William Barrett, 13.
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Being and Nothingness make understanding what being means central to their work. Out
of these studies emerge existential terms like Da-sien, thrownness, being-in-itself and
being-for-itself. What is distinct about humans, Heidegger asserts, is that as Da-sein “in
its being this being is concerned about its very being” (10). Heidegger establishes in the
beginning of Being and Time that to get at the question of the meaning of being we must
begin by understanding human existence.
The focus on being leads naturally to a reckoning with humans as contingent
creatures. None of us are necessary beings, and thus the fact of our existence is
accidental. But contingency does not relate merely to the accidental existence of humans,
but further to the individual realities that mark our individual existences. The first of
these is the involuntary nature of existence: no one chose to come into being, but rather
existence is thrust upon individuals. Contingency includes our self-conscious awareness
that our individual, particular existence—and that it is this existence and no other—is
thoroughly coincidental. Contingency encompasses the realization that this consciousness
is connected to this body, that this body was born to these parents, at this time, in this
place, and in this culture. Existentialists are interested in the absurdity that our conscious
awareness of existence is bound by a physical body that is bound by time and space.
As a result of this interest, existentialists emphasize concrete experience as a valid
source for philosophizing, and thus has roots in phenomenology. Instead of rejecting
human moods, emotions, or experiences as outside the purview of philosophy, the
existentialists placed those parts of human experience at the center of philosophy. As
Barrett says: “Ideas are not even the real subject matter of these philosophers,” rather the
individual’s unique, singular experience (13). Philosophy is done from a situation, but
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existentialists do not see this as a weakness of philosophy. Therefore existentialism
incorporates the individual’s unique perspective into the foundation of its philosophy,
deciding to turn those limits into its strength.
Out of the individuals unique, contingent existence emerges the next theme of
existentialism, and that is freedom and choice. Kevin Aho’s description of existentialists’
“concern for human situation as it is lived” (x) is exemplified in works like Either/Or and
Fear and Trembling by Kierkegaard and in Sartre’s analysis of bad faith, authenticity,
and responsibility. The nature of this freedom is seen in Sartre’s “Existentialism is a
Humanism:”
For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain
one’s actions by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other
words, there is no determinism—man is free, man is freedom. Nor, on the
other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or
commands that could legitimize our behavior. Thus we have neither
behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of
justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I
mean when I say that man is condemned to be free. Condemned, because
he did not create himself, yet is nevertheless at liberty, and from the
moment that he is thrown into this world he is responsible for everything
he does. (353)
Sartre uses the term “condemned” to describe man’s freedom in order to emphasize the
negative aspects of this human freedom. Because one’s nature is not given, and because
in Sartre’s atheistic existentialism there is no God to provide values, mankind is cast
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adrift. But religious existentialists also recognize a similar undercurrent to human
existence that even the existence of God cannot completely alleviate.
The result of this freedom is anxiety, otherwise called angst, anguish or dread.
Out of human freedom comes the knowledge that the individual is solely responsible for
choosing how to act. The typical example is to imagine walking on the edge of a cliff.
While there is a typical fear of falling off that cliff, existential dread is the possibility that
there is nothing that prevents you from choosing to throw yourself off the edge of that
cliff. In that moment we become aware of the precariousness of our existence. As Paul S.
MacDonald writes, “anxiety is the reflective awareness that there is nothing that stands
between her and not being…anxiety is the face-to-face encounter with the abyss between
one’s being and not being” (37). MacDonald further explains what is occurring here.
Anxiety occurs when without help and on one’s own one is faced with the necessity of
making a choice. Unlike fear, which has an object, “anxiety arises in confrontation with
oneself” (39). This is the difference between being afraid of falling off the cliff and
confronting the fact that nothing prevents one from choosing to throw oneself off the
edge of the cliff. The awareness of the precariousness of existence and the necessity of
making a choice produces anxiety.
The cliff example is also appropriate because it highlights the existential concern
with death. While existential anxiety can occur whenever one is forced to make a choice,
the fundamental, existential choice is between being and nonbeing. As Albert Camus says
in The Myth of Sisyphus, “There is but one truly serious philosophical problem and that is
suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the
fundamental question of philosophy” (3). Rather than reveal a disturbing morbidity,
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existentialism’s interest in facing up to the reality of death is about grappling with the
meaning of life. Existentialism claims that only in the face of death can you truly live.
Thus, it asks the individual to face the possibility of nonbeing because doing so is
necessary in order to answer the question on the meaning of life.
The question of meaning and purpose is central to existentialism. The
confrontation with nonbeing makes that all the more urgent. And by nonbeing I do not
mean merely facing the possibility of one’s death, but also the realization that one is
contingent and that were circumstances different (had your parents not met or had one of
your grandparents died in childhood) one might not have existed at all. How does an
accidental existence have meaning? Existentialism begins with the fact that the meaning
of life is not a given, but rather one is thrown into existence (to use the Heideggerian
phrase) without foundation. Thus, existentialists grapple with the desire for meaning and
purpose in a world that resists comprehension.
Camus calls this feeling the absurd, which he defines as the “divorce between
man and his life, the actor and his setting” (6). He further explains, “This world in itself is
not reasonable, that is all that can be said. But what is absurd is the confrontation of the
irrational and the wild longing for clarity whose call echoes in the human heart” (21). The
world is dense, irreducible. The yearning for meaning that individuals feel finds no
answers in the world, which denies any human attempt to make sense of it. The absurd
describes the confrontation between human beings and the lack of any apparent meaning
or purpose to existence. The absurd, Camus clarifies, is not in the world or a quality of
the world but emerges out of human interaction with the world. The absurd emerges
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when individuals who desire meaning are faced with a universe that refuses to make
sense.
The result of this confrontation is a feeling of loneliness, of isolation, of
alienation. Certainly, this feeling of alienation occurs between the individual and his
setting, as Camus writes in the quote above. This can be between the subject and the
physical world, as Sartre dramatizes in Nausea, or between the individual and the masses,
which Kierkegaard called “the crowd,” or between individuals, as Camus reveals in The
Stranger. All these forms of alienation can accompany the recognition of the absurd in
human life. The first recognizes the impossibility of truly understanding the world as it
“really” is, and hence the origins of existentialism in phenomenology. As Camus writes,
“The world evades us because it becomes itself again” (14). The second emerges from
the sense that the crowd, the herd, or the masses live inauthentic lives: they have never
considered the meaning of their existence or questioned the values that society tells them
they should have, that they simply adopt the gestures and habits of those around them
without questioning why. In other words, existentialists feel that the masses go about
their existence unaware of its absurdity, and this unawareness heightens the
existentialists’ sense of isolation. Finally, the existentialists are struck with the difficulty,
or even impossibility, of finding connection, of communication between individuals.2
The absurd penetrates the entirety of the individual’s existence, and loneliness, isolation,
and alienation are the human response to that absurdity.
A similar instinct instructs the existentialist’s account of nothingness. Richard
Gill, Helmut Kuhn and William Barrett invoke the encounter with nothingness in their
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See Jaspers, Karl, Philosophy: Volume 2. Jaspers focuses on communication, for whom it is possible for
whom it is impossible in the section titled “I Myself in Communication and Historicity” pp. 23-129.
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descriptions of existentialism. While Gill calls it an “authentic and uncanny metaphysical
phenomenon” that resists definition (28), Kuhn calls it “the privation of meaning and
reality” (x). Perhaps the best explanation for what this experience means is William
Barrett’s analogy of a man waking up blind, or not-seeing. According to philosophy notseeing is not an entity, or has no being, but try telling the man who suddenly finds
himself unable to see that his blindness is not a real entity.
Barrett finishes his description by turning to the subject of finitude:
Human finitude is the presence of the not in the being of man. That mode
of thought which cannot understand negative existence cannot fully
understand human finitude. Finitude is a matter of human limitations, and
limitations involve what we cannot do or cannot be. Our finitude,
however, is not the mere sum of our limitations; rather, the fact of human
finitude brings us to the center of man, where positive and negative
existence coincide and interpenetrate to such an extent that a man’s
strength coincides with his pathos, his vision with his blindness, his truth
with his untruth, his being with his non-being. And if human finitude is
not understood, neither is the nature of man. (290)
It is the reckoning with human finitude that encompasses the themes of existentialism.
The individual subject, contingency, freedom, anxiety, death, the absurd, nothingness all
emerge as different expressions of human finitude. The individual is this individual and
no other, and as such is limited by the historical moment in which he or she came to be.
With the individual’s freedom comes the recognition of both the possibilities of existence
and the limitations that come with the necessity of making a choice. Death is the most
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obvious example of human finitude. That life and existence has an end gives
existentialism its sense of urgency. If this existence has an endpoint, then discovering the
meaning of it is all the more important. The absurd emerges from the confrontation with
the limitations of our understanding, of the world resisting our attempts to give it
meaning or purpose. Nothingness is our finitude as expressed as an object of
contemplation.
Echoing this analysis William Barrett summarizes the themes of existential
philosophy thus: “Alienation and estrangement; a sense of the basic fragility and
contingency of human life; the impotence of reason confronted with the depths of
existence; the threat of Nothingness, and the solitary and unsheltered condition of the
individual before this threat…A single atmosphere pervades them all like a chilly wind:
the radical feeling of human finitude” (36). Barrett’s choice to describe finitude as an
atmosphere or a feeling is important. As we saw in the earlier section, finding language to
define existentialism is at best difficult and at worst impossible. The themes of
existentialism have a way of being grasped obliquely rather than definitionally.3 As
languages other than English have multiple verbs for “to know,” where one indicates
knowledge of facts or information about an object while the other indicates acquaintance
with that object. Existentialism is a philosophy that requires one to become acquainted
with the themes in order to understand them. To understand what existentialism means
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The most sustained philosophical examination of existentialism by Wesley Barnes ends up admitting that
philosophy as it is done formally cannot assimilate existentialism. He writes, “in the sense of the formal
philosophical methods, existentialism turns out to be a complete failure” (viii), however, “the failure of
existentialism to meet the logical consistency required in philosophical thought and inquiry becomes the
very strength of existentialism. Its failure, in the philosophical sense, stems not from its being ‘right’ or
‘wrong’ from intellectual or moral standards. Its failure is one of language” (ix).
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when it describes the encounter with nothingness necessitates one encounter nothingness
oneself. Similarly, to grasp what Camus meant by the absurd is to experience the absurd.
It is at this point that we reach my definition for existentialism. In recognition of
what has come before, I will not lay out a set of tenets or beliefs that constitute
existentialism. Neither will I list a number of related themes. Rather, my definition points
to the starting point for the different expressions of existential thought. My definition is
this: Existentialism is the crisis that occurs when the human individual is forced to face
his or her finitude.
Most of the existential themes reveal a common interest in human limitation.
Contingency is the fact humans are limited in time and space. Individuality and
subjectivity is the fact that humans are limited to one, singular existence. Freedom is, in
existentialism, interested in the limitations of choice, with anxiety and anguish being the
result of being forced to make a choice. Death is the limitation of life. The absurd is the
limitations of understanding. Existentialism is, as William Barrett writes, interested in the
“not” in man, in the presence of nothingness that lingers underneath our most magnificent
achievements. It is in reckoning with these limitations that these three authors of the
British fin de siècle begin.
Thomas Hardy, Joseph Conrad, and G. K. Chesterton examine human finitude as
it is expressed by failure. For Thomas Hardy it is the failure of narration. For Conrad it is
the failure of communication. For G. K. Chesterton it is the failure of understanding.
These failures express themselves in the literary styles of these novels. For Hardy, it is
the inability to express female subjectivity without falling prey to the myths that threaten
her subjecthood. For Conrad, the failure of communication is expressed in the very
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difficulty of the text and in the opaqueness of the central phrase of the novel, “the
horror.” For Chesterton, the failure of understanding is expressed in structure of the plot
and in the paradox that our greatest enemy is also our greatest ally. But this brings us to
the next question.
Existentialism and the Novel Form
Kaufmann asks the question in Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, “could it
be that at least some part of what the existentialists attempt to do is best done in art and
not philosophy?” (49). If it is not clear yet, it is my stance that existentialism finds its
most eloquent and powerful voices in art.
Kaufmann is certainly not alone in asking this question. Gordon Marino argues
“Existentialism is an interdisciplinary movement that finds expression in three genres:
philosophy, literature, and psychotherapy” (xv). Felicity Joseph, Jack Reynolds, and
Ashley Woodward recognize that novelists “have been productively associated with
existentialism” (4). Steven Earnshaw sees “a certain ‘literariness to Existentialism” and
sees “a prevalence of novels and other texts in the canon of Existential literature” (1).
Wesley Barnes writes that “existentialism should be seen as mainly literary and
psychological in tone and operation” (vii) and later observes that existentialism is “far
more literary than philosophical” (10). Steven Crowell writes, ‘Existentialism was a
much a literary phenomenon as a philosophical one” (15), and Mark Tanzer argues
similarly that “existentialism crossed the boundary between philosophy and literature to a
greater extent than most philosophical movements did” (1). Thomas Hanna explains why
this is the case:
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[T]he lyrical quality...is not an accident but a necessity…it is unavoidable.
If they felt compelled to sing rather than to speak, it is because what they
had to say about the existence of man could not be directly told, could not
simply be described and thrown out to the listener. They have sung
because they were compelled to sing; they were poets made, not born. (7)
Hanna’s explanation here eloquently answers Kaufmann’s initial question. Because art
does not bear the burdens that philosophy must it is freed from the constraints of
definition and formal analysis to express human truth through other means. A novel can
communicate through other means and methods, through metaphor and through narrative
structure, through allusion and atmosphere, through other literary tools unavailable to the
philosopher.
So why am I arguing Tess of the D’Urbervilles, Heart of Darkness and The Man
Who Was Thursday should be considered existential novels? Hardy, Conrad, and
Chesterton show little familiarity with existential philosophers. Nietzsche gets the most
extensive treatment, and that treatment is none too flattering. And yet lack of familiarity
or explicit engagement with existential thought does not disqualify Tess of the
D’Urbervilles, Heart of Darkness and The Man Who Was Thursday from being
considered as part of the existential tradition. A precedent here can be seen in the
treatment of Fyodor Dostoevsky.
Most commentators on existentialism include Dostoevsky in their ranks. In
anthologies of existential texts like Gordon Marino’s Basic Writings of Existentialism,
Walter Kaufmann’s Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, Richard Gill and Ernest
Sherman’s The Fabric of Existentialism, Robert C. Solomon’s Existentialism, and The
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Continuum Companion to Existentialism edited by Felicity Joseph, Jack Reynolds, and
Ashley Woodward all contain excerpts from Notes from Underground, while Thomas R.
Flynn, Rivca Gordon, William L. McBride, Kevin Aho, Jonathan Judaken, Mark Tanzer,
Wesley Barnes and other scholars mention him in their analyses of existential thought.
Neither of these lists is exhaustive, but they are merely meant to illustrate that
Dostoevsky, and Notes from Underground in particular, are commonly considered part of
the development of existential thought.
Dostoevsky’s novel is taught in creative writing courses as one of the most welldeveloped, singular voices in fiction. The novella is structured into two halves, the first
an expression of the underground man’s view of life, the second an account of events in
the underground man’s life. These sections are about the same thing, something never
explicitly stated in either section. Both are expressions of an overly conscious man trying
to fight against a world that does not recognize his existence. This undercurrent leads to
the climax of the novel, where the underground man is forced to make a free choice.
In the first half titled “Underground” the underground man touches on a number
of the existential themes identified in the previous section. The underground man begins
by contrasting the man of action with the self-conscious man. The man trapped in endless
self-reflection cannot act, except perhaps out of spite. Thus the underground man focuses
on rebellion against natural science and mathematics, against being a piano-key or organ
stop (8-9, 21). He engages in talk of a primary or fundamental cause, similar to that of the
existentialist need to make a choice for the meaning of existence—even if that choice is
to be a sluggard or a glutton—to avoid inertia or what Sartre called bad faith. (12). He
rejects the notion that enough enlightenment and education will inevitably lead to human
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perfection (14). Denying the project of rationalism bears many similarities to existential
thought, that were mankind reduced to a set of mathematical propositions something
perverse, something human would cause him to act contrary to science and mathematics
out of spite. This is an extension of the concern with freedom of will and choice (18). But
despite all that the Underground man recognizes, there is something missing.
What that is gradually becomes clear in “À Propos of the Wet Snow:” the
underlying need to have his existence recognized, to gain what Simone de Beauvoir calls
reciprocity. The first few pages of the second section establish the underground man’s
isolation and alienation from his coworkers. His loneliness is so intense that he envies a
man getting thrown out of a window, and so he enters the bar in order to get into a fight,
to have his existence recognized through conflict. That does not happen, and he observes,
“I was not even equal to being thrown out of a window and I went away without having
my fight” (33). His treatment by an officer further intensifies his feeling of
insignificance:
I was standing by the billiard-table and in my ignorance blocking up the
way, and he wanted to pass; he took my by the shoulders and without a
word—without a warning or explanation—moved me from where I was
standing to another spot and passed by as though he had not noticed me. I
could have forgiven blows, but I could not forgive his having moved me
without noticing me. (34)
What follows is a psychological drama that takes place entirely in the mind of the
underground man as he strives to force the officer to recognize his existence. For several
years he tries to find a means of forcing the officer to do so, by writing a satire or by
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challenging him to a duel, but eventually settles on refusing to move aside when their
paths cross. After finally working up the courage to run into the officer, “He did not even
look round and pretended not to notice it; but he was only pretending, I am convinced of
that. I am convinced of that to this day!” (38). We, the readers, are not so convinced.
Nevertheless, this anticlimactic end to the underground man’s obsession ultimately drives
home the underground man’s sense of his own insignificance even further.
The theme is further developed in the next section. While the drama with the
officer is about forcing someone else to recognize his existence, the goodbye party for
Zverkov is about recognizing that his existence has value. The underground man rather
inelegantly forces himself into the going away party for Zverkov. While the underground
man sees reason to take offense at nearly everything, what really rankles him is that they
do not seem to show him the respect he feels he deserves. He resents that the attention is
on Zverkov instead of himself (never mind that the gathering is for Zverkov and that he
forced his presence upon them), and so he observes, “No one paid any attention to me”
(52) and “they seemed to have forgotten me altogether” (52). In order to force them to
recognize him the underground man refuses to join in with their toast and insists on
making his own in which he insults Zverkov. The underground man fails in his goal, and
the others proceed once again to ignore him. Finally, when they are about to leave, the
underground man tries once more for recognition:
“I ask for your friendship, Zverkov; I insulted you, but…”
“Insulted? You insulted me? Understand, sir, that you never, under any
circumstances, could possibly insult me.” (55).
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Zverkov puts his finger right on the underground man’s chief anxiety. The
underground man’s existence is of such little account that he is incapable of insulting
another person. Despite his best attempts the underground man is being forced into an
existential crisis, where he comes face to face with his own insignificance, his failure to
act with dignity, the limitations his own bitterness places on him.
This culminates with his interaction with Liza. Chasing down the men whose
party he has crashed, the underground man ends up in a whorehouse. After the deed is
done he becomes aware of her watching him and he finds her calm regard as
uncomfortable as he finds the disregard he suffered from earlier. Under her gaze the
underground man begins to speak, stumblingly at first. After some perfunctory questions
about her he begins to talk of death and mortality, without which one cannot truly reckon
with meaning and purpose. The underground man then begins talking of his having
daughters, of Liza being a wife, of how there can be joy in spite of pain.
There is of course no honor in what the underground man is doing. When he
expresses his thoughts, they are as ugly as everything else about his life. Despite the
insincerity of the underground man he is able to reach Liza. Thinking she is not taking
him seriously “an evil feeling” (68) takes possession of the underground man and he
proceeds to describe her future were she to stay on at the whorehouse. In the previous
picture, with a husband and a child, there are others to recognize one’s existence, a
reciprocity. In this other future she is reduced to her body as long as that remains young
and pretty, and then when she finally dies it will be with relief that they bury her. As the
underground man opines:
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They will scatter the wet blue clay as quick as they can and go off to the
tavern…and there your memory on earth will end; other women have
children to go to their graves, fathers, husbands. While for you neither
tear, nor sigh, nor remembrance; no one in the whole world will ever come
to you, your name will vanish from the face of the earth as though you had
never existed, never been born at all! (71-72)
The underground man is able to see in Liza’s situation what he is unable to see as
clearly in his: that underneath the anger and frustration at Zverkov, the young officer, and
the crystal palace is the need for human recognition. Channeling that longing into his
speech to Liza he is able to touch her, to get her to the point he is himself unwilling to
reach. His speech pushes her into despair, vividly expressed by her suppressed sobs, by
her thrusting her face into her pillow and biting it. As he is about to leave she shows him
a letter a medical student had written to her “because she did not want me to go away
without knowing that she, too, was honestly and genuinely loved; that she, too, was
addressed respectfully” (74). In other words, someone has recognized her humanity and
affirmed she has value.
The underground man does not recognize the existential crisis for what it is,
dismissing it as “sentimentality” and “womanish hysteria” (74). His address to Liza was
motivated out of spite, out of an attempt to impress her, to make her regard him. That his
speech should have a positive impact is accidental. After he leaves Liza he is gripped
with fear that she is going to show up at his door.
Why is he so terrified? The underground man recognizes that were Liza to show
up at his house he would be forced to make a choice, either to choose to engage in
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reciprocity with Liza, to let her see him as a fellow human being with all his faults, or to
reject her. If we look at Notes from the Underground as a whole we can see in the
underground man a pattern of inertia, of inaction. It takes him years to work up the
courage to bump into an officer. When he commits himself to disrupting Zverkov’s party
he is unable to turn aside as he knows he ought. He hates his manservant Apollon (and
clearly cannot afford him) but cannot work up the courage to dismiss him. When Liza
shows up at his door the underground man is forced to face up to who he really is. The
underground man has been able to avoid facing up to his personal ugliness by attributing
the worst possible motives and characteristics to those around him. Liza, however, is
immune to that. As a prostitute she is the lowest of the low, has no false airs, cannot be
dismissed as stupid or trivial. Unlike the other interactions there is no hidden battle for
superiority. Liza has let that egoism go. She is simply there because despite himself the
underground man has touched her humanity.
At both partings between the underground man and Liza he gives her something.
In the first instance he gives her his address, in the second he gives her money. The first
action marks him as an individual.4 When he gives her his address and asks her to come
visit him, he has left the impersonal experience of the brothel, of the man and the
prostitute, and turned it into something personal, unique, existential. The second giving
reverses all that. In addition to reducing Liza once again to a prostitute, there is
something intensely impersonal about handing Liza money. Money is a means of

The underground man’s address functions as an identifying mark. No one seems to know how to get a
hold of him (which constitutes Simonov’s excuse for not informing him of the change of time). Thus when
he gives Liza his address he is inviting her to his inner sanctum, for her to see him as he is.
4
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exchange, infinitely interchangeable, symbolizing a lack of individual humanity,
implying that humans are essentially interchangeable—like a piano key or organ stop.
The underground man cannot bear his own self. In the depths of his own anguish,
burying his face in a pillow in a mirror image of Liza, the underground man sees that he
can give himself a reason for existence, a purpose: I exist for Liza. The tragedy of the
underground man is not that the world never recognizes his unique, individual, singular
existence. The tragedy is that when somebody finally does, he cannot say yes.
Throughout the novella, the underground man has been a man of spite, a man
defined by negation. He asserts his individuality by saying no, no, no. As Nietzsche
describes it in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, there are three metamorphoses of the spirit: the
camel, the lion, and the child. The camel is the one burdened by duty; the lion is the
underground man. “To create freedom for itself and a sacred No even to duty: the lion is
needed for that, my brothers” (55). But the lion is not truly free. “To create new values –
even the lion is incapable of that” (55). All the lion can do is rebel, to say No, and this is
the underground man. But when Liza comes to his house, when she responds to the
underground man’s one true act of giving his address, he has the opportunity to become
something more than a lion, something more than spiteful. He has the chance to become
what Nietzsche calls the child. “The child is innocence and forgetfulness, a new
beginning, a sport, a self-propelling wheel, a first motion, a sacred Yes…the spirit now
wills its own will, the spirit sundered from the world now wins its own world” (55). The
underground man is given, by Liza’s coming to see him, the chance to break out of inertia
and to make the independent choice he has declared earlier as “a most advantageous
advantage” (15).
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Given the chance to have an existential break with his past, the chance to say Yes
to Liza and to give himself meaning and purpose, the underground man is paralyzed. He
cannot choose Yes, and he tries to avoid making a choice, tries to avoid responsibility,
but the existential truth is he is not free not to choose. His choice is No. When the world
finally recognizes his personhood, when he finally has a personal effect on the world in
the shape of Liza, the underground man cannot handle it. He is a failed existentialist. He
had a chance to act, a chance to choose, a chance to exercise his existential freedom, to
make something of his personal existence, and instead he backs away, and despicably
gives Liza the five ruble note. He attempts to make up for his inability to say Yes, to
make good on the promise to give Liza a meaningful existence by giving her money. He
slips back into anonymity, into the faceless mass of which money is a symbol. By
refusing the five rubles, by leaving them crumpled on the table, Liza asserts her
independence and underlines the underground man’s insignificance. He had a chance to
say Yes, to become significant, to assert his singular individuality, to give himself an
existence that mattered, and he could not. He failed, and became the underground man,
and now, years later, he is only able to rage and roar against an indifferent world.
In the very first section of the Notes the underground man observes, “I did not
know how to become anything; neither spiteful nor kind, neither a rascal nor an honest
man, neither a hero nor an insect” (2). At the end of the novel he observes, “[W]e are all
divorced from life, we are all cripples, every one of us, more or less. We are so divorced
from it that we feel at once a sort of loathing for real life, and so cannot bear to be
reminded of it” (90). He continues, “Why, we don’t even know what living means now,
what it is, and what it is called…We are oppressed at being men—men with a real
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individual body and blood, we are ashamed of it, we think it a disgrace and try to contrive
to be some sort of impossible generalised man” (91). The novel is bookended by
existential laments. Life is defined by the absurd, by what Camus calls “The divorce
between man and his life” (153). But there does not seem to be any answer, any way out.
The underground man admits not knowing how to make meaning out of existence. We
seem to have lost any understanding of what it means to live, what it means to exist. Our
recourse is to try to reject our individuality and become absorbed into the faceless mob,
the “generalised man.”
The irony of this existential nihilism is that the underground man had the chance
to define what living means.5 In this way Liza is the existential hero of the novel, the one
who has seen the void and made the choice to make her own meaning, to reject the
impersonal universe of equivalent exchange, of men who are piano-keys. Liza is capable
of selfless love.6 The underground man in contrast is incapable of love. Love, to him,
means “tyrannizing and showing my moral superiority. I have never in my life been able
to imagine any other sort of love, and have nowadays come to the point of sometimes
thinking that love really consists in the right—freely given by the beloved object—to
tyrannise over her” (88). Given his stance for freedom against all that would threaten it,
even against his own self-interest, there is a way in which the underground man’s
rejection of Liza’s love makes sense. If love means tyranny, then how could love be
freedom?

5

The danger in Notes from Underground is not that nothing has meaning, but that the underground man has
no personal meaning, hence the qualifier “existential.” The existentialists’ recognition of the danger of utter
nihilism will be relevant to Conrad and Chesterton.
6
See Joseph Frank “Nihilism and Notes From Underground” 32.
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What Liza reveals is that love is not the loss of freedom. Freedom is not a
severing from everything and everyone, a freedom from connections or obligations.
Rather, freedom is the freedom to make connections, to choose to become obligated.
Love does not have to be tyranny; rather in the choice to love another one can find
freedom. Freedom does not send one into an abyss. Freedom entails something you are
freed into as well as something you are freed from. Sartre’s condemned to be free touches
on this concept. Absolute and total freedom is impossible and indeed undesirable. If one
is freed from everything then one is not freed into anything. Freedom is the ability to
choose, and choice entails something that can be chosen.
The underground man is thus ultimately not free. As “À Propos of Wet Snow”
reveals, the underground man is a prisoner of his own neuroticism. None of the choices
he makes have the mark of freedom, none that is except his decision to give her his
address. But the underground man was unable to see that choice through. Love remains
an impossibility for him.
All throughout the novella the underground man has, in Joseph Beatty’s phrase,
been engaged in a “desperate attempt to establish his being” (197). But this desperate
attempt is made so by his failure with Liza. Notes from Underground reveals that it is not
enough merely to echo existential sentiments. When faced with the void of his being the
underground man cowers and projects, avoiding at all possible costs the necessity of
action. While he ultimately fails, his failure makes all the clearer the need to make a
choice, to say yes, to commit oneself to something in order to truly live. Were the
underground man to have simply chosen to love Liza the book would not have been
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written; the first section of the novel could not have existed. The angst and despair
underneath the underground man’s rhetoric would never have found voice.
By writing this as a work of literature Dostoevsky is able to achieve a poignancy
he would never have been able to achieve in a work of philosophy. The underground
man’s failure becomes the key to unlocking the existential heart of the novel. We must
see the underground man in all his spiteful and abject ugliness to see where the attempt to
establish one’s being can lead if one is unwilling to face the void at the center of man.
The underground man is too attached his own sense of moral superiority, too afraid of
what he will find, to confront his own nature.
The existential merits of Notes from Underground are not derived from a
philosophic consistency with Sartre or Camus or Heidegger or Jaspers. It stems instead
from a similar impulse towards asking what existence means. Trapped between the merits
of his rebellion against the Crystal Palace and the prison of his self-consciousness the
underground man captures the difficulty of finding meaning as crooked souls in an
indifferent and impersonal world.
A Productive Failure
Though the term “existentialism” would not be coined until eighty years later,
Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground is commonly considered the first existential
novel. Clearly, we academics are unconcerned with anachronistic labelling. Yet in
existentialism’s case the unconcern is even more justifiable. Existentialism is not a creed,
not a set of tenets for an individual to hold. The label “existentialist” is thus a useful
means of establishing an intellectual context for understanding a work. As Notes from
Underground is more richly understood in conversation with Sartre, Camus, Nietzsche,
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and other existentialists, so Tess of the D’Urbervilles, Heart of Darkness and The Man
Who Was Thursday are more fully understood if examined in the context of existential
thought. But the reverse is also true: we understand the existentialists better when we
have encountered the underground man. My project, then, is uninterested in merely
showing parallels between existentialists and Hardy, Conrad, and Chesterton’s works.
Instead, my project is interested in how these authors help us better understand the
existential vision of the world.
Notes from Underground is a fitting place to start because of the centrality of
failure to the work. Not only does the underground man fail to take the existential leap,
he also fails to come to an end and is cut off by the fictional editor. Because
existentialism is interested in finitude, that is in the limitations of humankind, it is fitting
failure becomes a central theme to the existential novel. The project of storytelling is
undertaken with the knowledge or sense it might never come to a satisfactory end.
Wesley Barnes’ account of existentialism’s failure as a philosophy being its greatest
strength finds merit here. As we sense a kind of nobleness in fighting for a doomed cause
if that cause is right, so existentialism and the struggle to define the meaning of an
unmeaning universe has a touch of nobility. As William Barrett writes:
The realization that all human truth must not only shine against an
enveloping darkness, but that such truth is even shot through with its own
darkness may be depressing, and not only to the utopians. But it has the
virtue of restoring to man his sense of the primal mystery surrounding all
things, a sense of mystery from which the glittering world of his
technology estranges him, but without which he is not truly human. (275)
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Existentialism takes into account the limitations of humankind. This recognition is
however its greatest strength. Existentialism takes as its starting point the Shakespearean
phrase “There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio/Than are dreamt of in your
philosophy” (1.5.166-167). By accepting as a starting point human finitude existentialism
has a unique ability to get at what makes us human. And yet existentialism has its own
limitations. Wesley Barnes identifies existentialism’s failure as a failure of language, that
what existentialism is trying to express is fundamentally inexpressible.
It is not an accident that the major existentialists turned to literature. These
thinkers, as we have already seen, were “compelled to sing rather than to speak…because
what they had to say about the existence of man could not be directly told, could not
simply be described and thrown out to the listener. They have sung because they were
compelled to sing.” Existentialism runs up against the limitations of language. The ideas,
the concepts, the themes of existential philosophy exist beyond our ability to express
them. Existentialism attempts to bring into philosophy the whole of the human individual,
in their fallibility, in the imperfection, in their irrationality, in the emotions, their moods,
their longings. For this reason, the themes of existentialism find a voice in literary form.
Existentialism is about a crisis and art has always been more effective at forcing
individuals to reckon with their humanity. Hardy, Conrad, and Chesterton’s narratives
force us to reckon with the anguish of the solitary individual struggling against their
limitations. For Hardy it is the struggle of the female personality for self-realization in a
world and a narrative that prevents her from achieving her aim. For Conrad it is the
struggle of a man attempting to communicate the single most important moment of pure
vision while simultaneously recognizing the impossibility of doing so. For Chesterton it
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is the struggle of the individual soul to reject solipsism and to reaffirm belief in truth and
beauty in a brutal and uncaring universe. These struggles are not the themes of analytic
philosophy, but they are the themes of life.
None of these books provide answers to the questions they pose. It is this that
makes them a productive failure. The reality of human finitude means that no book can
possibly explain human existence. These novels, like Notes from Underground end
without truly ending. They leave the reader with unanswered questions, with a sense that
there is something there even if it is not quite visible. That ambivalence is a characteristic
of the existential novel. The existential novel achieves its aim when the reader is left
wondering why they feel what they feel. The existential novel achieves its aim when
readers find themselves struggling to describe words the meaning they nevertheless felt.
The existential novel achieves its aim when the reader is confronted with their own
finitude, their own limitations, and is left asking, now what?
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Chapter I: Thomas Hardy and Existential Absence
Thomas Hardy’s Tess of the d’Urbervilles is, of the existential novels I will
discuss in this project, the one most similar in form to the Victorian realist novel. While
Conrad’s Heart of Darkness appears to anticipate the formal experimentation of the
modernists, and Chesterton’s The Man Who Was Thursday deviates from realism, Tess
feels like a late-Victorian novel. Hardy’s use of an omniscient narrator and focus on
social relationships make him seem, initially, formally consistent with Victorian-era
realism.7 In general Hardy is seen as deviating from his Victorian contemporaries in
theme rather than in form.
Ian Watt in The Rise of the Novel describes the novel as a form whose primary
break with tradition is a commitment to “truth to individual experience” (13). The novel
presents in “clear and easy prose” (30) plots about “particular people in particular
circumstances” (15) that are causally rather than coincidentally structured (22). While
this does explain why the novel was the preferred form of literary expression for
existentialists, it also raises the problem of what exactly is distinctive about the existential
novel. How does it differ from earlier forms of art? In other words, what about the
conventional Victorian, realist novel was inadequate to the needs of the existential
novelist?
To begin answering this question, we need to identify some of the features of the
realist novel. Building on Watt’s argument, Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth argues that realism
in the novel emerges out of a consensus, which relies on distance: “One must step back

Widdowson describes the critical tendency to focus on Hardy’s so-called flaws as a symptom of the
premise that Hardy is “really a practitioner of humanist realism…whose work is marred on occasion by a
perverse deviation from the characteristic features of such a mode” (“Critical Theory” 75).
7
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from particulars in order to grasp them” (35). She continues, “The implication of realist
technique is that proper distance will enable the subjective spectator of the subjective
consciousness to see the multiple viewpoints and so to find the form of the whole in what
looks from a closer vantage point like a discontinuous array of specific cases” (35).8
Francis O’Gorman adds that “a defining feature of Victorian realism as a practice of
writing is that it usually assumes a collective or universalist point of view” (118). This
explains why the role of the narrator in the realist novel is to be a surveyor of the action
of the plot. Explaining further, Ioan Williams writes that mid-Victorian novelists wrote
from the belief “that Reality consisted in the material and social world around them” and
“that unless the individual accepts that Reality lies outside himself and reconciles himself
to its pressure upon him he can never build a firm basis for personal morality or
happiness” (x). Katherine Kearns argues realist novels wrote “to teach the lessons of what
it means to function humanly within a world increasingly oriented toward orderly, largescale productivities” (5). Ian Watt, when he reflects on the veracity of claiming Defoe as
the founder of the novel form, identifies as one of the signature characteristics of the
novel the focus “on character and personal relationships as essential elements in the total
structure” (131).9
While the realist novel shares an interest in the individual with the existential
novel, it is interested in the individual in relation to the his or her milieu. The novel
focuses on the relationship between the individual and the broader community, between

8

As we will see, Conrad and Chesterton find different methods of challenging the viability of this attempt.
The context of this is Watt’s discussion of Defoe’s individualism and treatment of his characters as selfcontained units. This, he argues, prevents Defoe from being considered as the founder of the novel form.
Interestingly, Watt identifies Defoe’s concern with isolated individuals as a precursor to the existential
writings of Camus. He concludes that only Defoe “among the great writers of the past, has presented the
struggle for survival in the bleak perspectives which recent history has brought back to a commanding
position on the human stage” (133-134).
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the individual and the economic, political, cultural, and social forces. In order to
accurately portray this relationship, realist authors use narrators that approach the subject
from a distance. Thus, Ioan Williams can discuss the individual’s “unreflecting
consciousness” of himself as one part of an undivided, total Reality (xii). Katherine
Kearns makes the point more explicit by stating realist authors “cannot (and they know
that they cannot) afford to yield to the seductions of existentialist reverie” (5). According
to Kearns, the realist project is unaccommodating to existentialism.
If this is the case, what is Hardy doing in a study on the existential novel? A
number of critics, like Peter Widdowson, John Paul Riquelme, and Zena Meadowsong,
note that Tess deviates from traditional realism.10 Widdowson, for instance, argues Hardy
“had a consciously contradictory relationship with Realism” (“Critical Theory” 75); this,
he argues, makes Hardy “ineluctably ‘transitional’ between ‘Victorian’ and ‘Modern’”
(74). Hardy’s conflicted relationship with realism is picked up by other critics. According
to O’Gorman, “Hardy’s interest in modes of perception, frames of observation –
exemplified by The Hand of Ethelberta or Tess – included, at the amplest level, a
readiness to expose realism as a representation act based on choice. He helped make
realism self-conscious” (117). Tom Lloyd connects Hardy’s movement away from
realism to Conrad’s experimentalism: “In Tess of the D’Urbervilles, however, Hardy
emphasizes the breakdown of the realistic middle space created between experience and
its organizing tropes. He looks, as it were, towards the collapse of realism into

Other critics, like G. Glen Wickens, Lynn Parker, and Donald Davidson point out Hardy’s reliance on the
on the ballad for the structure of his plots. According to Davidson Hardy “wrote as a ballad-maker would
write if a ballad-maker were to have to write novels; or as a bardic or epic poet would write if faced with
the necessity of performing in the quasi-lyrical but nonsingable strains of the nineteenth century and later”
(12). Davidson later asserts, however, “this habit of mind is a rather unconscious element in Hardy’s art”
(15).
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kaleidoscopic visual moments in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness” (141). Despite these
critics’ observation of Hardy’s fraught relationship with realism, none of them claim
Hardy’s novel feature formal experimentation, but rather exhibit the tension between
Victorian realism and the Modernist sense that “realism” is impossible.
In this chapter, I argue that Hardy’s existentialism is developed in this tension
between realism and its impossibility. Tess of the D’Urbervilles is deeply concerned with
representing the subjective experience of its protagonist. This is paired with the realist
novel’s emphasis on the personal relationships. What we discover, though, is the
demands of the realist novel ultimately prevent the novel from representing Tess’s
subjective experience of the world. The novel is committed to representing Tess as a
“Pure Woman” whose tragic end is determined by the myths men use in an attempt to
control her. But as the novel unfolds, Tess’s vibrant personality and inner life are lost,
with her major choices taking place outside the narrative frame. The novel’s failure to
represent Tess’s subjective experience of the world clarifies the distinction between the
Victorian realist novel and the existential novel.
While the realist novel focuses on the individual in relation to her broader context,
the existential novel is interested in the individual in relation to herself. The existential
novel attempts to represent what Kierkegaard describes in The Sickness Unto Death:
“The self is a relation which relates itself to its own self, or it is that in the relation [which
accounts for it] that the relation relates itself to its own self; the self is not the relation but
[consists in the fact] that the relation relates itself to its own self” (269). Or, we can use
Heidegger’s description of Da-sein as a “being concerned about its very being” (10). The
development of a new existential form emerges out of this focus. The realist novel is, as
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Kearns says, at odds with the existentialists’ concern with the self in relation to the self.
Because of the realist novel’s commitment to representing the subject in relation to the
broader world, its capability of engaging in existential inquiry is limited.
Tess’s concern with Tess Durbeyfield’s relationship to the outside world causes
the novel to fail to develop Tess’s subjective experience of the world. Tess’s omniscient
narrator begins the novel with poignant existential commentary on Tess’s inner life, but
as the novel continues Tess is absorbed into her social context, and her subjectivity is
subordinated to the narrator’s concern with her relationships with men and her uncertain
position as a result of the industrial revolution’s impact on rural English life. The erasure
of Tess from the text of her novel undermines the novel’s stated aim, “A Pure Woman
Faithfully Presented.” The novel, whether intentionally or not, is a narrative about the
failure of representation. However, as we will see with Heart of Darkness and The Man
Who Was Thursday, the novel’s failure is a productive one. Tess’s failure to present
faithfully its subject reveals the lack of space available to female subjects. Industrial
growth, cultural myths, and narrative form all fail to make room for Tess to determine for
herself the meaning of her existence.
Tess of the D’Urbervilles in Context
In 1887 Queen Victoria celebrated the fiftieth year of her reign. The historian R.
H. Gretton observed, “The Jubilee was an occasion which prompted retrospects, and
every newspaper and review fell to taking stock of England’s progress during fifty years”
(212). Dominating this reckoning was the industrial revolution. This reflection, Gretton
wrote, “provided ground for almost unmitigated satisfaction” (212). The Monthly
Chronicle of North-Country Lore and Legend reprinted an article that proclaimed, “[T]his
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year is a Jubilee year in the industrial development of the North” (3). Later that year the
London Quarterly Review identified the source of England’s material progress as the
technological inventions of the 19th century, these “mechanical appliances which have
made this wonderful expansion and extension possible” (16). The London Quarterly
Review goes on to describe machinery as “that modern Midas which turns everything to
gold” (16).
A casual glance through Hardy’s novels would be enough to see Hardy’s interest
in a society in transition. The Mayor of Casterbridge turns around the technological
progress that would transform rural life. While these anxieties are not as pronounced in
Tess, Hardy nevertheless depicts the impact industrialization would have on a rural way
of life. In his critical autobiography, Martin Seymour-Smith writes of Tess, “throughout
the book she is seen as the feminine rural victim of male lust or misplaced idealism, and
of male industrialization” (433). The most sustained argument on Tess’s relationship to
industrialization is Zena Meadowsong’s essay “Thomas Hardy and the Machine: The
Mechanical Deformation of Narrative Realism in Tess of the D’Urbervilles.”
Meadowsong argues that “the principal culprit is precisely the historical situation” and
“The Machine enters Tess of the D’Urbervilles not only as the diabolical agent of
modernization but—driving the action of the novel and producing its effects—as the
primary determinant of novelistic form” (231). Reading the passage at Flintcomb-Ash
where the threshing machine is transformed into a monster, Meadowsong asserts “Tess is
doomed because the agricultural order that she personifies is doomed, and Alec’s
diabolical tyranny—his incessant objectification of Tess—is enforced by the fatal plot of
industrialization” (240). The effect of this technological progress is, according to Irving
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Howe, that “Tess as a woman, Tess as a distinctive person hardly exists; she has become
a factor in the process of production” (125).
Hardy’s existentialism emerges in response to the dehumanizing forces of
industrial progress. This concern marks Hardy’s other works, as in The Mayor of
Casterbridge where the appearance of a new industrial thresher becomes a key factor in
the movement of the plot. Simon Gatrell argues that one of the key features of Hardy’s
fictional Wessex is the passing of a way of life. He argues that Wessex takes shape
through Hardy’s description of communities’ traditional practices, “but so too does
Hardy’s fear that it was faced with overthrow” (23). The culmination of this, according to
Gatrell, is Jude the Obscure. Jude, after being orphaned, is “transported to a village
whose traditions have been stripped by modernizing Victorianism” (28). The tool of this
loss of tradition is the railroad. In a context where progress was on the whole viewed as
favorable, Hardy writes novels that reminds readers of the human cost of
industrialization. Arnold Kettle argues Tess of the D’Urbervilles’ subject is “the
destruction of the English peasantry” at the hands of capitalist farming (49). The novel
functions as a warning against too eager an optimism in technology and increasing
material prosperity to answer the deepest longings of the human heart.
In Tess of the D’Urbervilles the focus turns to the impacts of industrialization on
female subjectivity. The plot of Tess of the D’Urbervilles emerges from the recognition
that the social structures fail to provide rural women space, and that increasing
industrialization is closing off that space even further. Tess is a novel that ostensibly sets
out to give Tess the space she is denied by social forces, but ultimately the demands of
novel’s form deny her the chance to exercise her agency.
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Hardy’s Literary Existentialism
As I said in the introduction of this chapter, Tess of the d’Urbervilles initially
strikes the reader as part of the realist tradition. This initial impression is a result of the
use of an omniscient narrator and an emphasis on the individual’s relationship with the
broader world. While critics point to a variety of ways in which Hardy’s novel is not
“realist” in the purest sense, of interest to our development of Hardy’s existentialism is
his use of myth. Hardy combines myth with an omniscient narrator and an emphasis
Tess’s relationship with Alec and Angel. Each of these aspects operates on multiple
levels. The omniscient narrator both reveals Tess’s existential impulses and reduces her
to a symbol. Hardy uses myth not only as an inspiration for the structure of his novels,
but also peppers his narrative with mythic allusions. Tess’s relationship with Alec and
Angel reveals the way men attempt to control Tess’s existence, and reveals the absence
of choice for Tess within the narrative structure of the novel.
The use of the omniscient narrator makes Tess distinct from most existential
novels, which tend to privilege one character’s perspective, often choosing to write a
first-person narrative. Hardy uses this narrator to comment on the situation and larger
significance of the action of his novel. In this role Hardy expresses certain aspects of the
novel’s existential vision. While occasionally Tess gives voice to her own vision, much
of the time the narrator steps in to present her perspective. This choice is part of what
makes critical responses to Tess so complicated: the narrator occasionally erases Tess’s
subjectivity while simultaneously presenting that subjectivity as significant. The novel
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makes problematic its own relationship to its themes.11 The novel’s plot reveals the harms
of men’s attempts to control Tess while at the same time attempting to control Tess itself,
ultimately denying Tess space within the novel.12 As the novel draws to a close, Tess is
pushed out of the narrative and replaced with a black flag signaling her death. Thus, one
of the challenges of discussing Hardy’s existentialism is to elucidate the existential
commentary while simultaneously showing places where the narrator undermines Tess’s
ability to make an authentic choice.
The symptom of the narrative’s conflict with its themes is seen in the narrative’s
use of mythic allusion. In the narrative Angel, Alec and the narrator refer to Tess in
mythic terms, as Eve (130, 170, 323, 348), Artemis and Demeter (130), the whore of
Babylon (323), Faustina, Cornelia, Lucretia, Phyrne, and Bathsheba (370). Alec and
Angel’s use of myth is viewed critically by the novel. Alec uses myth to blame Tess for
his lack of self-control, while Angel is seduced into seeing Tess as a kind of Artemis or
Demeter and as a result does not treat her as an actual person. However, the narrator,
without irony, engages in the same mythic comparisons.
As a structural element, myth determines the direction of the plot. There is,
however, a lack of consensus on which myth forms the foundation for the novel.13 Even
if critics disagree on what form the myth takes or on its significance, they all see the
novel deliberately invoking a mythic dimension. Donald Davidson and Lynn Parker offer

See: “‘A Confusion of Many Standards’: Conflicting Value Systems in Tess of the d’Urbervilles” by
Bernard J. Paris (1969), “‘Pure Woman’ and Tragic Heroine?: Conflicting Myths in Hardy’s Tess of the
d’Urbervilles” by Lynn Parker (1992), and “The Deadly Misreading of Mythic Texts: Thomas Hardy’s
Tess of the d’Urbervilles” by Felicia Bonaparte (1999).
12
I am using the term space in line with Alex Woloch’s definition of character-space as “the intersection of
an implied human personality…with the definitively circumscribed form of a narrative” (13).
13
Felicia Bonaparte and G. Glen Wickens argue that Tess re-enacts the Persephone myth, Donald Davidson
and Lynn Parker argue that Hardy uses the ballad form, and Brigid Lowe argues that Hardy is creating a
new myth.
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the most convincing argument, which is that the narrative demands Tess play the role of
the seduced maiden from folklore, forcing her to play a prescribed role in the plot—
exactly that which she fears.14 This use of myth as a structuring element aligns Tess of the
D’Urbervilles with the other British existential novels. As Heart of Darkness and The
Man Who Was Thursday use allegorical elements, so too does Tess. And like the other
novels, as we shall see, the allegorical distinctions break down. Alec and Angel initially
appear as allegorical opposites: the devil and—in a demonstration of incredible
subtlety—the angel. However, the novel undermines this distinction: Alec and Angel
both fail to interact with Tess as an individual, human subject and like the narrative itself
understand her through predetermined roles.
With this collapse Hardy subverts the typical love triangle to develop the lack of
choice offered to Tess. In the typical love triangle, not unlike what Hardy uses in Far
From the Madding Crowd, one woman is pursued by two (or more) men that she has a
difficult time choosing between. This plot device gives the female protagonist the power
of choice (even if that choice must be within the framework of modern love). In Hardy’s
novel, however, the triangle between Alec, Angel, and Tess is used to highlight Tess’s
lack of freedom. There is never a point where Tess can choose one or the other. The force
of the plot leaves her very little autonomy. What little choices she has are poor choices
indeed. Early in the novel she has the choice to live with her rapist or leave to live with
her family as a young mother with an only child. Later, she has the choice to eke out a
miserable existence as a migrant worker or to become the mistress of her rapist. Finally,

When Tess tells Angel she has no interest in furthering her education, she explains: “Because what’s the
use of learning that I am one of a long row only – finding out that there is set down in some old book
somebody just like me, and to know that I shall only act her part” (126). Tess wants to preserve her sense of
freedom—even if it is merely an illusion.
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she has the choice to murder Alec and flee with Angel. Significantly, each of these
choices takes place outside of the action of the novel. We meet Tess again after she has
made these crucial decisions. We are not privy to the thought process by which she
makes these choices.15
What makes Hardy’s existentialism complicated is the difficulty in determining
how much of the novel’s vision is intentional. Hardy set out to show how the lack of
space afforded to women by cultural, industrial, and social forces. He succeeded, perhaps
beyond what he intended, by creating a narrative that itself limits the space afforded to
Tess’s subjective experience of the world. Laura Claridge observes that Tess’s actual
personality is at odds with the space afforded her in the novel. She senses an attempt by
the narrator “to downplay at best or, in some cases, suppress the startling portrait of Tess
as assertive, shrewd young woman that surfaces throughout at the expense of the novel’s
unity” (65). In the moments where the narrator, as Lloyd says, “delimits her” he observes
“no indication that we are to place this ironically, as there is about Angel’s hypocrisies
concerning Tess’s sexual history” (152). In contrast, Linda M. Shires argues, “In a text so
profoundly concerned with names, spoken and written words, and meaning, language
sometimes fails…But language does not fail because of narrative deficiency; it fails by
narrative design” (157). It is difficult, then, to deduce how much of Hardy’s literary
existentialism is intentional and how much of it emerges out of a sensitivity to subjective
human experience which his commitment to certain realist techniques overwhelmed.

The only choices we actually see Tess make is her decision to accept Angel’s marriage proposal and,
more significantly, her choice to tell Angel about her past. This latter choice happens twice: once in the
letter that fails to make it into Angel’s hands and once after Angel admits his past affair with a widow.
15
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Ultimately this question is periphery. The literary existentialism of the novel
emerges out of a despairing view of the social world: a world that has little no space for
female agency. The novel reproduces this reality by reducing the space afforded Tess
within the world of the novel. The narrative reproduces formally the violence that
happens to Tess within the text. The novel, as a faithful presentation, fails as Tess is
consumed by the narrative. Thus, the arc of Tess of the D’Urbervilles emphasizes not
Tess’s agency or her autonomy, but her absence.
The Narrator
The omniscient narrator of Tess of the D’Urbervilles is very present in the text.
Far from being an unbiased reporter of events, the narrator is prone to lecturing,
commenting on the action, and attempting to sway the reader’s understanding of the
events of the novel. In these reflections, the narrator paints in broad strokes a vision of
the world that matches existential views of contingency, being, and meaning. This
tendency not only to present but also to explain creates tensions between Tess’s
individual, subjective experience and the narrative itself. What we have is a narrative that
creates an existential frame but fails to create space within the text for the protagonist to
undergo her own existential journey.
The narrator of Tess of the d’Urbervilles emphasizes the random and accidental
nature of existence. When an individual is born, she is thrust into existence at a specific
time, in a specific place, and into a specific situation. Speaking of Tess and her siblings,
the narrator says:
All these young souls were passengers in the Durbeyfield ship – entirely
dependent on the judgment of the two Durbeyfield adults for their
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pleasures, their necessities, their health, even their existence. If the heads
of the Durbeyfield household chose to sail into difficulty, disaster,
starvation, disease, degradation, death, thither were these half-dozen little
captives under hatches compelled to sail with them – six helpless
creatures, who had never been asked if they wished for life on any terms,
much less if they wished for it on such hard conditions as were involved in
being of the shiftless house of Durbeyfield. (24)
While at first recognizing the way in which children’s quality of life depends on
their parents, the narrator then moves to reckoning with the way in which parents,
through the act of conception, thrust existence upon their children. Certainly Tess and her
siblings are “entirely dependent” on their parents for “their existence” in terms of the
circumstances they are in, but the very fact they exist is a result of their parents’ actions.
No one is asked before she is brought into existence whether that is something she
desires. Existence, then, is not a choice. As beings, we find ourselves already existing in a
specific situation.
That Tess’s consciousness is attached to her particular body is significant—that it
is this body and no other, that her parents are hers and no other, that she lives in Wessex
and not some other place, all these things have significance for Tess. The narrator is
creating an existential framework for the presentation of Tess. As Jaspers writes, “Man
finds himself determined in his concrete environment—in his nation, in mankind, in life
on earth, in the universe” (Humanism 72). Jaspers observes that existential questions are
connected to this specific situation: “I do not begin at the beginning when I ask questions
such as ‘What is being?’ or ‘Why is anything at all? Why not nothing?’ or ‘Who am I?’
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or ‘What do I really want?’ These questions arise from a situation in which, coming from
a past, I find myself” (“Situation” 53). Jasper’s point is that the existential questions are
not the starting point, and that existential thought always starts from a situation. Hardy’s
narrator shares with Jaspers an emphasis on human consciousness being anchored to an
individual that exists at a certain time and place.
Because existentialism emphasizes the individual’s free choice, it can be easy to
forget that existentialism also emphasizes the concrete embodied individual who must
make that choice. William Barrett observes the central subject of existentialism is “the
unique experience of the single one, the individual” (13). Simone de Beauvoir draws our
attention to the mystery of why our singular consciousness should inhabit one particular
body. Beauvoir calls “the bond that in every individual connects the physiological life
and the psychic life – or better the relation between the contingence of an individual and
the free spirit that assumes it…the deepest enigma implied in the condition of being
human” (269). Tess, because she is embodied, is anchored in time and space to Wessex
and to the house of Durbeyfield.
Hardy is not distinctive because his novels are about specific individuals in
specific situations; after all, Ian Watt’s definition of the novel identifies this as one of its
distinctive features. Similarly, Yi-Ping Ong argues in The Art of Being the emphasis on
situatedness is a feature of the novel form (165). What makes Hardy distinctive is the
narrator’s drawing our attention to the precarious nature of that existence. In the longer
passage quoted above Hardy describes the Durbeyfield children as “entirely dependent,”
“helpless,” and “captives.” Not only is existence accidental and therefore “precarious” in
the sense that the existence could easily not have been, but the existence possessed is also
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precarious in that it can be taken away. This sense reappears later when the narrator
reflects on Angel Clare’s growing interest in Tess: “This consciousness upon which he
had intruded was the single opportunity of existence ever vouchsafed to Tess by an
unsympathetic First Cause – her all; her every and only chance” (154).16 This
precariousness produces anxiety. The text describes her at different points as “agitated”
(152), “distressed” (171), and suffering in “palpitating misery” (178) while deciding
whether to accept Angel’s proposal of marriage. The limitations imposed on Tess by her
contingent existence give her choices added weight and significance because she can (and
in fact does) lose things that matter to her as a result of the choices she makes.17
The narrator’s commentary on Tess’s “single opportunity of existence” as “her
every and only chance” emerges out of a reflection on the nature of being. Earlier in this
passage the narrator observes, “Upon her sensation the whole world depended to Tess;
through her existence all her fellow-creatures existed, to her. The universe itself only
came into being for Tess on the particular day in the particular year in which she was
born” (154). This statement is radically subjective. The universe “came into being” when
Tess was born. Other people only exist (to her) because she existed first. On this
experience Jaspers writes, “Since existence is consciousness and I exist as consciousness,
things are for me only as objects of consciousness. For me, nothing can be without
entering into my consciousness” (57). Like Jaspers, Tess’s narrator implies that,
subjectively speaking, the world only exists insofar as she is conscious of it.

As we will see, it is significant that the passage that seems most to emphasize Tess’s subjective
experience of the world is couched within Angel’s perspective. As affirming as it is of female subjectivity,
the novel seems to imply that the male perspective is still primary. So while this passage might appear to
emphasize the importance of Tess’s choices, it instead emphasizes Angel’s.
17
For instance, Tess loses the possibility of life with Angel twice: once because she tells him about her past
and once because she murders Alec.
16
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Despite this articulation of the subjective, individual, personal nature of Tess’s
experience of the world, the narrator often steps in between the reader and Tess. Part of
this is a function of the narrative genre. Penny Boumelha argues Tess “is not merely
spoken by the narrator, but also spoken for. To realise Tess as consciousness, with all that
that entails of representation and display, inevitably renders her all the more the object of
gaze and of knowledge for reader and narrator” (47). As a fictional character Tess is
placed before the reader and the narrator as an object of contemplation. Her subjective
experience is objectified through the process of narration.
We can see this play out after a conversation between Tess and Angel about her
fears. Tess, after some prompting from Angel to explain why she finds existence
burdensome, explains: “And you seem to see the numbers of to-morrows just all in a line,
the first of ’em the biggest and clearest, the others getting smaller and smaller as they
stand farther away; but they all seem very fierce and cruel and as if they said, ‘I’m
coming! Beware o’ me! Beware o’ me!’” (124). After Tess’s description of the weariness
of existence the narrator steps in to explain from Angel’s perspective:
She was expressing in her own native phrases – assisted a little by her
Sixth Standard training – feelings which might almost have been called
those of the age – the ache of modernism. The perception arrested him less
when he reflected that what are called advanced ideas are really in great
part but the latest fashion in definition – a more accurate expression, by
words in logy and ism, of sensations which men and women have vaguely
grasped for centuries. (124)
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While the phrase “the ache of modernism” is arresting, what is important here is that
while Tess expresses a rather poignant view of existence, the narrative prioritizes the
narrator and Angel’s understanding of Tess’s attitude over Tess’s understanding of
herself. We get reflections on Tess’s feelings about the world, but they are filtered
through another’s perspective. Angel’s interpretation of Tess’s words is prioritized over
her own understanding. It is the masculine vision which is privileged. This move
confirms Boumelha’s identification of a certain masculinity to Tess’s narrator. She
writes, “And so it is that all the passionate commitment to exhibiting Tess as the subject
of her own experience evokes an unusually overt maleness in the narrative voice. The
narrator’s erotic fantasies of penetration and engulfment enact a pursuit, violation and
persecution of Tess in parallel with those she suffers at the hands of her two lovers” (47).
Despite the insistence on Tess’s vivid, individualized subjectivity, the novel implies that
the educated, male perspective is the preferred one.
Perhaps the clearest expression of this tension between affirming Tess’s unique,
individual experience of the world while simultaneously erasing it happens after Tess
begins to recover from her abuse at the hands of Alec D’Urberville. After feeling the
desire “to taste anew sweet independence” despite her shame, the narrator observes, “She
might have seen that what had bowed her head so profoundly – the thought of the world’s
concern at her situation – was founded on an illusion. She was not an existence, an
experience, a passion, a structure of sensations, to anybody but herself. To all mankind
besides Tess was only a passing thought. Even to friends she was no more than a
frequently passing thought” (91). The accumulation of words, “existence,” “experience,”
“passion,” and “structure of sensations” encompass her as embodied consciousness. She
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is, as in she has being. But she is in a particularly human sense. She is a subject who has
desires and drives and a will she can exercise. But she is not pure consciousness. She has
a physical presence, as you can see by her “structure of sensations”—she interacts with
the world. But all these things that define her human experience are accessible only to
her.
This passage offers a profound existential affirmation of the existence of an inner
life while denying the significance of Tess’s inward sensibilities. Functionally, this serves
to replace Tess’s inward experience with the narrator’s interpretation of Tess’s relation to
the external social world to whom she is nothing but “a passing thought.” The irony is
there exists a significant group for whom Tess is “an existence, an experience, a passion,
a structure of sensations.” This group being, of course, the readers of the novel. In
addition, the number of books written on Tess indicates that Tess has been far more than
“a passing thought” for generations of literary scholars.
The narrator’s dedication to showing readers how little concern the world has for
Tess is matched by the narrator’s gradual loss of concern for Tess’s inwardness. Early in
the novel readers are presented with sense of Tess’s rich inner life. After her child’s death
Tess “philosophically noted dates” of significance to her life, anniversaries whose
significance emerges in how they were “individualized by incidents in which she had
taken some share” (98). This habit leads her to a revelation:
She suddenly thought one afternoon, when looking in the glass at her
fairness, that there was yet another date, of greater importance to her than
those; that of her own death, when all these charms would have
disappeared; a day which lay sly and unseen among all the other days of
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the year, giving no sign or sound when she annually passed over I; but not
the less surely there. When was it? Why did she not feel the chill of each
yearly encounter with such a cold relation? …Almost at a leap Tess thus
changed from simple girl to complex woman. (98-99)
The narrator implies a significance to this realization. All the other markers of maturity—
motherhood, tragedy, loss of innocence—are not what brings Tess “complex
woman[hood].” Instead it is the knowledge and realization that one day she will die, that
her life is marked by finitude. In fact, Tess sees her death as having more significance to
her than any other date: more significance than her birth, her rape, the birth or death of
her child. The knowledge her life has an end point opens up for Tess the possibility of
authentic, free existence symbolized by her decision to leave her parents’ home to work
as a dairymaid at Talbothays.
As the novel continues, the emphasis on Tess’s inner life seen in this passage
fades. As I mentioned in the previous section, most of the significant choices Tess makes
in the novel occur outside of the text. When we meet Tess again after Alec has raped her,
she has already made the decision to leave (75, 76). In the final section of the novel, titled
“Fulfillment,” Tess’s subjectivity and inner life is noticeably absent. The section begins
with Angel returning to England, and when Tess makes an appearance it is filtered first
through Angel’s perspective and then through the perspective of Alec’s landlady. The last
time we saw Tess she had told Alec to leave her before wishing she were dead. Now she
is Alec’s mistress (378). A few pages later, from the perspective of the landlady, we
discover she has murdered Alec (382). It is jarring for there to be this distance. Tess’s
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subjectivity is suddenly inaccessible. The space the narrative had given her is gone, and
the reader is struck with this absence.
This erasure of Tess is paired with an erasure of agency. There is not space in the
novel for her to make her decisions. But the narrator goes further: not only does the
murder take place offstage, but Hardy revised the novel to emphasize Tess’s passivity.18
Lynn Parker points out that the manuscript version of the discovery of Alec’s murdered
body
portrays an energy in Tess’s act of murder that is absent in the final
version of Tess. Tess originally drives the knife full into Alec’s heart, and
her confident claim “‘I have done it well’” suggests both her vitality and
her decisiveness. In contrast, the final Tess barely accomplishes the act of
murder, confessing that she does not know where the energy of her actions
came from (278)
She concludes, “Hardy’s alterations, which bleed off this energy, however, weaken
Tess’s credibility as murderer because she seems barely capable of fulfilling the action”
(278). Not only does the novel not give space to Tess’s choice, the narrative seems intent
on draining the action of the finality of a choice. As Lynn Parker goes on to argue, “[T]he
extent and consistency of Hardy’s changes, from the power of the blow to Tess’s
exhilaration after the murder, suggest that he sought to limit or control Tess’s powers of
action” (278).

In her article “Tess’s Purity,” Mary Jacobus illuminates these differences. In the manuscript Alec “has
been stabbed—the carving knife is sticking up in his heart” and “The knife had been driven through the
heart of the victim” (334). These are lessened to “He has been hurt with the carving knife” and “The
wound was small, but the point of the knife had touched the heart of the victim” (334, 335). Tess’s reaction
to the murder is similarly softened. In the manuscript she wears “a triumphant smile” instead of “a pitiful
white smile” and tells Angel “I have done it well” instead of “I have done it—I don’t know how” (335).
18
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In combination the lack of space given to Tess and the revisions’ erasure of Tess’s
decisiveness imply that the novel cannot accommodate Tess’s existential journey.
Despite the occasional appearance of a vibrant personality, the narrative of Tess closes
off the reader’s ability to share Tess’s subjective experience of the world. Because of the
demands of the plot Tess’s existential journey is interrupted. The narrative denies Tess
the ability to decide for herself the meaning of her existence, mimicking the way in which
she is denied existential self-determination by her social, economic, and cultural
situation.
Tess and Mythic Determinism
In Tess of the D’Urbervilles the lack of space in the social and novel worlds for
Tess’s subjectivity is evidenced in the novel’s use of myth. The novel’s invocation of
myth, especially mythic allusions, imply that Tess can only exist within defined patterns
of being. This tendency to understand Tess via myth is most visible through Angel, and
then to a lesser extent through Alec and in the narrator’s voice. Tess herself explains the
significance of this use of mythic frameworks when she rejects Angel’s offer to tutor her.
She explains:
Because what’s the use of learning that I am one of along row only –
finding out that there is set down in some old book somebody just like me,
and to know that I shall only act her part; making me sad, that’s all. The
best is not to remember that your nature and your past doings have been
just like thousands’ and thousands’, and that your coming life and
doings’ll be like thousands’ and thousands’. (126)
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Tess fears studying history because she’s afraid that she will learn she is not unique: her
life’s movement follows predetermined patterns and the possibilities of her existence are
limited. It is with a tragic irony, then, that after this expression of longing for existential
freedom Angel’s response to Tess wishing to learn “why the sun shines on the just and
the unjust alike” is to decide that she “could only have caught up the sentiment by rote”
(126). Tess’s concern with the world’s injustice does not fit within Angel’s understanding
of her. His response is not to revise his understanding of Tess but to assume she is simply
giving voice to a question she has learned elsewhere. Myth impels those who use it to
erase Tess’s existential individuality.
Angel is unable to reconcile Tess with his imagined version of her. Simone de
Beauvoir discusses this type of reinterpretation in The Second Sex:
Thus, as against the dispersed, contingent, and multiple existences of
actual women, mythical thought opposes the Eternal Feminine, unique and
changeless. If the definition provided for this concept is contradicted by
the behavior of flesh-and-blood women, it is the latter who are wrong: we
are told not that Femininity is a false entity, but that the women concerned
are not feminine. The contrary facts of experience are impotent against the
myth. (267)
Angel consistently interprets his interactions with Tess according to mythic frames.
Echoing Beauvoir, Angel seems to value Tess most when she least resembles herself and
appears to take on universal significance. The narrator observes during their earlymorning meetings, “It was then, as has been said, that she impressed him most deeply.
She was no longer the milkmaid, but a visionary essence of woman – a whole sex
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condensed into one typical form. He called her Artemis, Demeter, and other fanciful
names half teasingly, which she did not like because she did not understand them” (130).
He views her not as a woman, but as Woman. She has become a physical manifestation
of the “Eternal Feminine.” She is “a visionary essence of woman – a whole sex
condensed into one typical form.” This is not merely the sense of isolation or the feeling
lovers have of being the only two souls who matter: when Tess is transposed into a
symbol of Woman she becomes more significant. She gains value by losing the various
qualities that make her herself.
This attitude towards Tess reflects Angel’s biases towards the abstract, the
transcendent, and the ideal and away from the concrete, the particular, and the individual.
The narrator observes, Angel “was, in truth, more spiritual than animal” (192). He is
described by one of Tess’s fellow dairymaids as “too much taken up wi’ his own
thoughts to notice girls” (112), and Tess “At first…seemed to regard Angel Clare as an
intelligence rather than as a man” (125). Angel is one of a number of intellectuals that
populate Hardy’s Wessex. These figures often cause pain to those they live among. The
problem, William Barrett explains, is “intellectuals are the embodiment of reason, and
reason itself if cut off from the concrete life of ordinary mankind is bound to decay.
When the head is too far away from the body, the head withers” (135).
The symptom of Angel’s severance from the “concrete life of ordinary mankind”
is his inability to notice details. When the readers are reintroduced to Angel at
Talbothay’s dairy, the narrator says, “Angel Clare rises out of the past not altogether as a
distinct figure, but as an appreciative voice, a long regard of fixed, abstracted
eyes…Nevertheless, something nebulous, preoccupied, vague in his bearing and regard,
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marked him as one who probably had no very definite aim or concern about his material
future” (113-114). There is a lack of definition to Angel Clare. He is not “distinct,” is
“abstracted,” “nebulous,” and “vague.” The use of the word “material” to describe
“future” emphasizes Angel’s disconnect from his embodied existence. This lack of
concern is reflected in the way he interacts with the outside world. As previously seen,
Angel’s preoccupation with his own thoughts prevents him from noticing the girls at
Talbothays. The narrator reiterates this aspect of Angel, observing that “he was ever in
the habit of neglecting the particulars of an outward scene for the general impression”
(119). Tess herself is even at first “the merest stray phenomenon to Angel Clare as yet – a
rosy warming apparition, which had only just acquired the attribute of persistence in his
consciousness” (129). Angel’s habits of retreating into his mind cause him to ignore Tess
on more than one occasion. After Tess makes an observation, the narrator informs us
“Clare was not particularly heeding” (201), and earlier his “revived thoughts of his father
prevented him from noticing her particularly” (173).
Angel’s prioritization of the intellectual over the actual prevents him from
developing an authentic relationship with Tess. There is not space within his mental
framework for the reality of Tess’s personality. He continuously approaches her as an
example of a type rather than as the actual milkmaid he interacts with. When he is first
growing intrigued by Tess, Angel observes: “What a genuine daughter of Nature that
milkmaid is!” (120). The narrator continues, “And then he seemed to discern in her
something that was familiar, something which carried him back into a joyous and
unforeseeing past, before the necessity of taking thought had made the heavens gray”
(120). Almost immediately Tess ceases to be herself for Angel, but he instantly
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mythologizes her as a “daughter of nature,” as a remnant of a “joyous and unforeseeing
past” before philosophy, theology, and science. Angel is a representative of Nietzsche’s
claim in Twilight of the Idols: “Man created woman – but what out of? Out of a rib of his
God, of his ‘ideal’… (33).
It is his mental construction of Tess as a daughter of nature that prevents Angel
from taking her desire to know “why the sun shines on the just and on the unjust alike”
seriously. Angel, the narrator tells us, “looked at the unpractised mouth and lips, he
thought that such a daughter of the soil could only have caught up the sentiment by rote”
(126). It never occurs to Angel that Tess might have a reason for questioning the balance
of justice in the universe. Rather than ask her what she means or why she wants the
answer to that question, Angel preserves his image of her. As Beauvoir might say, Tess is
impotent against this myth. It is not the concept of an unspoiled daughter of the soil that
is wrong; Tess is. When Tess contradicts his understanding, Angel finds a way to
preserve his prior conception. In the hierarchy of Angel’s imagination, the actual Tess is
placed below his conception of her.
This explains why Angel ignores her attempt to tell him about her past (187), calls
her inexperienced when she wishes she had never been born (190), and later tells her
“You are a child to me” (191). Angel ignores, interrupts, and infantilizes Tess because his
idealized image has more solidity in his mind than the actual girl. Because Angel
understands what the daughter of Nature is, he therefore understands all he needs to know
about Tess. However, this image of Tess as the unspoiled daughter of nature only endures
because Angel is unwilling to listen. She remains the idealized country girl in his
imagination because he shows no interest learning more about the concrete subject in
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front of him. Beauvoir explains: “To pose Woman is to pose the absolute Other, without
reciprocity, denying against all experience that she could be a subject, a fellow human
being” (267-268). And later: “Here again we have to do with the substitution of a set idol
for actual experience and the free judgments it requires. For an authentic relation with an
autonomous existent, the myth of Woman substitutes the fixed contemplation of a
mirage” (275). Angel is constitutionally unable to recognize Tess as a peer: she must
always remain mythologized. This is why he is so quick to abandon her once he finds out
she is not the fresh-faced innocent maid he imagined her to be. She has destroyed the
myth, and his love was as shallow as the myths he relied on to understand her.
Beauvoir implies something deeper, something more significant to the existential
vision of Tess of the D’Urbervilles. What is lost in the myth of Woman, Beauvoir argues,
is individual women’s subjectivity and autonomy. Earlier in the same conversation where
Tess expresses her fear that she is merely following a predetermined pattern, Tess tells
Angel, “My life looks as if it had been wasted for want of chances!” (126). Tess’s sense
that the world has denied her the chances it has afforded Angel is partially the product of
class, but furthermore the product of gender.19 As Beauvoir says, “For a great many
women the roads to transcendence are blocked….They wonder indefinitely what they
could have become, which sets them to asking about what they are. It is a vain question”
(273). Societal structures and myths circumscribe women, denying them the possibility of
existential self-determination. For Beauvoir, when women are unable to choose they are
Beauvoir asserts, “[W]hen one offers the existent no aim, or prevents him from attaining any, or robs him
of his victory, then his transcendence falls vainly into the past – that is to say, falls back into immanence.
This is the lot assigned to woman in the patriarchate (267). The myths used to encode Tess cut her off from
any goal, to deny her the ability to define for herself the meaning of existence. The use of myths in Tess of
the d’Urbervilles shows how woman is conceptualized in a way that undermines her autonomy. This denial
of agency by the conceptual world is reflected by a similar denial of self-determination by the social world
and by the novel world.
19
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then unable “to make themselves anything” (273). They are “on the fringe of world”
(273) as the actual Tess is on the fringe of Angel’s consciousness.
For Angel, Tess is significant insofar as she reflects the Eternal Feminine, and for
that reason her actual history, her actual attitudes towards life, the pain of her existence
are unimportant. Because Tess’s symbolic meaning is more real to Angel than the actual
dairymaid, he can convince himself he loves her for her own sake: “It was for herself that
he loved Tess; her soul, her heart, her substance – not for her skill in the dairy, her
aptness as his scholar, and certainly not for her simple formal faith-profession” (165).
What the narrative reveals is that Angel does not love Tess for herself, or her soul, heart,
or substance. Angel loves Tess insofar as she represents the “daughter of Nature,” the
“visionary essence of woman,” the “Eternal Feminine.” But the myth of femininity is so
strong and so unchallenged that Angel does not recognize the gap between the Tess he
envisions and the Tess who actually exists.
The narrator’s description of Angel’s retreat into his mind after Tess’s confession
reveals his total unconcern with the concrete existent he has married:
Clare’s love was ethereal to a fault, imaginative to impracticability. With
these natures, corporeal presence is sometimes less appealing than
corporeal absence; the latter creating an ideal presence that conveniently
drops the defects of the real. She found that her personality did not plead
her cause so forcibly as she had anticipated. The figurative phrase was
true: she was another woman than the one he had desired. (244)
The narrator describes Angel’s love as “imaginative” and “ethereal”, more concerned
with the “ideal” than the “real.” Her “corporal presence” is in fact less appealing than her
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absence—because Angel does not truly love Tess. The narrator’s insistence on Tess’s
contingency is the counterpoint to Angel’s obsession with what Tess represents. We are
impressed with Tess as an individual, as a subject so that when Angel is unable to treat
her as one we sense the cruelty, whether intentional or not, that Tess endures because her
husband cannot reckon with a specific, individual “daughter of Nature,” one who has
subjectivity.20 Because his abstract understanding is more significant to him than the
concrete world he inhabits, Angel is unwilling and unable to see anything in Tess that
might not fit the innocent, pure, idyllic daughter of nature he imagines her to be. Thus he
is unable to respond appropriately to her expressions of pain, to what Hardy’s narrator
calls “the ache of modernism” in Tess.
Tess, for her own part, realizes that it is her “supposed untraditional newness” that
attracts Clare (128). Angel’s reaction to the boy with no surname shows a nostalgia for a
“joyous and unforseeing past,” for an unspoiled, natural existence. He wants to return to
the Garden of Eden. But “[M]an cannot go back to being what he has been” (Ortega y
Gasset 209), and “History has never allowed man to return to the past in any total sense”
(Barrett 26). It is unfair of Angel to look to Tess to return him to this imagined past, and
furthermore cruel of him to reject her when she no longer fits his idealized image.
Angel will never understand or recognize Tess for who she is because he is unable
to offer her the reciprocity Beauvoir sees as essential for true communion. He is too
rational, and in his rationality he finds himself, as Bonaparte says, “imprisoned in the

Barrett’s account of German idealism is useful here: “What cannot be thought…cannot be real. If
existence cannot be thought, but only lived, then reason has no other recourse than to leave existence out of
its picture of reality…reason has only one means of accounting for what does not come from itself, and that
is to reduce it to nothingness” (159). Because Angel cannot think Tess’s subjectivity, his only recourse is to
reduce it to nothingness.
20
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secular” (427). Angel can only see Tess as a deceiver, not as a human subject full of
passion and feeling, with fears and failures to go along with dreams and desires. Angel’s
pure realm of abstract thought can abide no sinner (apart from himself).21 Though he too
has had his failings, Tess’s seems worse: she has disrupted Angel’s contemplation of the
ideal, of the Eternal Feminine, by bringing in the dirt and grubbiness of reality.
It is the intrusion of reality that seems most offensive to Angel. When Tess begins
to fall for Angel, she is moving through “weeds emitting offensive smells…gathering
cuckoo-spittle on her skirts, cracking snails that were underfoot, staining her hands with
thistle-milk and slug-slime, and rubbing off upon her naked arms sticky blights which,
though snow-white on the apple-tree trunks, made blood-red stains on her skin” (122123). While Angel Clare is imitating his namesake and playing a harp up in the attic, Tess
is among the rank grasses. The contrast of heaven and earth is striking in this scene, until
Hardy points out that Angel plays the harp poorly. The two approaches are not shown as
equally valid, that Angel could find a woman who was as abstracted as himself, but rather
Angel is dreadfully hypocritical for expecting a woman devoid of touches of the earth.22
Writing on Kierkegaard, William Barrett comments, “The lover may become
more fascinated by his theory about love than by the person of the beloved and so cease
to love” (158). What we see in the romance between Angel and Tess is what happens
when one individual has always been more fascinated by theories about the beloved than

Angel’s failure is explained by Jaspers: “A man whose morality is rationalistically fixed, who is not so
much acting himself as passing judgments and making demands, lacks the experience of original living.
With moral pathos he will state supposedly compelling reasons for the results he applies to every case that
occurs. What he shows in his life: ethical actions, developed directly from principles and then exaggerated,
will be mixed with actions due to emotional drives and instinctive cunning. As himself such a man cannot
enter into communication” (Vol. II, 81).
22
Angel, after all, lived with a woman for a while in a similar (and rather more willing) manner as Tess did
with Alec. Yet while he excuses himself, he cuts off Tess and leaves her to travel halfway across the world
with no regard for her wellbeing.
21
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the beloved herself. It is symptom of this love that Angel spent months romancing Tess
and never once asked himself why Tess expressed such a dark view of the universe, never
wondered if some tragedy had cast a pall on the world for her.
Set up against the myth of the eternal Feminine, the reality of Tess cannot hope to
win Angel over. When Tess tells him, “I thought, Angel, that you loved me – me, my
very self!” (228), at least Angel has the self-awareness to respond, “the woman I have
been loving is not you” (229). He does not have the self-awareness to recognize the
harmful mythicization he has engaged in: “Here was I thinking you a new-sprung child of
nature; there were you, the exhausted seedling of an effete aristocracy!” (232). Angel
replaces one myth for understanding Tess with another. While one is coded as “good”
and the other as “ill,” both are equally harmful. Tess is neither the “new-sprung child of
nature” nor “the exhausted seedling of an effete aristocracy;” she is, as he cannot see,
Tess. Which is, understandably, what she tells him to call her when he calls her by
mythic names (130).
The use of myths to understand women is deeply engrained. As Beauvoir
explains:
Everyone can draw on myth to sublimate his own modest experiences:
betrayed by a woman he loves, one man calls her a slut; another is
obsessed by his own virile impotence: this woman is a praying mantis; yet
another takes pleasure in his wife’s company: here we have Harmony,
Repose, Mother Earth. The taste for eternity at bargain prices and for a
handy, pocket-sized absolute, seen in most men, is satisfied by myths. The
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least emotion, a small disagreement, become the reflection of a timeless
Idea; this illusion comfortably flatters one’s vanity. (272)
Beauvoir’s description of men’s “taste for eternity at bargain prices” and a “pocket-sized
absolute” fits Angel’s romance with Tess. It is important to recognize, however, that the
myths “Harmony, Repose, Mother Earth” are as harmful as “slut” and “praying mantis”
as both erase the actual woman. Even when Angel decides to return to her he does so
through mythic terms: “[H]e had seen the virtual Faustina in the literal Cornelia, a
spiritual Lucretia in a corporeal Phyrene; he had thought of the woman taken and set in
the midst as one deserving to be stoned, and of the wife of Uriah being made a queen”
(370). He still has not learned how to understand Tess, and is unsurprisingly shocked
when he finds out that due to the necessities of actual life she has become Alec’s
mistress.
Angel’s habitual reliance on myths to understand and explain Tess reveals the
way in which myths erase identity. The tragedy of Tess’s marriage is what results when
Beauvoir’s warning touches individual lives: “But to say that Woman is Flesh, to say
Flesh is Night and Death, or that she is the splendor of the Cosmos, is to leave terrestrial
truth behind and spin off into an empty sky. After all, man also is flesh for woman; and
woman is other than [not merely] a carnal object…Assimilating her with Nature is simply
a prejudice” (268). Tess of the d’Urbervilles reveals how the mythic frameworks for
conceptualizing women limit their opportunities for authentic existence. As Beauvoir
observes, “For many women, the roads to transcendence are blocked” (271). For Tess,
her husband’s mythologizing of her denies her the possibility of reciprocity, of being
recognized as a fellow subject, as a peer. Tess will never be seen as an equal: even as a
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new-sprung daughter of nature she is worshiped insofar as she lacks the education and
sophistication to appreciate what that symbolizes.
One might expect the narrator to set up a critique of Angel’s use of myth. After
all, it is part of a mindset that leads to his abandonment of her. However, the narrator falls
prey to similar impulses as Angel. As Lloyd observes of Tess:
Entoiled in a historical trace, which is given form by Alec’s lust, Angel’s
idealism, and the narrator’s metaphorical vision, she is pursued across
formless space, as it were, by the forms others would impose on her and it.
She is at once forced onto nature as essentially pure, yet is transfixed by
the very setting of boundaries this entails. In this sense, her rape is
reenacted throughout Tess, as she tries but is unable to create an identity
through differentiation on her terms. (145)
Lloyd writes later, “Hardy depicts not so much a real woman as an idealized conception
of her: that is, his representation is several times removed from experience, codified in a
philosophical matrix framed, as it were, by the prefaces in which he implicitly
acknowledges the fictiveness of the purity he defends” (152). Like Angel, this is seen in
the narrator’s use of myth.
The narrator also falls into Angel’s habit of describing Tess symbolically. She,
her sisters and her mother form “a picture of honest beauty flanked by innocence, and
backed by simple-souled vanity” (51). When Tess is falling in love with Angel, “she
regarded him as Eve at her second waking might have regarded Adam” (170). When she
baptizes her baby the narrator describes her face “as a thing of immaculate beauty, with
an impress of dignity which was almost regal” (94), using language meant to recall the
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virgin mother.23 Finally, the narrator makes the dubious claim, “Beauty to her, as to all
who have felt, lay not in the thing, but in what the thing symbolized” (297). Like Angel,
the narrator looks past the concrete particular to the symbolic significance.24
Charlotte Thompson argues that the mythical impulse Angel and Alec have
infects the narrator: “In the minds of these compulsive interpreters, reality becomes
contorted to fix ancient stereotypes…This language seems to corrupt the narrative voice,
which begins free of it, as an innocent on a blighted star, and ends by succumbing to its
vernacular” (743). Even as the narrative reveals the harms of mythical approaches to
reality, the narrator still turns to myth. Thompson continues, “By pursuing this inclination
for a moment it is possible to observe how such mythic structures obey the second
directive of Hardy’s fictional universe: the tendency of tangible things to move toward
abstraction” (746-747). Like Angel, the narrator retreats from the concrete world towards
the symbolic and abstract. Tess at times appears less important than her role as
representative of a “pure” woman. George Wotton claims, “Hardy’s writing produces a
determinate view of the Victorian masculinist alter ideology of woman as the sexus
sequior. In this ideological construction woman appears in the image of her innate
difference” (38). In Wotton’s argument, the narrator falls into the contemporary Victorian
myths where her characteristics as a woman are “manifestations of the unfathomable

23

In earlier versions he also compares her to Cleopatra and Atalanta, making the call back to myth more
obvious.
24
The erasure of space afforded Tess is consistent with other descriptions of women: “A field-man is a
personality afield; a field-woman is a portion of the field; she has somehow lost her own margin, imbibed
the essence of her surrounding, and assimilated herself with it” (87-88). Unlike the men who retain their
personality, a woman is “a portion of the field” and is “assimilated with it.” As Bonaparte reflects on this
passage, “Women for Hardy in any case…are the essence of the earth” (Bonaparte 42). Kaja Silverman
comments that “the assimilation of figure into background means the abolition not just of hierarchy, but of
difference, and hence of identity” (143).
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mystery of her essential otherness” (38). The narrator undermines female subjectivity for
the sake of symbolism.
The use of these myths ultimately denies Tess her freedom. According to
Thompson:
By their persistence, these constructs determine men’s thoughts and
inevitably their lives. The accompanying language, perpetuated by the
desire to amplify experience, continually detaches itself from reality and
rises toward the ideal or toward the ideal or toward allegory, forcing
thought into those aesthetic categories that Kierkegaard saw as separating
man from his ability to see the unvarnished truth. For from impeding
imagination, this old language impels imagination, but impels it toward
predetermined ends. (744)
The narrator’s impulse towards myth puts him at odds with the existential insistence on
leaving the abstract world of ideas behind to engage with the concrete realities of
existence. Thompson’s invocation of Kierkegaard reveals what happens as a result. The
sense of a realized personality in Tess is lost in the narrator’s need to absolve her, to
assert her status as pure.25 The result is that Tess’s life follows the same patterns Patricia
Ingham is critical of this move: “The last minute addition to the novel of the subtitle ‘A
Pure Woman’, though peripheral, deflects attention from the meanings that Tess herself
conveys, by attempting to rehabilitate her under the old womanly category” (83). The
phrasing of the subtitle, “A Pure Woman” emphasizes that Tess is representative of a

See “‘A Confusion of Many Standards’: Conflicting Value Systems in Tess of the d’Urbervilles” by
Bernard J. Paris and “Tess: A Less than Pure Woman Ambivalently Presented” by Laura Claridge.
25
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type. The novel is no longer committed to representing Tess as an individual, but instead
committed to asserting her as a “Pure Woman.”
Structurally, the narrator’s use of myth touches directly on Tess’s fear that her life
follows predetermined patterns, that her “doings have been just like thousands’ and
thousands’.” Davidson and Parker argue that Tess’s murder is determined structurally by
the novel’s faithfulness to the ballad form. Davidson writes, “Tess of the D’Urbervilles,
whatever else she may be, is once more the deserted maiden who finally murders her
seducer with a knife in the effective ballad way” (17). Parker invokes Davidson’s
argument to explain why Tess remains a murderer throughout Hardy’s revisions despite
the feeling expressed by Hardy’s contemporaries and later critics that “Tess is a poor
candidate for a murderer” (279). She observes, “the inevitability of Tess’s story becomes
located within the constraints of an earlier tradition” (279). This, however, creates
problems for the novel.
If Tess is fated to fulfill the role of ballad maiden, regardless of her
intrinsic “purity,” Hardy’s claim in the preface to the fifth edition, that
Tess’s “enterprises and hopes” are not ended by seduction is misleading.
Like the ballad maiden, whose fate arises from the seduction itself, Tess’s
“enterprises and hopes” are only a prelude to her inevitable final act of
murder. (280)
Despite her expressed longing for the freedom of choice, the folk mythology of the ballad
prevents Tess from achieving any sort of authenticity. The sudden distance the narrative
creates between reader and Tess in the final section also makes sense given this
imposition of the ballad narrative. The glimpses of Tess’s subjectivity within the
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narrative do not indicate a woman capable of murder, and so the narrative erases her
subjectivity in an attempt to preserve narrative unity.
The narrative’s loyalty to the ballad plot combined with Charlotte Thompson’s
argument on the narrator’s appropriation of mythic language both indicate the way the
novel gradually closes off the space available to Tess. Most of the narrative reflections on
Tess’s inner life as an individual subject take place early in the novel. As the novel
progresses the possibilities available to Tess are closed off and all that is left is for her to
follow tired patterns of past generations. The further Tess travels into her narrative, the
more she is forced into playing the roles created for her by a patriarchal and classist
society. As Patricia Ingham writes, “Murder and execution as the only available
expression of autonomy speak for themselves as to the real limits of agency for a fallen
woman” (88).
Tess reveals the way in which existential choice—the ability to define for oneself
the meaning of existence—is denied women, especially poor women. Tess’s autonomy is
erased by men forcing women into symbolic roles, like Angel, by narratives adhering to
predetermined patterns, like the novel itself, and—as we will see in the next section—by
men abusing their social capital. Laura Claridge’s contention that Hardy and his critics
suppress an “assertive, shrewd” portrait of Tess makes sense given the arc of her story.
Despite her best hope, and despite the intensity of her subjectivity, Tess finds no room to
exercise her freedom. As Tom Lloyd says, Tess “cannot control her narrative” (156).
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Caught in the myths written for her and the meanings defined by those myths, Tess is
unable to make her own meaning.26
Existential Absence
Understanding the literary existentialism of Tess clarifies Tess’s relationships
with Alec and Angel. It is easy to see Alec and Angel as diametrically opposed figures in
the life of Tess Durbeyfield. In many ways the novel suggests for the reader to view them
this way. Alec is described using the devil-like imagery, while Angel is named, well,
Angel.27 As Bonaparte observes, “All of this, however, seems so excessive we must
conclude one of two things: Hardy is either pathetically clumsy in the creation of his
characters and in devising imagery for them—which some have actually concluded—or
he is teasing us by mirroring, in these deliberate exaggerations, what he expects our
judgments will be” (426). While I agree with Bonaparte that Hardy is playing with his
readers, I disagree with her conclusion that Tess should have married Alec. Instead of
reversing expectations, the novel reveals Angel and Alec are not so different as the
imagery suggests they are. As the omniscient narrator, ballad plot, and mythic allusions
work to reveal Tess’s lack of freedom for self-determination, so too does Tess’s social
relationships with Alec and Angel. Instead of giving Tess the chance to exercise her

What about various existentialists’ use of myth? Kierkegaard used Abraham, Nietzsche used Apollo and
Dionysus, and Camus used Sisyphus. It is important to recognize the difference between male and female
situation. A man, Beauvoir asserts, never begins by establishing himself as a man. It is the default state of
humanness (5). Because of this the myths told with male figures do not have the kind of prescriptive effects
that they do for women. Myths, she argues, “are explained in large part by the use man makes of them”
(272). Men are free from the confining features of myths because they are in a position to control the
meanings those myths produce. Women are not afforded this luxury. As Beauvoir writes, “They are on the
whole still in a state of serfdom. It follows that woman knows and chooses herself not as she exists for
herself but as man defines her. She thus has to be described first as men dream of her since her being-formen is one of the essential factors of her concrete condition” (156).
27
See Bonaparte 425-426
26
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autonomy, the social world in which Tess moves consistently demands she act according
to prescribed roles of behavior.
It is at this point I am going to assert that Tess was raped. While some critics have
suggested that Tess was a willing participant in her seduction, our understanding of how
men abuse their power over women makes it difficult for me to consider her relationship
with Alec to be consensual. For her to be willing implies that she has a choice, which is
an illusion perpetuated and sustained by the men in the novel.
An understanding of Tess and Alec’s relationship must begin with an
understanding of the imbalance of power between the two. Tess feels responsible for her
family’s financial difficulties, as their horse Prince died when she fell asleep driving the
cart, and so she reluctantly agrees to go “claim kin” with the D’Urbervilles. By coming to
claim kin, Tess is placed in a position of dependence on Alec. Her acute awareness of
this, as well as her inherent sense of the indignity of it, creates a dynamic that makes her
vulnerable and lessens her ability to resist his advances. This is depicted most
dramatically when Alec uses her fear of the speed of his gig to coerce her into giving her
a kiss: “He was inexorable, and she sat still, and D’Urberville gave her the kiss of
mastery” (56). While much has been made of Tess’s passivity, her failure at resistance is
more a function of Alec’s position of power over her than of any lack of will on her
part.28 So while she is still, it is Alec’s inexorability and mastery that are of more

28

Tess does, after all, resist, although ineffectually. She dodges his first attempt at a kiss (55) and wipes the
spot where he kissed her with her handkerchief (56). Finally, she lets her hat blow off in the wind as an
excuse to escape him (57). She is forced into deception and subterfuge because of the imbalance of power,
as de Beauvoir observes, like all oppressed people, women are “also taught from adolescence to lie to men,
to outsmart, to sidestep them” (271). It is Tess’s only recourse.
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significance here. Tess’s ability to resist is undermined by her position as a woman
dependent on a man.
Tess recognizes her own powerlessness in the situation into which she has been
forced. When Alec asks her why she hasn’t told him he has made her angry, she
responds, “You know very well why. Because I cannot help myself here” (69). Her
dependence on him as an employer has undermined her ability to offer resistance. This is
emphasized further after he asks if he can treat her as a lover: “I don’t know – I wish –
how can I say yes or now when—” (70). Far from being a sign of inherited passivity Tess
recognizes that her ability to say yes or no has no meaning. Yes and no can only have
meaning when they indicate a free choice, and Tess is not free. Choice is an illusion.
Without her answer, Alec “settled the matter by clasping his arm round her as he desired,
and Tess expressed no further negative” (70-71). What Tess wants, whether she says no
or not, has no meaning. Alec will do as he wishes.
While Alec is perfectly willing to use his power to force her to acquiesce, he is
angry when she reacts in instinctual self-preserving ways. When he frightens her by
driving out of control, he tells her he will stop if she kisses him. When she dodges him he
responds: “Now, damn it – I’ll break both our necks!...So you can go from your word like
that, you young witch, can you?” (55). Alec acts as though she owes him sexual favors,
when he has been using his position of power to coerce her into giving them. She is a
“witch” for daring to resist his advances. As noted earlier, Tess’s passivity is a result of
her relative powerlessness. Alec has all the power here, as indicated in his “kiss of
mastery.”
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Alec’s other actions indicate a desire to keep the imbalance of power. His gifts to
her family and his offer of money, and later of marriage, are designed to make her
obligated to him. Tess is keenly aware of this obligation and tells Alec she wished he had
not done so. Whether by fear or by kindness, Alec is nevertheless trying to control Tess,
to coerce her into doing what he wills. The methods may be different, but the motives are
the same. Even his statement, “I’ll never do it again against your will” (57) reveals that
she is dependent on him not to take advantage of his power. Her will only matters as far
as he respects it, which as the narrative shows he fails to do.
Because he is a man, and a wealthy powerful man, she ought to respond in a
certain way to his interest in her. Alec views himself as the victim. When Tess apologizes
for scaring his horse in her fear of him, he responds: “‘I won’t pardon you unless you
show some confidence in me. Good God!’ he burst out, ‘what am I, to be repulsed so by a
mere chit like you? For near three mortal months have you trifled with my feelings,
eluded me, and snubbed me; and I won’t stand it!’” (70). Alec views Tess’s resistance to
his advances as an offense against him, as though she owes him returned affection. Class
certainly plays a role (hence his calling her a mere chit), but this is primarily gendered. In
his description of her treatment, snubbing, eluding, and trifling with his feelings, there is
not one moment where her agency is taken into account.
Tess realizes that her victimization is not unique, but part of what it means to be
female in her society. After the rape she leaves Tantridge. When Alec intercepts her, the
following exchange happens:
‘I did not understand your meaning till it was too late.’
‘That’s what every woman says.’
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‘How can you dare to use those words!’ she cried, turning impetuously
upon him, her eyes flashing as the latent spirit (of which he was to see
more some day) awoke in her. ‘My God! I could knock you out of the gig!
Did it never strike your mind that what every woman says some women
may feel?’ (77)
Alec’s response to Tess indicates that women are always conceived of as guilty. “That’s
what every woman says” carries with it the assumption that women are willingly
seduced. Tess’s response shows the absurdity of that point of view. It also shows that,
while he’s not relying on Classical mythology, Alec has his own myths he uses to read
Tess. Because Tess has little power to resist him, he reads her as willing.
Alec’s view of her as willing has little to do with her choice. Tess is sexually
available because her face is beautiful. She is the source of danger, not Alec’s
unwillingness to control his sexual desire.29 During his period of religious fanaticism, he
makes much of the fact that simply because of the proportions of her face and her body
she is a temptress. Tess is thus coded as guilty: “And there was revived in her the
wretched sentiment which had often come to her before, that in inhabiting the fleshly
tabernacle with which nature had endowed her she was somehow doing wrong” (310).
Tess has internalized the notion that she is partially at fault for the actions against her.
Because she is beautiful and because the female body’s beauty is sexualized, Tess

By reading Tess’s body as temptation, Alec lessens his culpability for what he did to Tess. Under the
guise of his newfound faith, Alec tells her to put her veil down. He explains his request: “It may seem harsh
of me to dictate like this…but it is better that I should not look too often on you. It might be
dangerous…Well women’s faces have had too much power over me already for me not to fear them! An
evangelist has nothing to do with such as they; and it reminds me of the old times that I would forget”
(310). Alec doubles down on this interpretation of relations between the sexes: “I fear you at moments – far
more than you need fear me; and to lessen my fear, put your hand upon that stone hand, and swear that you
will never tempt me – by your charms or ways” (311).
29
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believes her existence is inherently guilty. She is “doing wrong” merely by “inhabiting
[her] fleshly tabernacle.” Her sense that her continued, embodied existence is an immoral
act explains both her fancy for out-of-body experiences and her peace at her impending
death. To exist in her body is to be guilty. The only thing that can absolve her is for her to
leave her body behind.
Alec casually devalues Tess’s subjectivity. His experience, his sense of selfworth, is more important than whether she has to endure his taking advantage of her. Tess
clearly states her lack of interest, responding to his request that she swear not to tempt
him by exclaiming, “Good God – how can you ask what is so unnecessary! All that is
furthest from my thought!” (311). But, again, Alec ignores her clear statement of what
she wants: “Tess, Tess, I was on the way to salvation till I saw you again…And why then
have you tempted me? I was firm as a man could be till I saw those eyes and that mouth
again – surely there never was such a maddening mouth since Eve’s!...You temptress,
Tess; you dear witch of Babylon – I could not resist you as soon as I met you again!”
(323). All assertions to the contrary, Tess is still seen as purposefully tempting Alec away
from the faith. And like her husband, Alec turns to myths: she is Eve, the temptress, the
witch of Babylon.
These myths lay the fault of his boorish behavior at Tess’s feet. Her will is
subordinated to the myths used to define her, as the following dialogue indicates:
‘Why do you trouble me so?’ she cried, reproach flashing from her very
finger-ends.
‘I trouble you? I think I may ask, why do you trouble me?’
‘Indeed I don’t trouble you.’
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‘You say you don’t? But you do! You haunt me. Those very eyes that you
turned upon me with such a bitter flash a moment ago, they come to me
just as you showed them then, in the night and in the day!...The Gospel
channel is left dry forthwith; and it is you who have done it – you!’ (328329)
Tess’s will is continuously dismissed. Alec’s response to her legitimate question is to
fling it back at her. His mental obsession with her is more significant than her discomfort
at his physical presence. His disregard of her request to leave her alone is not justified by
the fact he thinks about her. Alec twists the meaning of her words; he takes the very real
distress she feels at being in the presence of her abuser and equates it with his sexual
fascination with her. Finally, he concludes by putting all the blame for his abandoning the
Christian faith at her feet. He is not responsible for his actions anymore—she is.
Alec finds himself able to defer responsibility because Tess’s subjectivity is
always subordinate to his. Alec displays a staggering lack of care for Tess’s feelings and
her wishes, and appears completely oblivious to his lack of respect. He does not seem
aware that she has feelings, desires, and a will. This can be seen by his dismissal of her
reasonable request he never come near her again:
‘Well – you will see me again.’
‘No,’ she answered. ‘Do not again come near me!’
‘I will think.’ (311)
His response here shows that Tess’s will has no significance to him. Her desire, that he
never approach her again, only has validity insofar as he chooses to respect it. Alec, of
course, does not choose to honor her request, a fact Tess is not shy in pointing out: “You
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have refused my last request, not to come near me” (314). The reason for his failure to
respect her is because he wants to marry her in order to right the wrong he did to her.
Alec destroys any nobility in this request when he tells her, “Will you not marry me,
Tess, and make me a self-respecting man?” (316). Alec is more concerned with his selfimage than he is with the sense of oppression Tess feels in his presence. His sensibilities
take precedence, and because he would feel better about himself were he to marry Tess
the fact she is made miserable by his presence is of no account.
The absence of choice in Tess’s relationship with Alec extends to the absence of
choice between Alec and Angel. The novel both denies Tess the freedom to choose one
or the other and reveals that the dichotomy between the two is a false one. The three
features of Alec and Tess’s relationship, the imbalance of power, the blaming of Tess for
her assault, and the erasure of her subjectivity, find parallels in Angel’s relationship with
Tess. As with Alec, there is an imbalance of power in their relationship. Angel is of a
higher class, highly educated, and male. Angel, at least, recognizes this imbalance of
power:
Do I realize solemnly enough how utterly and irretrievably this little
womanly thing is the creature of my good or bad faith and fortune? I think
not. I think I could not, unless I were a woman myself. What I am, she is.
What I become she must become. What I cannot be she cannot be. And
shall I ever neglect her, or hurt her, or even forget to consider her? God
forbid such a crime! (218)
The irony is of course that Angel does neglect, hurt, and forget to consider Tess. But this
is understood in the context of Tess’s relative powerlessness. She is “utterly and
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irretrievably” dependent on Angel’s “good or bad faith.” Angel does to his credit
recognize the gendered nature of this power imbalance, admitting that he would not be
able to understand her position unless he were a woman. This glimpse of recognizing the
difference between the male and female stations in society is undermined by his view that
Tess’s identity, that her being, is wrapped up in his. The language, “What I am, she is.
What I become, she must become” denies Tess any freedom for self-determination, for
choice. Angel determines her existence for her.
That Tess willingly places her identity in the care of Angel does not make this
more palatable. Instead, her love and admiration serve to explain why she is so easily
victimized by Angel despite his intentions.
There was hardly a touch of earth in her love for Clare. To her sublime
trustfulness he was all that goodness could be – knew all that a guide,
philosopher, and friend should know. She thought every line in contour of
his person the perfection of masculine beauty, his soul the soul of a saint,
his intellect that of a seer. The wisdom of her love for him, as love,
sustained her dignity; she seemed to be wearing a crown. The compassion
of his love for her, by comparison, made her lift up her heart to him in
devotion. He would sometimes catch her large, worshipful eyes, that had
no bottom to them, looking at him from their depths, as if she saw
something immortal before her. (192)
While Tess’s view of Angel is badly misguided, the description reveals how dramatic the
imbalance of power is. Even if Angel does not consciously abuse it—or whether he is or
isn’t aware of how great that imbalance is—Tess’s absolute belief in him puts her at his
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mercy. The description of her love as “wisdom” and his love as “compassion” along with
her “devotion” and “worshipful eyes” cast Angel as a deity in Tess’s eyes.
Tess’s worship of Angel is a theme that carries through the novel. In the early part
of their courtship, “She loved him so passionately, and he was so godlike in her eyes; and
being, though untrained, instinctively refined, her nature cried for his tutelary guidance”
(181). After her marriage, “She tried to pray to God, but it was her husband who really
had her supplication. Her idolatry of this man was such that she herself almost feared it to
be ill-omened” (214). Later, when Alec accuses her of enslaving her mind to Angel’s, the
narrator observes her “triumphant simplicity of faith in Angel Clare that the most perfect
man could hardly have deserved, much less her husband” (321). Angel, when he finally
decides to return to her, reflects, “How her eyes had lingered upon him; how she had
hung upon his words as if they were a god’s!” (341), and the narrator turns to myth
himself and asserts, “He was still her Antinous, her Apollo even” (386). Then, most
significantly, Tess “adhered to the letter to orders which he had given and forgotten; that
despite her natural fearlessness she asserted no rights, admitted his judgment to be in
every respect the true one, and bent her head dumbly thereto” (340). While different in
quality—Angel’s power is to some degree one given to him by Tess—both he and Alec
consciously and unconsciously use that power to coerce Tess. For Alec, that is for sexual
favors. For Angel, that is remaking her into his feminine ideal.
Like Alec, Angel implies that Tess is responsible for her rape. His lack of
recognition of Tess’s relative powerlessness leads him to this conclusion. While he does
not say so as explicitly as Alec does, it is clear that he blames Tess for losing her
innocence. His insistence throughout the immediate aftermath of her revelation that the
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woman he loved was not her indicates that he views her lack of virginity as her fault.
That Tess feels it necessary to tell him of her ignorance when it happened shows Tess
recognizes that he is to some degree holding her responsible (232). He blames her “want
of firmness” (232) for what happened.
As much as Tess’s past offends him, what is a worse offense in Angel’s eyes is
the destruction of the myth of the unspoiled daughter of Nature. When Tess points out
that she forgives him for doing the same thing she has done—engaged in sexual relations
with another person—he argues, “Forgiveness does not apply to the case. You were one
person; now you are another. How can forgiveness meet such a grotesque prestidigitation
as that?” (228). Later he bemoans, “I thought – any man would have thought – that by
giving up all ambition to win a wife with social standing, with fortune, with knowledge
of the world, I should secure rustic unsophistication as surely as I should secure pink
cheeks” (237-238). Angel finds the loss of his innocent daughter of the soil
unforgiveable. To fit his ideal, Tess must still be a maiden. Because she no longer
matches with his ideal, she becomes unlovable and unworthy. Thus he is able to neglect,
hurt, and forget to consider her.
Angel, like Alec before him, erases Tess’s subjectivity. Earlier, before her
revelation, Angel has thought to himself, “It was for herself that he loved Tess; her soul,
her heart, her substance” (165). Tess attempts to point this out, “I thought, Angel, that
you loved me – me my very self!...Having begun to love ‘ee, I love ‘ee for ever – in all
changes, in all disgraces, because you are yourself. I ask no more. Then how can you, O
my own husband, stop loving me?” (228). Angel, however, simply repeats that the
woman he has been loving was not her. Angel either refuses to consider her for who she
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is or is incapable of doing so. Regardless, when he impresses on her the necessity of them
living apart he tells her, “Don’t think of me or of yourself, my feelings or your feelings”
(243), effectively telling her that her subjective experience of the world is of no account.
But by far the way Angel erases Tess’s subjectivity is by mythologizing her, by
painting over her person an ideal. This is why he keeps insisting that Tess is another
woman than the one he loved. To him that is true, and to him that is all that matters. Her
justified reproach of him falls on deaf ears. The difference between Alec and Angel is
that the latter sublimates through myth the same sense of entitlement and ownership of
Tess’s personhood. The difference, then, is that while Alec’s misogyny is obvious and
transparent, Angel disguises his with high-minded ideas. Angel convinces himself that it
is because of society, or respectability, or some other notion or principle, rather than
facing up to his disappointment in losing out on something that does not exist.
Alec and Angel are not antitheses of each other. While Alec and Angel appear on
the surface to be opposites, and Tess certainly treats them as such, the way they each
relate to Tess is remarkably similar. Both fail to recognize Tess for who she is and
instead treat her in terms of what they are able to get from her. Boumelha observes, “For
both of these male characters, Tess is representative of her sex” (57), and Kaja Silverman
argues that the gaze is always constructive: “Angel’s gaze may be more benign in intent
than Alec’s, but there can be no doubt that it is informed by a similar mandate” (132). For
Alec, Tess provides sexual pleasure; for Angel, Tess provides intellectual pleasure. Tess
of the d’Urbervilles conflates the physical and mythical, the sexual and intellectual to
show how in either case Tess is inevitably victimized. Instead of striking the reader in
how different they are, Alec and Angel should strike the reader as two different ways in
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which men take advantage of women.30 Whether knowingly, blatantly as Alec, or
disguised by high minded sentiments, the result for woman is tragedy.
Thomas Hardy and the Failure of Representation
Despite the novel’s stated aim of being the account of “A Pure Woman Faithfully
Presented,” the novel fails to deliver. The tensions between the impression of Tess and
the narrative which presents her begs the question whether a novel can actually be a
faithful presentation of a subject. The combination of an omniscient narrator, ballad plot
and mythic allusions with the novel’s social relationships creates a novel world that has
little room for the main character. Instead of being a striking narrative of Tess’s
existential journey, the novel emphasizes instead Tess’s existential absence. As Peter
Widdowson argues, “we know almost nothing substantive about Tess’s ‘character’, for
the novel never attempts to penetrate her secret being” (“Introduction” 19). The
occasional glimpses we do have only serve to make her absence more poignant.
This absence finds its most vivid picture in the novel in the depiction of Tess’s
death. Tess has been replaced by her “spiritualized image” (296) who is walking hand in
hand with Angel. They pause. “Upon the cornice of the tower a tall staff was fixed. Their
eyes were riveted on it. A few minutes after the hour had struck something moved slowly
up the staff, and extended itself upon the breeze. It was a black flag” (397). Tess’s
embodied existence has been reduced to a black flag waving in the wind. What space she
formerly occupied is now taken by her sister, implying interchangeability. The symbol of
the flag denies the singularity and significance of Tess’s existence. On the day Tess as a

Boumelha argues Alec and Angel are “precisely complementary,” showing how the similarities between
Alec and Angel extend to their use of transportation and fruit to gain Tess’s acquiescence. (58) Similarly,
Meadowsong argues that “Angel is not the anti-Alec but in fact a new version of him.” (238)
30
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young woman identified as having greater importance than any of her past experiences—
the day of her death—Tess herself makes no appearance but is doubly replaced by her
sister and a sign.
The novel’s failure to present Tess faithfully produces a poignant commentary on
the need to create space for female existential self-determination. Whether the novel does
this intentionally, where Hardy combines the realist novel with the ballad plot in order for
the narrative to fail, or unintentionally, where Hardy genuinely attempted to represent
Tess but chose forms that prevented him from doing so, the existential vision remains the
same. The failure of these forms to accommodate Tess’s subjectivity indicate the need to
invent new forms. In order for novels to present the individual’s existential journey the
novel needs to be remade. The failure of Tess of the D’Urbervilles sets up the formal
experimentation of Conrad and Chesterton. These authors pick up on Hardy’s use of
mythic forms, but instead of letting those forms lead to an existential failure these
novelists will set their allegories up to fail. Conrad and Chesterton’s existential vision
comes into fruition with the narrative destruction of the allegory. Hardy remains faithful
to the allegory with the result of the narrative destruction of Tess’s agency.
The tragedy of Tess, and what keeps readers and critics coming back to the novel,
is the injustice of Tess’s experience, and the way in which the world of the novel closes
in on her. That this young woman who has striven and struggled against her
circumstances should find her life concluded in her execution for murder grinds against
readers’ sense of how the world ought to be. Readers feel that there are glimpses of Tess
that persist despite the narratives attempts to disclose her. Tom Lloyd’s closing thought
on Tess are representative: “Yet the novel remains rewarding on affective and intellectual
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levels…Tess eludes the narrative placement that would make her merely the victim of
nature or man” (155). The “startling portrait” of Tess that Claridge identifies emerging
despite narrative pressure reminds us that there is a subject to be represented. The arc of
this subject’s representation within the text is tragic. As Shires observes, “The novel
takes her from being a she, to a collection of aspects, to an it, and ultimately to a
nothingness” (154-155). But the failure of representation in Tess points, strangely
enough, to Tess Durbeyfield. Her absence is felt keenly by readers because they suspect
the possibility of her presence. The narrator’s early concern with the accident of Tess’s
parentage reminds readers that her existence could have been different. The tragedy of
contingency is that this one was hers.
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Chapter II: Joseph Conrad and Existential Horror
While Tess of the d’Urbervilles bears similarities with the Victorian realist novel,
Conrad’s Heart of Darkness often finds itself categorized with the modernists. When
compared to Hardy’s novel, Heart of Darkness immediately strikes the reader as
something different from Victorian realism. The limitations of the realist novel revealed
in Tess lead to the narrative form of Heart of Darkness. There is no omniscient narrator
and thus no invocation of a universal perspective. Similarly, the novel demonstrates little
concern with individual’s place in the social world. When the larger social setting is
discussed, it is seen as denying those caught within its framework access to reality.
Kenneth Graham connects Conrad to modernism in the deployment of “personae and
narrative intricacy to provide a multiplicity of viewpoints that will conceal the artist yet
express his view – his sceptical view – of the world’s lack of fixed meaning” (206).
While with Hardy this project is interested in what makes the existential novel different
from the realist novel, with Conrad this project is interested in what prevents the
existential novel from simply being an expression of modernism.
Some of this difficulty arises from a lack of clarity on what literary modernism is.
In their book Modernism: Evolution of an Idea, Sean Latham and Gayle Rodgers begin:
What is modernism? This question has now beset, driven, and often
befuddled generations of students and scholars alike. It is not, however,
the question this book will answer. That’s because there is no such thing
as modernism—no singular definition capable of bringing order to the
diverse multitude of creators, manifestos, practices, and politics that have
been variously constellated around this enigmatic term. (1)
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Thus, my project is in danger of saying that Heart of Darkness does not belong to this illdefined category, but instead belongs to this other ill-defined category. Nevertheless, they
do argue, “The idea of modernism as a unified movement developed at the intersection of
two trends: the attempt to adumbrate a new aesthetic tradition…and a new attention to the
autonomy of form as the supreme marker of modernist art” (52-53). This new form was,
Laura Winkiel writes, “fragmented, allusive and indirect” and as a result aesthetically
difficult (2). Peter Childs adds, “Modernist writers therefore struggled…to modify if not
overturn existing modes and subjects of representation” (11). We might sum up this up
with Ezra Pound’s axiom to “Make it New.” While not a definition, we can usefully
identify formal experimentation and a self-conscious break with the past as key
characteristics of modernism.
Is Conrad self-consciously breaking with tradition? Is he interested in formal
experimentation for its own sake? This language does not seem to appear in his
descriptions of his art. In a letter to William Blackwood, Conrad wrote: “in its essence
[my work] is action…action observed, felt and interpreted with an absolute truth to my
sensations” (qtd. in Graham 204). In the Preface to The Nigger of the “Narcissus”
Conrad writes “art itself may be defined as a single-minded attempt to render the highest
kind of justice to the visible universe, by bringing to light the truth, manifold and one,
underlying its every aspect” (3). His hope is that in his art you will find “that glimpse of
truth for which you have forgotten to ask” (5). As we will see, the form of Heart of
Darkness was not meant as a break from tradition, nor conceived of as experimental, of
an attempt to “Make it New.” In fact, Graham notices Conrad shares many features and
aims with Victorian realism, notably a commitment to surface realism and the
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significance of individual moral choice (204, 205). These parallels between Conrad and
realist authors suggest that, like Hardy, he is caught between two traditions.31 While he
leans more modern while Hardy leans more Victorian, neither fit comfortably in either
tradition. Like Hardy as well, the features that place Conrad in this liminal space develop
out of his literary existentialism.
By bringing attention to the form of Heart of Darkness we can recognize how
Conrad fits within the broader tradition of existential thought.32 In the introduction to
this project, I defined existentialism as the crisis that occurs when the individual is forced
to face his own limits. Heart of Darkness, by confronting the reader with a narrative that
slips away from the narrator, creates the sense of going through an existential crisis.
Heart of Darkness creates its profound, powerful depiction of the angst, anxiety, and
dread of an existential crisis through Marlow’s inability to find language to describe his
experience. The failure of communication in Heart of Darkness paradoxically produces
the existential horror that lies at the center of the novel.
Heart of Darkness in Context
Ten years after England celebrated the nation’s progress over the 50 years of
Queen Victoria’s reign another celebration was in order. Dubbed the “Diamond Jubilee,”
the nation once again gathered to celebrate Queen Victoria. There was, however, a
different flavor to the celebrations. While empire played a role in the 1887 Jubilee, as

For more thorough examinations of Conrad’s relationship to modernism, see “Conrad and Modernism”
by Andrea White and “Modernism” by Michael Levenson.
32
Unlike Tess of the d’Urbervilles and The Man Who Was Thursday, there is a decent body of criticism
dealing with Joseph Conrad and Heart of Darkness in terms of existentialism. See “Language, Silence and
the Existential Whisper: Once Again at the ‘Heart of Darkness’” by Sanford Pinsker, “Conrad and Sartre”
by Wit Tarnawski, ‘Conrad and Sartre” by Adam Gillon, “Conrad’s Heart of Darkness and Kierkegaard’s
Existentialism” by Ewa Bobroska, Joseph Conrad: A Study in Existential Vision by R. J. Das, and
Conrad’s Existentialism by Otto Bohlmann. Most of these accounts simply notice similarities of language
or theme and do not clearly define what makes Conrad’s contribution to existentialism unique.
31
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historian R. H. Gretton noted, “The nation came to the celebration of the second Jubilee
in a different spirit from that in which it approached the first. It may be said that Queen
Victoria was herself the centre of the loyal enthusiasm of 1887, and that in 1897 the toast
was rather ‘Our Noble Selves’…The Jubilee of 1897 was imperial, and the source of
pride our vast territory and our possessions in men and money” (408). The cultural
context of Heart of Darkness is one which believed very strongly in the project of
imperialism, both that it was good and that England deserved preeminent place among
the nations.33
The difference in the two jubilee’s focus is reflected in the subject matter of
Thomas Hardy and Joseph Conrad’s novels. Gretton observes that the 1887 Jubilee
“produced a summing-up of the enormous advances in invention, means of
communication, and all the mechanism of modern life” (413) while the 1897 Diamond
Jubilee found “the presence of the colonial representatives at the review was the centre of
interest” (417). Greg King writes, “[T]he Diamond Jubilee would focus almost
exclusively on a celebration of the British Empire, and the queen’s role as its head” (King
19-20). The expansion of the Queen Victoria’s realm transformed her into a “mystical
symbol of empire” (King 43). While Hardy responds to industrialization, Conrad
responds to imperialism.
Conrad’s literary existentialism can only be understood in the context of these
positive beliefs about empire. Heart of Darkness was published just two years after
England paraded representatives of their colonies through the London streets. In the essay

C. De Thierry writes, “Unlike any other pageant of the same kind, [the Jubilee] developed from a great
spectacle into the embodiment of a great principle. Impregnated by the passion of a united people, it
brought forth the sentiment of nationality, and the British Empire ceases to deserve the sneer of its
detractors” (“Imperialism” 316).
33
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“On National Culture” Frantz Fanon writes, “the final aim of colonization was to
convince the indigenous population it would save them from darkness” (149). Heart of
Darkness reveals that not only must empire convince the colonized that they were being
saved from darkness, but empire must convince the imperialists themselves that they
were a necessary global force of enlightenment. Conrad reveals that this alibi is a lie. The
existential crisis at the core of Heart of Darkness has to do with Marlow’s choice whether
to make Europe face its image in Kurtz. The narrative of Heart of Darkness emerges out
of Marlow’s failure to communicate his experience to the Intended. Yet as he tries to give
voice to his experience, Marlow is forced to recognize the impossibility of
communication. Marlow’s failure recognizes the way in which the existential crisis
occurs beyond the bounds of language.
Conrad’s Literary Existentialism
The formal features of Heart of Darkness bear witness to the inability of
traditional forms to express the existential experience and, by extension, limit these forms
capabilities to operate as a critique of empire. The first of Heart of Darkness’s formal
features is the frame narrative. The novel opens on a boat where an unnamed “I” relates
to us Marlow’s story. The second feature of Conrad’s novel is Marlow’s narrative voice,
which features a number of distinctive stylistics that undermine clarity. The third formal
feature is an emphasis on atmosphere. Heart of Darkness relies on its readers’ affective
response to the text. The novel wants us to feel uncertain and uneasy. Existential horror
emerges out of the interplay between these formal elements.
The frame allows the development of Marlow’s distinct voice, which creates
much of the atmosphere of the novel, which in turn draws an occasional comment from
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the frame narrator. Together, these craft a reading experience radically different from the
realist Victorian novel. No longer is there an omniscient narrator who comments on the
action, draws symbolic connections, or controls what gets attention in the text. By
layering two first-person narrators and emphasizing moods over action, Heart of
Darkness suggests the knowledge an omniscient narrator implicitly claims is
inaccessible.
Nor does the novel suggest that the realist project is inadequate because of the
setting. When Marlow accuses his listeners of being incapable of understanding him
because they have spent their lives in Europe the implication is not that in Europe is
safety. Instead, the implication is that in Europe it is easier to avoid dispelling the illusion
of safety. Marlow challenges an unwritten interlocutor:
You can’t understand? How could you—with solid pavement under your
feet, surrounded by kind neighbours ready to cheer you or to fall on you,
stepping delicately between the butcher and the policeman, in the holy
terror of scandal and gallows and lunatic asylums—how can you imagine
what particular region of the first ages a man’s untrammeled feet may take
him into by the way of solitude—utter solitude without a policeman—by
the way of silence—utter silence, where no warning voice of a kind
neighbour can be heard whispering of public opinion. These little things
make all the difference. When they are gone you must fall back on your
own innate strength, upon your own capacity for faithfulness. (49)
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Out in the wilderness there is no social world that can cover up the abyss.34 Absent these
influences, the silence and solitude of the wilderness takes hold—one is “assaulted by the
powers of darkness” (49). The institutions of control that preserve the veneer of
civilization—policemen, psychologists, public opinion—allow us to ignore civilization’s
fragility.35 Similarly, the realist novel creates the illusion of solidity. By claiming the
ability to represent reality through narrative, the realist novel implies reality can be
contained and controlled. Heart of Darkness’s literary form implies that meaning, and
therefore reality, escape control.
The fragility of civilization suggested by the novel runs against English beliefs
about Empire. C. De Thierry wrote in 1897, “That destiny has made England the
colonising Power of modern times is beyond dispute” (“Colonial Empires” 151). The
language De Thierry uses of “destiny” and “beyond dispute” and even the capital-lettered
“Power” all indicate certainty. There is no doubt in De Thierry’s mind that England not
only deserves its empire but was destined to achieve global dominance. Nor was
England’s dominance seen as merely the natural result of strength. Empire was itself a
moral good. De Thierry describes England as “the light of the moral, social, and
intellectual world” (152), and in a similar vein Edward Dicey asserts England is “the
champions of Liberty, Enlightenment, and Progress, in every quarter of the globe” (667).
England is both example and emissary of civilization. England’s moral, social, and
intellectual achievements show the rest of the world what they ought to aspire to be, and

On the effect of the social world, Paul S. MacDonald observes, “In the ordinary course of events, this
absurdity or lack of reason for our existence and our anxiety in the face of this absurdity are concealed or
buried by our engagement in the social world in which conventional values are already in place” (39).
35
There are certain problems with how Marlow depicts and discusses Europe and Africa and seems to deny
civilization for the latter. See “An Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness” by Chinua
Achebe.
34
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this not only justifies England’s imperial aims but makes England’s pursuit of empire a
moral imperative.
Marlow explicitly counters these attitudes as he prepares to begin his story. As he
winds down his initial thoughts on England once being a land of savagery colonized by
an empire, he asserts that a nation’s “strength is just an accident arising from the
weakness of the others” (7). There is no destiny in Marlow’s description as there is in De
Thierry. The strength to build an empire is an accident. But it is the justification for
imperialism that serves as the impetus for Marlow’s tale. He asserts, “The conquest of the
earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different
complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look
into it much. What redeems it is the idea only. An idea at the back of it, not a sentimental
pretence but an idea; and an unselfish belief in the idea” (7). Marlow’s set up for his story
makes it an explicit commentary on the belief that empire was not only morally justified
but moreover morally required.
Immediately after Marlow refers to the justification of colonialism by “an
unselfish belief in the idea” the novel draws attention to its form. The frame narrator
steps in, drawing our attention to Marlow’s oral storytelling, and observes, “we knew we
were fated, before the ebb began to run, to hear about one of Marlow’s inconclusive
experiences” (7). The language of “inconclusive experiences” resists the confidence in
imperialism of De Thierry and Dicey. Heart of Darkness deviates from realism to
introduce uncertainty, confusion, and uneasiness. Conrad’s use of the narrative frame,
Marlow’s difficulties in expressing himself, and the novel’s invocation of an unclear,
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unimaginable, and incommunicable threat all work together to make the reader
experience existential horror.
The Frame Narrative
An existential crisis happens when habitual ways of being suddenly reveal
themselves to be inadequate. To create this narratively, Heart of Darkness deviates from
habitual methods of making meaning. The use of the frame gives Conrad a means of
commenting on Marlow’s tale from an outsider’s perspective without invoking the
authority of an omniscient narrator. Most of the frame narrator’s comments are warnings
about Marlow’s lack of clarity. For instance, when the narrator introduces Marlow he
observes, “The yarns of seamen have direct simplicity, the whole meaning of which lies
within the shell of a cracked nut” (5), before warning us that “Marlow was not
typical…and to him the meaning of an episode was not inside like a kernel but outside,
enveloping the tale which brought it out only as a glow brings out a haze, in the likeness
of one of these misty halos that, sometimes, are made visible by the spectral illumination
of moonshine” (5). In this passage, the frame narrator prepares readers for what is to
come. In contrast with a typical yarn, which might operate like a fable, end with a neat bit
of irony, or conclude with a happily-ever-after, Heart of Darkness leaves readers with, at
best, a vague sense of what the story means. The narrative’s commentary on itself reveals
that this is intentional and actually necessary for a narrative about an existential crisis.
The metaphors the narrator uses to describe the seamen’s typical and Marlow’s
unusual narrative styles mimic the way meaning is conveyed in both. The metaphor of
the kernel has the solidity of a nut while the metaphor of the glow is forced into
circumlocution. The second metaphor is almost as vague as the style it is intended to
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describe. What does it mean for meaning to be a glow, a misty halo? The answer is like
the metaphor itself: vague, unclear, hazy. It is a warning: expect to find yourself in a fog,
expect to come to moments where the meaning is not clear, expect to find yourself
confused, expect for the narrative to leave you in the dark. As James Guetti describes it,
“we encounter the idea of his language moving over the outside of an ‘episode,’
surrounding the episode but never penetrating it” (498). Meaning is a matter “of the
surface or exterior, while the reality—not Marlow’s artificial reality but the reality
beyond surfaces—is something deep within, something at the center that is not
approached” (498). Through the frame narrator, Conrad prepares us for the difficult,
winding, vague narrative that is to follow. We should expect to reach the end of the novel
feeling uncertain.
Marlow recognizes his story’s lack of clarity. He reflects on his experience: “It
seemed to throw a kind of light on everything about me—and into my thoughts. It was
somber enough too—and pitiful—not extraordinary in any way—not very clear either.
No. Not very clear. And yet it seemed to throw a kind of light” (7). The language of
Marlow’s description emphasizes the vague nature of the forthcoming narrative. The verb
“seemed” serves two purposes. The first indicates an emphasis on appearances and
surfaces, resisting that inner kernel of meaning. The second emphasizes, again, a lack of
certainty. This lack of clarity is emphasized by the story throwing “a kind of light on
everything.” While light is commonly used as a metaphor for knowledge, Marlow’s
description undermines the typical meaning of that metaphor. It is “somber,” “pitiful,”
“not extraordinary,” and finally, “not very clear.” He then repeats that final description,
emphasizing that of all the descriptions it is the lack of clarity that is most certain.
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The novel’s self-awareness does not render irrelevant criticisms like that of E. M.
Forster, who questions the existence of a point or a message to Conrad’s art. Forster
writes:
What is so elusive about him is that he is always promising to make some
general philosophic statement about the universe, and then refraining with
a gruff disclaimer…Is there not also a central obscurity, something noble,
heroic, beautiful, inspiring half a dozen great books; but obscure,
obscure?...These essays do suggest that he is misty in the middle as well as
at the edges, that the secret casket of his genius contains a vapour rather
than a jewel, and that we need not try to write him down philosophically,
because there is, in this particular direction, nothing to write. No creed, in
fact. Only opinions, and the right to throw them overboard when facts
make them look absurd. Opinions held under the semblance of eternity,
girt with the sea, crowned with the stars, and therefore easily mistaken for
a creed. (316)
Though Forster recognizes that Conrad is responsible for “half a dozen great books”, the
overall tone of this section is one of frustration and disappointment motivated by the
texts’ obscurity. Forster’s frustration is motivated by a sense that underneath Conrad’s
dense prose lies nothing worth grasping. Is Forster right, and Conrad simply a master of
narrative sleight-of-hand? Or do Forster and others after him reveal a profound
misunderstanding of Conrad’s work?
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While critics hint that Conrad’s obscurity is an artistic flaw, Conrad indicates that
the obscurity is intentional. 36 We must ask, then, what purpose does this obscurity serve?
In his preface to Nigger of the “Narcissus” Conrad writes, “My task which I am trying to
achieve is, by the power of the written word to make you hear, to make you feel—it is,
before all, to make you see. That—and no more, and it is everything. If I succeed, you
shall find there…perhaps…that glimpse of truth for which you have forgotten to ask” (5).
Conrad’s vision for his prose literature is that it be sensual, not a transcendent or abstract
play of ideas. This isn’t to say that Conrad is uninterested in ideas, in “truth.” What he
implies instead is that truth is only received in glimpses.
It would be disingenuous, then, to satisfy Forster with a clear articulation of his
philosophy. While the artist “like the thinker or the scientist, seeks the truth and makes
his appeal,” the truth that the artist pursues is not the same as the scientist or thinker.
Conrad explains, “Impressed by the aspect of the world the thinker plunges into ideas, the
scientist into facts—whence, presently, emerging they make their appeal to those
qualities of our being that fit us best for the hazardous enterprise of living” (3). But for
Conrad, the thinker and scientist are constantly in danger of being disproved. He
continues, “The changing wisdom of successive generations discards ideas, questions
facts, demolishes theories. But the artist appeals to that part of our being which is not
dependent on wisdom; to that in us which is a gift and not an acquisition—and, therefore,
more permanently enduring.” (3). The preface suggests that while science and philosophy

36

In his letter to Cunningham Graham Conrad recognizes his friend might miss the idea (293), and as we
have seen Conrad includes in Heart of Darkness several observations by both Marlow and the framing
narrator that indicate Conrad is well aware of the obscurity of his prose. It does not appear an accident that
the “vapour” Forster sees at the heart of Conrad’s genius is so similar to Conrad’s own metaphor of haze or
misty halo.
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are worthy exercises, they are ultimately flawed in that what passes for truth in both
fields is subject to the judgment of future discoveries. The artist, on the other hand,
“speaks to our capacity for delight and wonder, to the sense of mystery surrounding our
lives” (4). We would be hard pressed to find in Heart of Darkness much delight and
wonder, but we do find “the sense of mystery surrounding our lives” vividly portrayed.
The haze of Marlow’s story is intended to communicate some “glimpse of truth.”
Forster’s instinct is to look for something at the center, but the frame narrator suggests
that, rather than obscuring the center, the haze is the truth we seem to glimpse.
Heart of Darkness is interested in more than just communicating a sense of
mystery. It is invested in interrogating the nature of communication itself. The actual
action of the novel is a ship crew listening to one of their fellows attempt to tell a tale. By
narrating Marlow’s attempt to communicate in “real time,” the novel vividly depicts
Marlow’s struggle to communicate. At one point in the middle of the narrative Marlow
turns to his audience and asks a series of questions:
“Do you see him? Do you see the story? Do you see anything? It seems to
me I am trying to tell you a dream—making a vain attempt, because no
relation of a dream can convey the dream-sensation, that commingling of
absurdity, surprise, and bewilderment in a tremor of struggling revolt, that
notion of being captured by the incredible which is the very essence of
dreams….”
He was silent for a while.
“….No, it is impossible; it is impossible to convey the life-sensation of
any given epoch of one’s existence—that which makes its truth, its
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meaning—its subtle and penetrating essence. It is impossible. We live, as
we dream—alone…” (27)
This aside begins with a series of three parallel questions, moving from the specific
“him” (meaning Kurtz), to the broader, “story,” to the all-encompassing “anything.”
These questions add to the sense that Conrad has been building of a fundamental
epistemological uncertainty. It is interesting that Marlow uses the word “see” to describe
his listener’s response to his story, as this is the same verb Conrad emphasizes in his
preface to The Nigger of the “Narcissus” to describe his task as an author. What we have
in this quote is Conrad, through the voice of Marlow, questioning his own ability to
accomplish what he saw as his task.37
Marlow’s attempt to narrate his experience makes vivid the struggle to
communicate and the effect of that struggle on the speaker. R. A. Gekoski argues,
“Marlow is sharply aware that he was trying to express the inexpressible; his rhetorical
strategy is to invoke its inexpressibility—he constantly turns to the audience, challenging
them with the fact that they are simply not equipped with a depth of experience sufficient
properly to understand what he is trying to say” (63). But while Marlow does reference
the incommunicability of his life-experience, Gekoski’s other point, that Marlow is

Conrad’s emphasis on his apparent inability to make us see is one of the most discussed features of his
writing. C. B. Cox argues that “Conrad is deliberately creating a kind of writing which draws attention to
its own inadequacies” (34); Anthony Fothergill adds, “the narrator self-consciously draws attention to his
own activity, the difficult task of narrating meaning. Does the difficulty lie in conveying the experience to
others, or in the very ‘unknowableness’ of meaning?” (2). The result of this self-conscious reckoning with
the difficulties in telling a story is a strange realism, as Watt observes that “while we read we are, as in life,
fully engaged in trying to decipher a meaning out of a random and pell-mell bombardment of sense
impressions.” (179). Guetti observes, “Conrad knows very well what he means, but he knows also that
what he means is not enough; his insistence on unresolved paradox and the failure of language suggests
here, as elsewhere, that within the imagined world of his narrative there is a reality which escapes the
resources of imagination itself” (503). Marlow himself calls his attempt at communicating his meaning
“impossible,” that what makes an experience’s “truth, its meaning” is always beyond the reach of language.
37
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challenging his audience, is less certain. Marlow’s final, “We live, as we dream—
alone…” hardly reads as a challenge to the audience. Instead it is an expression of
loneliness, isolation, and alienation that carries a note of sadness. Marlow is forced to
face the impossibility of communicating the meaning of his experience even as he is
impelled to try.
Thus, the narrative simultaneously indicates there is a meaning while failing to
articulate that meaning. By making us aware of Marlow's struggle to communicate his
personal experience in Africa, we are made aware of the struggle to communicate
experience in general, particularly experience that is meaningful, impactful, or profound.
Guetti observes:
Marlow suggests throughout the story that at the center of things there is
meaning and that he is pursuing this meaning. And yet the intensity of
Marlow’s inquiries serves to emphasize the inconclusiveness of his
findings. Again and again he seems about to declare the truth about Kurtz
and the darkness, but his utterance most often takes the form of either a
thunderous contradiction in terms or a hushed an introspective ambiguity.
(488)
Readers are at the mercy of Marlow’s storytelling ability, and Marlow’s ability is suspect.
During a pause in Marlow’s story, the narrator says, “I listened, I listened on the watch
for the sentence, for the word that would give me the clue to the faint uneasiness inspired
by this narrative that seemed to shape itself without human lips in the heavy night-air of
the river” (27). Here we see a longing for clarity and the anxiety that results when clarity
is denied: the narrator waits for “the sentence” or “the word” that would explain his
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uneasiness. But as the narrator has already indicated, there is no word, no sentence, no
“kernel” for the narrator to grasp.
This commentary does not strike the reader as a clumsy attempt to signal the
appropriate response. By the time this observation appears, Conrad has already taken
advantage of the frame to disorient and confuse the reader. This happens with the very
first words Marlow speaks. He begins with, “And this also…has been one of the dark
places of the earth” (5). The first word is a conjunction, but there is no connection
apparent. The second word “this” is a pronoun with an indeterminant referent. The next
word is “also,” an enumerative, but again it is not clear what “this” is in addition to. “And
this also” implies a thought antecedent but we are not privy to that thought. Conrad
creates distance between the reader and the story, and this distance heightens the sense of
isolation for both Marlow and the reader. This disorientation is compounded by the
vagueness of the rest of the sentence. While we are able to figure out he is talking about
location, we are still not sure what Marlow means by “one of the dark places of the
earth.” While Marlow goes on to explain what he means, the distance between Marlow’s
thoughts and the words he speaks has been made apparent. Marlow’s tendency to refer to
thoughts he has not yet voiced emphasizes the gaps in our knowledge and reminds there
is much we do not know.38
The frame narrative stages Marlow’s failure of communication, which produces
the experience of epistemological uncertainty.39 This explains the obscurity that E. M.
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The first time Marlow mentions the Intended he speaks as if his listeners know who he is referring to, but
then later seems to forget he has mentioned her. The sense of the story being told in real time enables
Conrad to isolate both Marlow and the reader.
39
Richard Ambrosini claims that confronted with the “limitation of [Marlow’s] senses and intellect in their
confrontation with the wilderness” Conrad attempts “to overcome the communication gap between himself
and his audience by creating a suggestive language” (101). Direct communication is impossible, so
Conrad’s narrative works by communicating obliquely.
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Forster finds so frustrating about Conrad. For Forster to demand more solidity out of
Conrad is to ask Conrad to do the impossible. Heart of Darkness relies explicitly on the
sense of narrative insubstantiality, the sense as Marlow himself says, of the impossibility
of conveying the “life-sensation of any given epoch of one’s existents.” The “subtle and
penetrating essence” will always escape any attempt to render meaning through language.
Sanford Pinsker argues, “The story shows increasingly difficult attempts to reconcile fact
and language; its escalating anxieties about the nature of language culminate, strangely,
in a vacuum pregnant with meaning” (53).
Marlow’s Narrative Voice
The frame allows Heart of Darkness to present itself primarily as an oral
narrative. The sense of the story being told in real time, without the benefit of edits,
affects the linguistic style of the narrative.40 While critics like Ian Watt have discussed
Conrad’s style in terms of impressionism and what Watt calls “delayed decoding,” very
little attention has been paid to the distinctive speech patterns Marlow uses and what their
thematic significance might be. Marlow’s response to an unwritten accusation exhibits a
number of these stylistics:
“Absurd!” he cried. “This is the worst of trying to tell….Here you all are
each moored with two good addresses like a hulk with two anchors, a
butcher around one corner, a policeman round another, excellent appetites,
and temperature normal—you hear—normal from year’s end to year’s
end. And you say, Absurd! Absurd be—exploded! Absurd! My dear boys,
what can you expect from a man who out of sheer nervousness had just

40

Compare the impact that an audience has to Heart of Darkness to what happens without such an audience
in Notes from Underground.
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flung overboard a pair of new shoes? Now I think of it, it is amazing I did
not shed tears. I am, upon the whole, proud of my fortitude. I was cut to
the quick at the idea of having lost the inestimable privilege of listening to
the gifted Kurtz. Of course I was wrong. The privilege was waiting for me.
Oh yes, I heard more than enough. And I was right, too. A voice. He was
very little more than a voice. And I heard—him—it—this voice—other
voices—all of them were so little more than voices—and the memory of
that time itself lingers around me, impalpable, like a dying vibration of
one immense jabber, silly, atrocious, sordid, savage, or simply mean
without any kind of sense. Voices, voices—even the girl herself—now….”
He was silent for a long time.
“I laid the ghost of his gifts at last with a lie” (48).
In this passage are abrupt shifts in thought, digressions, repetition, and the use of the
pathetic fallacy, with this last characteristic part of the focus of the next section on
atmosphere. Together Marlow’s abrupt shifts, digressions, and repetition produce a
dense, difficult prose, with Marlow struggling to make his meaning clear.
The abrupt shifts in thought signal the difficulty Marlow has in translating his
memories into language. These abrupt shifts are sometimes indicated throughout by
dashes and ellipses. Here, Marlow begins “This is the worst of try to tell” but then leaves
off without finishing the thought and proceeds to describe the limitations of his audience.
Conrad uses dashes to indicate emphasis, Marlow struggling for words, or him getting
lost in thought. The last of these uses of dashes has much the same effect as the ellipses.
When Marlow leaves off in the middle of a sentence or speaks aloud his wandering
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thoughts we are made aware that this is a story told by a character, and as a result the
perspective is limited and finite. Our knowledge and understanding of the events of the
novel are filtered through Marlow’s perspective and Marlow’s language. These abrupt
shifts, signaled by dashes and ellipses, disorient the reader as Marlow refers to things the
reader cannot know and often moves on without explaining.
An example of how digressions operate is found after Marlow informs his
listeners he was wrong about missing the opportunity to hear Kurtz speak. He says, “Of
course I was wrong. The privilege was waiting for me. Oh yes, I heard more than enough.
And I was right, too. A voice. He was very little more than a voice.” Marlow reminds us
of an earlier statement that Kurtz discoursed rather than acted through a vague fragment,
“A voice” before adding “He was very little more than a voice,” which foreshadows the
condition Kurtz is in when Marlow meets him. He continues, apparently on the same
topic of Kurtz’s voice, by stating he heard Kurtz—presumably Kurtz is who Marlow
means by “him”— before adding “it.” But what does “it” refer to? Kurtz’s voice?
Something else? Then Marlow adds “this voice—other voices—all of them were so little
more than voices,” and it is clear he are not talking about Kurtz anymore. But what
voices he is referring to is never made clear. The “this” is a determiner, it is not certain
which voice he means by “this voice.” It could be “him—it—this” all refers to Kurtz, or
“it—this voice—other voices” indicates Marlow’s thoughts moving away from his
memories of Kurtz’s voice. We do not know.
The recurrence of “voice” and “voices” in this passage exemplifies Conrad’s use
of repetition. Repetition has a rhetorical history of being used for emphasis or for
clarification. In Heart of Darkness repetition reveals Marlow’s struggle to make himself
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understood. The repetition of “voices” here indicates Marlow’s memories, but Marlow is
not able to make that memory clear. The reader simply has an eerie sense of disembodied
voices. To build on this eerie lack of clarity, Conrad has Marlow use another type of
repetition to describe these voices, what I call contemplative parallelism, a recurring habit
Marlow has of describing things circuitously. As simply repeating the word “voices” with
indeterminate modifiers leads to no more clarity, neither does the accumulation of words
here. The “dying vibration of one immense jabber” is evocative, but Marlow does not
stop there and instead piles on more adjectives: “silly, atrocious, sordid, savage…mean.”
He finishes with a prepositional phrase “without any kind of sense.” Adding these
descriptions of the “immense jabber” serves to make the description less, not more, clear.
Conrad uses contemplative parallelism to obfuscate throughout the text. Marlow
tells us that the woods “looked with their air of hidden knowledge, of patient expectation,
of unapproachable silence” (56). Marlow attributes a personality to the wilderness, but
this personality is not made clear by his repetitive prepositional phrases. The wilderness
is “hidden,” “unapproachable,” and silent. Marlow’s repetition emphasizes an inability to
understand or make sense of the wilderness. The atmosphere Marlow creates is one of
confusion and incomprehension. Other moments of repetition build other sensations: “He
struggled with himself too. I saw it—I heard it. I saw the inconceivable mystery of a soul
that knew no restraint, no faith, and no fear, yet struggling blindly with itself” (66); “he
could not have been more irretrievably lost than he was at this very moment when
foundations of our intimacy were being laid—to endure—to endure—even to the end—
even beyond” (65); “This was the unbounded power of eloquence—of words—of
burning noble words” (50).
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Marlow’s confrontation with Kurtz indicates the purpose of the accumulation of
descriptions. After finding Kurtz crawling towards the natives’ fires, Marlow tells his
audience, “I’ve been telling you what we said—repeating the phrases we
pronounce…They were common everyday words—the familiar vague sounds exchanged
on every waking day of life. But what of that? They had behind them, to my mind, the
terrific suggestiveness of words heard in dreams, of phrases spoken in nightmares” (66).
Conrad uses dashes here, indicating Marlow is searching for the words to describe his
experience. The movement of the first two repetitions is from implied meaning to
unmeaning: “what we said” becomes “phrases we pronounce,” “everyday words” become
“vague sounds.” But the clearest use of parallelism is the description “of words heard in
dreams, of phrases spoken in nightmares.” Here the parallels are structurally clear: they
both use the preposition “of,” a participle modifying the object of that phrase, followed
by another prepositional phrase using “in.” The repetition does not add much in terms of
content. Marlow emphasizes the dreamlike nature of his experience. But the repetition
refines the atmosphere—the move from “dreams” to “nightmares” is a movement
towards fear. The reader is affected by this language, and Conrad is able to build a mood
that readers can sense even if they cannot pinpoint exactly what’s causing them to feel
that way.
Marlow’s narrative voice creates the impression of some idea, concept, or
meaning existing beyond Marlow’s clumsy attempts to put it into words. F. R. Leavis
contends that Conrad’s shifts, digressions, and repetition are “merely an emotional
insistence on the presence of what he can’t produce. The insistence betrays the absence,
the willed ‘intensity’ the nullity.” (178). What the frame narrative and Marlow’s
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linguistic style imply is that the insistence and the absence are intentional. Language is
meant to fail. To put Marlow’s experience in clear and precise prose is to define his
experience and therefore control it. This would prevent the experience from ever
becoming existential. Marlow’s attempt to put into words the meaning of his experience
forces him to confront his own limitations, and the distinct patterns of speech indicate his
struggle against the limits his own storytelling ability places on him. By dramatizing this
linguistically, by making readers sense the existence of something that cannot be put into
words, Conrad makes the failure of communication all the more poignant.
The Unseen Threat
Atmosphere refers to the reader’s affective response to the narrative. It refers to
the way language and form work together to create a certain feeling or mood in the
reader. The reliance on atmosphere to communicate meaning is existential. Camus claims
the existential method starts with the idea that “solely appearances can be enumerated
and the climate make itself felt” (12). The words “climate” and “felt” suggest that
existentialism operates by means of creating affective responses in readers through the
description of how things appear. Conrad reflects Camus through Marlow’s emphasis on
surface-truth. Attending to “the mere incidents of the surface” (34) causes reality to fade.
Marlow’s observance that his devotion to his craft had “surface truth enough…to save a
wiser man” (36) implies not only that looking past surfaces is impossible, but also that
the attempt itself is dangerous. There is an undercurrent in existentialism that suggest
existential inquiry is perilous. In other words, facing one’s limitations places the
individual at risk. Looking at Marlow’s habitual use of the pathetic fallacy, we can see
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how the novel invokes both the sense of incomprehensibility and the feeling that there is
something within the incomprehensible that is dangerous.
In the longer passage quoted in the previous section the pathetic fallacy is applied
to the memory itself. Marlow says, “[T]he memory of that time itself lingers around me,
impalpable, like a dying vibration of one immense jabber, silly, atrocious, sordid, savage,
or simply mean without any kind of sense.” The memory is personified. It “lingers,” in a
sense haunting Marlow. The disembodied nature of the voices is linked to the
incomprehensible jabber by the word “impalpable,” with both meanings of the word in
play. It is only after falling silent for “a long time,” Marlow explicitly references the
extended metaphor: “I laid the ghost of his gifts at last with a lie.” Implying the
supernatural, the sense of being haunted, helps build the uneasiness the frame narrator
describes. This ultimately leads to the final confrontation with the Intended, where the
sense of being haunted is much stronger and more explicit when Kurtz “lived then before
me; he lived as much as he had ever lived” (73) and “seemed to enter the house with
me—the stretcher” (73). Marlow hears again the voice of Kurtz, and “the memory of
what I had heard him say…those broken phrases came back to me, were heard again in
their ominous and terrifying simplicity” (73). Conrad foreshadows both the final
interview with the Intended and the atmosphere he will engender in that encounter.
The use of ghostly imagery further implies the existence of the unseen. This
feeling is made more explicit in Marlow’s use of the pathetic fallacy to describe the
wilderness. During a conversation with the brickmaker, Marlow describes the scene:
The smell of mud, of primeval mud by Jove, was in my nostrils, the high
stillness of primeval forest was before my eyes…All this was great,
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expectant, mute, while the man jabbered about himself. I wondered
whether the stillness on the face of the immensity looking at us two were
meant as an appeal or as a menace. What were we who had strayed in
here? Could we handle that big dumb thing, or would it handle us? I felt
how big, how confoundedly big, was that thing that couldn’t talk and
perhaps was deaf as well. What was in there? (26-27).
The wilderness has a face, but this face is ambiguous: is it an appeal or a menace? The
description is accompanied by three questions that emphasize the tenuous position the
two men have in the face of “that big dumb thing.” These questions emphasize the
fragility and the insignificance of the human figures. Their petty squabbles are contrasted
with the surrounding wilderness, which is “confoundedly big,” an “immensity” and
silent. Yet at the end of this passage Marlow is left describing a feeling instead of the
wilderness. He senses the presence of something in the wilderness, yet this
“confoundedly big” thing is not visible.
The thread throughout these personifications of the wilderness is the feeling that it
is watching and waiting. On the trip down, the African coast is likened to an “enigma”
that is “smiling, frowning, inviting, grand, mean, insipid, or savage, and always mute
with an air of whispering—Come and find out” (13). The wilderness is given a face and a
voice. On the steamer, Marlow notes, “And this stillness of life did not in the least
resemble a peace. It was the stillness of an implacable force brooding over an inscrutable
intention. It looked at you with a vengeful aspect” (34). The wilderness’s threatening face
is paired with a threatening patience. At the station Marlow observes, “And outside, the
silent wilderness surrounding this cleared speck on the earth struck me as something
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great and invincible, like evil or truth, waiting patiently for the passing away of this
fantastic invasion” (23). This observation is repeated just before the steamer is fixed and
they are able to sail up the river. Watching two of the more sinister members of the
company, Marlow says, “The high stillness confronted these two figures with its ominous
patience, waiting for the passing away of a fantastic invasion” (33). In both these
passages the wilderness is “waiting patiently.” In the initial quote the wilderness is made
abstract, something “invincible, like evil or truth.” The choice of the abstract words
creates indeterminacy and uneasiness; the listeners are not sure what exactly to make of
the comparison. It casts us into an unfamiliar misty world of concepts when we expect a
solid world of trees and leaves and branches. In the second, the patience of the wilderness
has become ominous.
Marlow tries to avoid confronting the wilderness by devoting himself to his work,
to “mere incidents of the surface,” but this is ultimately unsuccessful. Marlow claims,
“The inner truth is hidden—luckily, luckily” (34), but this is not enough. He continues, “I
felt it all the same; I felt often its mysterious stillness watching me at my monkey ticks”
(34). The threat is there, seeming to watch, despite Marlow’s best attempts to avoid it. As
descriptions of the wilderness accumulate, the reader is left with a sense of the futility of
human attempts to understand and thereby control reality. Early in the final section of the
novel Marlow reflects: “I looked around, and I don’t know why, but I assure you that
never, never before did this land, this river, this jungle, the very arch of this blazing sky
appear to me so hopeless and so dark, so impenetrable to human thought, so pitiless to
human weakness” (55). He adds, “The woods were unmoved like a mask—heavy like the
closed door of a prison—they looked with their air of hidden knowledge, of patient
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expectation, of unapproachable silence” (56). While there was some ambiguity with the
suggestion of danger in earlier descriptions, at the end of Marlow’s journey upriver the
wilderness has become overtly hostile to humanity, and especially to human attempts at
understanding. The wilderness has “hidden knowledge,” and is “unapproachable.” It is
“impenetrable to human thought,” which through parallelism is connected to “human
weakness.” The implication being that, unlike what the Enlightenment would believe,
human understanding is not a sign of human strength. That which we do understand only
serves to make more vivid all that we do not.
The atmosphere invoked in these descriptions of the wilderness aligns with the
sense that Marlow is haunted by his memories. As Tess emphasizes the existence of
Tess’s subjectivity by denying readers access, by emphasizing its absence in the text so
too does Heart of Darkness use the failure of language to hint at the existence of
something that exists just past language, just out of reach of Marlow’s story. We sense
the existence of a threat, but as of yet we do not have a means of describing that threat.
Yet this threat underlies Heart of Darkness. Marlow’s tale takes on the characteristics of
a “misty halo” because he is trying to express a response to the threat he can neither
describe nor understand. Marlow is “not very clear” because the things he is working
with are not very clear either. The “presence of what he can’t produce” and the “nullity”
that Leavis objects to is precisely the point.
Combined with the frame narrative and Marlow’s distinctive voice, the
atmosphere adds to a literary existentialism that emphasizes the existence of something
that remains unrepresented in the text. This causes readers to feel the same uncertainty,
anxiety, alienation, and isolation that characterize Marlow’s existential crisis. The thread
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tying all these features together is the novel’s commitment to dramatizing the failure of
communication. This is the action contained in the narrative frame, this is the source of
Marlow’s abrupt shifts, digressions, and repetition, and this is felt in Marlow’s
personification of the wilderness and his own memories. Each of these elements hint at
the existence of something that escapes language and representation, something that
causes uneasiness. The frame, Marlow’s style, and the pathetic fallacy prepare us for
understanding the horror not as an object to be defined, but as a reaction.
Existential Horror
The frame narrative, Marlow’s voice, and the pathetic fallacy prepares us for
Kurtz’s final words, “The horror!” In Kurtz we see someone who has taken up the
wilderness’s whispered appeal to “Come and find out.” Upon witnessing evidence of
Kurtz’s savagery, Marlow observes, “But the wilderness had found him out early, and
had taken on him a terrible vengeance for the fantastic invasion. I think it had whispered
to him things about himself which he did not know, things of which he had no conception
till he took counsel with this great solitude” (58). Whatever hidden knowledge or
impenetrable truth is contained in the wilderness, the effect it has had on Kurtz is horrific.
Yet it is clear that whatever Kurtz found in the wilderness was a reflection of himself.
The wilderness whispered to Kurtz “things about himself.” In the solitude of the
wilderness Kurtz was forced to confront himself, and what he found there is the
existential center of the novel. But Kurtz’s judgment “The horror!” cannot be simply
reduced to a judgment on what he has found at his core. The horror is existential, which
is to say Kurtz found it not in the nature of his individual being, but in the nature of being
itself.

114
Nevertheless, while Kurtz is alive, his relationship with himself is the primary
preoccupation of the novel. This realization underscores Marlow’s confrontation with
Kurtz. Marlow explains: “Soul! If anybody had ever struggled with a soul I am the
man…his soul was mad. Being alone in the wilderness, it had looked within itself and, by
Heavens I tell you, it had gone mad…He struggled with himself too. I saw it—I heard it.
I saw the inconceivable mystery of a soul that knew no restraint, no faith, and no fear, yet
struggling blindly with itself” (66). Kurtz is at war with himself. But this is not a
Freudian war of id and superego. This struggle is not the struggle of a man against any
internalized demands. Kurtz has “no restraint,” “no faith,” and “no fear.” These are all
things that involve voluntary limitations. Human desires are limited by one’s capacity for
restraint, like the cannibals whose internal restraint keeps them from killing the
Europeans for food. Similarly, faith controls the various lusts of humankind, whether that
faith is in a god or in ideals. Finally fear prevents the individual from making choices and
doing things he or she otherwise would. Marlow rejects all of these causes for internal
struggle. This means that Kurtz’s soul struggles with itself not because of any limitations
placed on him by internal checks, religion, or fear.
Kurtz’s internal struggle emerges out of his discovery of his existential freedom.
The wilderness, by freeing Kurtz from institutions of control, gives him absolute,
existential freedom. But the accompaniment to freedom is, according to Sartre and
Kierkegaard, the experience of anxiety or anguish or dread. Otto Bohlmann writes on
Kurtz’s discovery of his freedom that anxiety is “especially revealing about the human
condition in general, a manifestation of man’s sense of radical insecurity over his
precarious and contingent existence” (35). For the existentialist, freedom is accompanied
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by anxiety, not because of any external force but because of possibility. To theorize
anxiety, Kierkegaard analyzes Adam’s choice to eat the fruit in the garden. He argues that
when Adam made his choice he had no concept of good, evil, or even freedom.
Kierkegaard writes, “The prohibition alarms Adam [induces a state of dread] because the
prohibition awakens in him the possibility of freedom” (“Dread and Freedom” 104). This
dread is “a nothing, the alarming possibility of being able” (104). Kurtz has discovered in
the wilderness the freedom which “gazes down into its own possibility, grasping at
finiteness to sustain itself” (105), but with “no restraint, no faith, and no fear” Kurtz has
nothing to grasp. The result is that Kurtz becomes a god unto himself.
It is Kurtz’s scrabbling towards deity that frightens Marlow, because of the
realization that there is nothing—external or internal—that restrains Kurtz. When
Marlow confronts Kurtz as he is crawling back to the natives’ fires, he observes:
the terror of the position was not in being knocked on the head…but in
this, that I had to deal with a being to whom I could not appeal in the name
of anything high or low. I had, even like the niggers, to invoke him—
himself—his own exalted and incredible degradation. There was nothing
either above or below him—and I knew it. He had kicked himself loose of
the earth. Confound the man! he had kicked the very earth to pieces. He
was alone—and before him I did not know whether I stood on the ground
or floated in the air. (66)
When Kurtz kicks himself loose of the earth with nothing either above or below him, he
has severed himself from any earthly sense of duty and any heavenly sense of
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righteousness.41 His absolute freedom in the wilderness, his lack of connection to others
and to the world, the absence of anything for him to hold on to allows Kurtz to give full
reign to his “brutal instincts” and “monstrous passions” (65). The only appeal Marlow
can make to Kurtz is to Kurtz himself, “his own exalted and incredible degradation.”
Kurtz’s discovery of existential freedom does not lead to the next evolution of mankind:
the Übermensch is degraded.
The corruption of Kurtz’s soul is made vivid by the subject of his eloquence.
Kurtz’s discourse has as its center of gravity Kurtz himself, and this makes him unaware
of his own absurdity:
Kurtz discoursed. A voice! a voice! It rang deep to the very last. It
survived his strength to hide in the magnificent folds of eloquence the
barren darkness of his heart. Oh, he struggled, he struggled. The wastes of
his weary brain were haunted by shadowy images now—images of wealth
and fame revolving obsequiously around his unextinguishable gift of
noble and lofty expression. My Intended, my station, my career, my
ideas—these were the subjects for the occasional utterances of elevated
sentiments. (68)
While earlier the darkness “seemed to draw him to its pitiless breast” (65), implying the
heart of darkness is external, here the darkness is internal. The inner darkness is not as
obvious as the outer, however, as the darkness of Kurtz’s heart is hidden in his eloquence.
Marlow’s ironic use of the terms “lofty expression” and “elevated sentiments” in contrast

On this passage Watt writes, “Marlow is horrified, and so, just before the end, is Kurtz, to understand
what happens to a man who discovers his existential freedom under circumstances which enable him to
pervert the ultimate direction of nineteenth-century thought: not the disappearance but the replacement of
God” (166).
41
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with the unimaginable possessiveness of Kurtz. “My Intended, my station, my career, my
ideas”—on his deathbed Kurtz is still consumed with himself, with his future, with his
ideas. For Kurtz there is nothing beyond himself to reach for, no purpose beyond the
satisfaction of his own voracious appetites.
Is it Kurtz’s recognition of the gap between his desires and his ability to satisfy
them that causes him to cry out, “The horror! The horror!” (69)? According to Marlow
Kurtz’s final words were a “judgment upon the adventures of his soul on this earth” (69),
but this interpretation is simplistic. Marlow tells us “No eloquence could have been so
withering to one’s belief in mankind as his final burst of sincerity” (66). This would
imply that the judgment “The horror!” is not limited to a judgment on Kurtz. But what
exactly it is a judgment of cannot be made clear. The distance created by the oral
narrative is mirrored in Marlow’s distance from Kurtz. We are cast again into the misty
halo of Marlow’s meaning. Kurtz’s final words represent the judgment of a man who has
recognized the absurdity of the universe but because of his impending death is unable to
make any choice. All Kurtz has left is his magnificent eloquence, his voice, and he uses
this voice to sum up, “The horror! The horror!”
Yet this pronouncement, like the rest of the narrative, describes something just
beyond the edge of our vision. According to Bohlmann this pronouncement is
“enigmatic, but suggestive of some profound discovery that Kurtz had made about
himself and the world” (100). Kurtz “looked into the Nietszchean ‘abyss’ of his deformed
self – and judged it a place of horror enveloped by a universe of horror” (100). But,
Bohlmann goes on to observe, “What the precise nature of this horror was, Marlow never
clarifies. But his intimations lend themselves to an existential reading that what Kurtz
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perceived was the nothingness, the ‘hollowness’, of his self and the brute world” (100).
Marlow observes that “there was something wanting” (57) in Kurtz, and that the whisper
of the wilderness “echoed loudly within him because he was hollow at the core” (58).
Marlow admits, “Whether he knew of this deficiency himself I can’t say. I think the
knowledge came to him at last—only at the very last” (57). Marlow couches this claim in
qualifications: he “can’t say” whether Kurtz knew there was something wanting in him.
But it would be a mistake to believe that the horror is limited to the confines of Kurtz’s
soul—that it is his heart and his alone that is the heart of darkness.
Yet, instead of reaching this heart we forced to recognize that “horror” is not an
object but a reaction. Denied Kurtz’s final vision we are left with Marlow’s interpretation
of Kurtz’s final expression, one that continues to haunt Marlow. What the pronouncement
“The horror!” refers to is absent. All that is available to Marlow is Kurtz’s response:
Anything approaching the change that came over his features I have never
seen before and hope never to see again. Oh, I wasn’t touched. I was
fascinated. It was as though a veil had been rent. I saw on that ivory face
the expression of somber pride, of ruthless power, of craven terror—of an
intense and hopeless despair. Did he live his life again in every detail of
desire, temptation, and surrender during that supreme moment of complete
knowledge? He cried in a whisper at some image, at some vision… (69)
This passage implies several things about the horror. The first is that this is not
some kind of repentance. The horror is not Kurtz’s revulsion at what he had done or who
he had become. There is no deathbed conversion here; no turn to faith, no rejection of the
world, no humbling of the self in the face of the infinite. Kurtz’s expression mingles
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pride with power with terror with despair. These are not the emotions of a repentant man.
Kurtz might have relived his life in that “moment of complete knowledge” but his
judgment cannot be understood as a moral one. Marlow makes this clear when he
recounts his own wrestle with death. But while the judgment is not moral Marlow does
imply that the horror still is a judgment on his life. It is couched in the form of a
question—Marlow cannot know what image or vision it was that Kurtz saw—but the
implication is still there that Kurtz’s last moment is one of reflection on “every detail of
desire, temptation, and surrender.” Finally, this passage implies that Kurtz right before
his death has achieved some form of insight in a “supreme moment of complete
knowledge.” This is why Kurtz’s judgment can be viewed as a “moral victory.” In a
narrative characterized by uncertainty and inconclusiveness Kurtz “had something to
say…He had summed up—he had judged. ‘The horror!’ He was a remarkable man” (70).
Marlow, on the other hand admits that “within a hair’s breadth of the last opportunity for
pronouncement…I found with humiliation that probably I would have nothing to say”
(70).42 Kurtz judged, but Kurtz is dead and only Marlow who “had been permitted to
draw back [his] hesitating foot” from the edge can attempt to convey the meaning of the
horror.
Marlow attempts to make this a story about Kurtz when it cannot be anything but
a story about Marlow.43 What Kurtz does is to give Marlow the term “the horror” and an
example of what happens to a man who embraces completely his freedom but remains
James Guetti comments, “Marlow is torn, throughout the story, between the desire to achieve a
realization as final as Kurtz’s and the conviction that he must deny such a realization if his life is to have
meaning. Kurtz is destroyed in his movement toward and final confrontation of what Marlow views as
ultimate truth” (502).
43
Sanford Pinkser argues that the novella is more concerned “with the anguish of the living rather than the
burial of the dead…Kurtz answers the jungle’s existential whisper with, ‘The horror! The horror.”
However, the task of giving those words a meaning and significance falls to Marlow” (56).
42
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unprepared for his unavoidable existential crisis. Marlow did not die, and “remained to
dream the nightmare out to the end” (69), but by coming face-to-face with death Marlow
has an insight those who have not wrestled with death have not: “Since I had peeped over
the edge myself, I understand better the meaning of his stare that could not see the flame
of the candle but was wide enough to embrace the whole universe, piercing enough to
penetrate all the hearts that beat in the darkness. He had summed up—he had judged.
‘The horror!’ (70). While before the implication is that Kurtz has looked back on his life,
here we understand that Kurtz’s words refer to something deeper and more
fundamental.44 His final stare takes in both the universe and the hearts of man. His
judgment encompasses both the nature of the universe and the nature of man. The horror
lies beneath everything.
Marlow’s attempt to make sense of the horror begins with an account of his
experience of wrestling with death. It is this experience that leads Marlow to deny
viewing the horror as a simple fear of death. After all, how could an expression of a fear
of death be “withering to one’s belief in mankind”? Marlow’s own fight with death “is
the most unexciting contest” and “takes place in an impalpable greyness with nothing
underfoot, with nothing around, without spectators, without clamour, without glory,
without the great desire of victory, without the great fear of defeat, in a sickly atmosphere
of tepid sceptiscism, without much belief in your own right, and still less in that of your
adversary” (70). It is hard to imagine this experience pushing Kurtz to his “supreme
moment of complete knowledge.” Marlow says of his near-death experience: “If such is

Guetti notes, “These words seem a response to the most private nightmare, to the unknown itself, but
Marlow insists that they are quite the reverse: a ‘moment of complete knowledge.’ He asserts that ‘the
horror’ has to do not only with Kurtz’s unspeakable history, but also with the world at large” (489).
44
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the form of ultimate wisdom then life is a greater riddle than some of us think it to be”
(70). Marlow rejects the notion that those on the brink of death have some kind of special
insight. By comparing his own experience to Kurtz’s, Marlow is emphasizing that “The
horror” is more than the individual face to face with his own mortality. Marlow’s
existential crisis happens not because of what happens to him but because of what he
witnessed. The horror is a realization of something profoundly disturbing lurking beneath
the surface.
It is important to recognize that describing the horror as a realization means that
the horror is a reaction. If we think about our own experience with horror, it is the
sensation of being horrified that we remember first—not necessarily what horrified us.
It’s the unknown that terrifies. Thus, we have a clearer idea of what it means to be
horrified than we do of what causes the sensation of horror. The horror operates in the
same way as the absurd, which according to Camus “is not in man (if such a metaphor
could have a meaning) nor in the world, but in their presence together” (165). Similarly,
the horror is not in man, nor is it in the world (hence the ambiguity of the title of the
novel) but is in the confrontation. It is the nature of being itself, severed from any
structure of thought or language that might attempt to control it.45 The horror is pervasive
because it is contained in the very structure of existence where the individual human is
always already thrown into a hostile and incomprehensible world.
While the horror is like the existential concept of absurdity or nausea, it carries
with it a sense of a threat that Camus and Sartre are unable to capture. It is this ability of

While there is not space here to do so, it is fascinating to compare Roquentin’s description of the
unveiling of existence in Nausea to Kurtz and Marlow’s experience of the horror. The whole passage from
pp. 126-135 is illuminating when read in conjunction with this understanding of the horror. Like horror,
nausea is a feeling and this passage offers an useful, affective response to existence.
45
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Conrad to move in us an affective response to the horror that makes him a more profound
writer of the existential crisis. There is a threat, a fear—a horror—at that moment of
knowledge that only Kierkegaard seems to have been able to approach. While Camus and
Sartre recognize the way in which inertia can blind one to existence, they both see the
recognition of absurdity as fundamentally good. For Conrad, when one is caught up in
matters of the surface, “The inner truth is hidden—luckily, luckily. But I felt it all the
same; I felt often its mysterious stillness watching me at my monkey tricks” (34).
Conrad’s existentialism is a more dangerous existentialism. His universe is a threatening
one. It is not certain at the end of Heart of Darkness whether or not the illusions we live
in every day ought to be dispelled.
The Intended and the Crisis of Empire
What the object of Kurtz’s horror is will never be defined. We are too distant. But
Marlow takes up Kurtz’s language—the eloquence of the gifted Kurtz lives on—and
brings it to Europe with him. Marlow’s own existential crisis does not occur until his
interview with the Intended.46 He has been primed for his own crisis by his experience in
Africa and has caught a glimpse of the horror witnessing Kurtz’s death, but his crisis does
not occur until he is forced to choose between telling the Intended Kurtz’s last words or
lying to her. This gives the Intended a significant role in the arc of the narrative. The
contrast between the Intended’s idealism and utter faith and the reality of who Kurtz

Conrad himself said that “the last pages of ‘Heart of Darkness’ where the interview of the man and the
girl locks in—as it were—the whole 30000 words of narrative description into one suggestive view of a
whole phase of life and makes of that story something quite on another plane than an anecdote of a man
who went mad in the Centre of Africa” (“Selected Letters” 299). Conrad recognizes that the Intended
cannot be “out of it—completely” as Marlow believes (48).
46
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became turns the novel from a narrative about the existential crisis of one man in Africa
into a narrative about the existential crisis of empire.
The novel delays this crisis to set up the fragility of the sepulchral city. Back in
Europe Marlow finds himself “resenting the sight of people hurrying through the streets
to filch a little money from each other, to devour their infamous cookery, to gulp their
unwholesome beer, to dream their insignificant and silly dreams” (70). For Marlow to
become aware of the horror, what Camus calls “the chain of gestures” (156) had to be
broken. Those Marlow resents in Europe have not been shaken out of their complacency.
To Marlow, “They were intruders whose knowledge of life was to me an irritating
pretence because I felt so sure they could not possibly know the things I knew” (70-71).
While there is in this statement a kind of ugly pride of which Marlow is aware, there is
truth in this observation. The populace of the sepulchral city have not experienced the
horror, they do not know they live atop an abyss. Marlow tells his audience:
Their bearing, which was simply the bearing of commonplace individuals
going about their business in the assurance of perfect safety, was offensive
to me like the outrageous flauntings of folly in the face of a danger it is
unable to comprehend. I had no particular desire to enlighten them, but I
had some difficulty in restraining myself from laughing in their faces so
full of stupid importance. (71)
William Barrett discusses the profound effect the year 1914 had on the human
world, of “the awful vision of all Europe’s elegance and beauty being mere gaudy
decoration over the face of a human abyss” (34) and of the realization that “the apparent
stability, security, and material progress of society had rested, like everything human,
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upon the void” (34). Fifteen years before the events of World War I Heart of Darkness
places European society in the darkness that made up Marlow’s experience in the
wilderness. The “flauntings of folly” recalls the gestures of the tiny humans in the face of
the silent, patient wilderness.47 The danger—the horror—is beyond their comprehension
despite their unconscious participation in it. Marlow’s final interview with the Intended
reveals the emptiness of Europe’s self-perception. The nobility of European civilization
rests on a lie.
Critics of Heart of Darkness debate whether the Intended is meant to be a symbol
of the noble aspirations of Europe or whether she ironizes the civilized world. In her
essay “The Ultimate Meaning of ‘Heart of Darkness,’” Florence H. Ridley interprets the
story as “the balance of opposites, a core of faith versus hollowness, restraint versus its
lack, civilization versus savagery, light versus darkness” (49). The crux of her
interpretation rests on the Intended as being a pure symbol of goodness. This misses the
way in which the text undermines morality throughout; as Guetti argues, the horror
means “all hearts are in darkness; the morality and meaning with which man surrounds
himself and his experience is unreal; the reality of experience lies beyond language and
the processes of the human imagination” (501). While Guetti is wrong to close off
possible meanings, he is right that Heart of Darkness reveals morality is an illusion, and
if morality is an illusion than the Intended cannot be the symbol of righteousness and

Relating a conversation between the Manager and his uncle, Marlow narrates: “I saw him extend his
short flipper of an arm for a gesture that took in the forest, the creek, the mud the river—seemed to beckon
with a dishonouring flourish before the sunlit face of the land a treacherous appeal to the lurking death, to
the hidden evil, to the profound darkness of its heart. It was so startling that I leaped to my feet and looked
back at the edge of the forest, as though I had expected an answer of some sort to that black display of
confidence” (33).
47
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faith Ridley wants her to be. C. B. Cox, responding to F. R. Leavis’s view of the Intended
as an example of innocent nobility and idealizing faith, argues
“Nobility” seems to me the wrong word to use for the Intended, and I do
not agree that there is nothing ironical in the presentiment of her. We have
already seen how her home is a graveyard. It is appropriate that Marlow’s
should lie to her, should tell her Kurtz's last words were her name, for her
life is based on hypocrisy, like the European civilization in which she has
been nurtured. Her devotion has transformed the reality of Kurtz into a
false idea, and this self-deception is a psychological necessity for her. (43)
Ian Watt sees a more ambiguous conclusion where the reader is “left wondering whether
it is worse that the ideals of the Intended should continue in all their flagrant untruth, or
that Marlow should have been unable to invoke any faith in whose name he could feel
able to challenge them” (249). To view the Intended as a pure symbol of goodness is to
claim the objectivity that the novel form is invested in denying. Recognizing how the
form of the novel actively resists clarity suggests we view with suspicion any
interpretation of the Intended that makes her symbolic function simple.
This is not to say that the Intended is not symbolic. She is. As the African woman
is the symbolic figure of the incomprehensible darkness of the wilderness, the Intended is
the light of civilization. She has “a mature capacity for fidelity, for belief, for suffering”
(73); the light takes “refuge on her forehead” (74), implying the rational, the Apollonian
to the African woman’s Dionysian. Later in the interview when “with every word spoken
the room was grower darker”, her forehead “remained illumined by the unextinguishable
light of belief and love” (74). She is “guileless, profound, confident, and trustful” and
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seems to exist outside of time. Her rationality, her timelessness, her belief represents
humanity’s capacity for transcendence. The Intended displays everything Western
civilization typically associates with goodness—Marlow himself bows his head “before
the faith that was in her” (75).
But as C. B. Cox has pointed out, the Intended’s home is a graveyard—it has the
flavor of death and is “a place of cruel and absurd mysteries not fit for a human being to
behold” (74). Throughout the novel Marlow has called Brussels the “sepulchral city.”
That sense culminates in the interview with the intended. The street she lives on is “as
still and decorous as a well-kept alley in a cemetery” (73), her piano is “like a somber and
polished sarcophagus” (73), and she floats towards him like a ghost. When he enters the
dead enter with him. As he approaches the Intended’s house he has a vision of Kurtz
“opening his mouth voraciously as if to devour all the earth…he lived as he had ever
lived—a shadow insatiable of splendid appearances, of frightful realities, a shadow
darker than the shadow of the night…The vision seemed to enter the house with me”
(73). The order of the vision follows the chronology of Marlow’s experience. It begins as
we have seen with him in the stretcher, then “the memory of what I had heard him say
afar there, with the horned shapes stirring at my back…those broken phrases came back
to me, were heard again in their ominous and terrifying simplicity” (73). It ends with
Kurtz seeming “to stare at me out of the glassy panel—stare with that wide and immense
stare embracing, condemning, loathing all the universe. I seemed to hear the whispered
cry, ’The horror! The horror!’” (73). When he sees her enduring sorrow, Marlow
collapses his experience in the wilderness with his experience in the heart of the city: “I
saw her and him in the same instant of time—his death and her sorrow—I saw her sorrow
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in the very moment of his death. Do you understand? I saw them together—I heard them
together” (74). He hears, “mingled with her tone of despairing regret, the summing-up
whisper of his eternal condemnation” (74), and
the sound of her low voice seemed to have the accompaniment of all the
other sounds full of mystery, desolation, and sorrow I had ever heard—the
ripple of the river, the soughing of the trees swayed by the wind, the
murmurs of the crowds, the faint ring of incomprehensible words cried
from afar, the whisper of a voice speaking from beyond the threshold of an
eternal darkness. (75)
Marlow’s vision is accompanied by “the beat of the drum regular and muffled like the
beating of a heart, the heart of a conquering darkness. It was a moment of triumph for the
wilderness, an invading and vengeful rush” (73), and as he speaks with the Intended her
house is giving away gradually to the darkness: “The room seemed to have grown
darker” (73-74), “the room was growing darker” (74), “The darkness deepened” (75).
The most important collapse is of the two women, who initially seemed diametrically
opposed. Ridley interprets them this way, emphasizing the difference between the two,
holding them as symbols of civilization and light, savagery and darkness. This misses the
structure of the passage. As the interview with the Intended continues darkness gradually
overtakes her home, the light is more and more feeble, until in a sudden burst of sorrow:
She put out her arms, as if after a retreating figure, stretching them black
and with clasped pale hands across the fading narrow sheen of the
window. Never see him! I saw him clearly enough then. I shall see this
eloquent phantom as long as I live and I shall see her too, a tragic and
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familiar Shade resembling in this gesture another one, tragic also and
bedecked with powerless charms, stretching bare brown arms over the
glitter of the infernal stream, the stream of darkness. (76)
It becomes meaningless to distinguish the Intended and the African woman, the
symbols of Europe and Africa, the sepulchral city and the wilderness in relation to the
horror. Guetti’s argument that “the essentials of experience remain amoral and, even,
alinguistic” (502) and that “there is more to life than language” (504) along with
Pinkser’s contention that “such experiences are always irrational, somehow beyond the
province of language” (54) has the necessary implication that our terms light and dark,
civilization and savagery are themselves suspect. Ian Watt argues that in this scene “We
move into a world where there are no longer any easy and complacent distinctions
between black and white, and there are no longer any simple choices to be based upon
them” (249). He argues, “Light has been degraded to a cold and artificial brightness—it
can no longer combat darkness” (251). It is “sick and pallid indeed compared with the
other tragic and heroic woman whom Kurtz abandoned in the heart of darkness” (251),
and “light seems to have a particular affinity with unnaturalness, hypocrisy, and delusion,
and to be quite as contrary to the positive values of human life as the worst
manifestations conventionally attributed to darkness” (251-252). As Guetti argues, “when
Kurtz’s vision—the vision that Marlow assumes to be so similar to his own—destroyed
the truth of morality and restraint, it also destroyed their availability” (495). For Ridley to
argue for a positive understanding of the Intended is to accept a dubious assumption that
the terms light and dark hold to their traditional symbolic meanings.
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When the Intended and the African woman are collapsed into each other, Marlow
undermines the project of imperialism, of the civilizing work of Europe.48 The
“powerless charms” (76) of the African woman are no different than the Intended’s
“great and saving illusion” (75). This irony undercuts all of the interactions between
Marlow and the Intended and is rooted in her unwavering belief in Kurtz’s goodness. The
Kurtz Marlow knows and the Kurtz the Intended worships (and in this worship she is
again like the “primitive” inhabitants of the wilderness) are not the same. The Intended is
guided throughout the conversation by a mistaken assumption of Marlow’s sympathy, his
unspoken agreement with her view of Kurtz. This is highlighted by her finishing his
sentence “It was impossible not to…” with “Love him” (74). This silences Marlow into
an “appalled dumbness” (74). She believes that Kurtz “drew men to him by what was
best in them” (75), unaware that he presided over unspeakable rites. “But you have heard
him. You know!” She tells Marlow, and when he replies he did know, it is “with
something like despair in my heart” (75). Marlow’s claims throughout are all
characterized by a suggestive ambiguity. The Intended in her delusions can interpret them
as praise, but Marlow’s audience knows better. “He was a remarkable man…We shall
always remember him…His words will remain...His end…was in every way worthy of
his life” (74, 75, 76). She claims she “knew him best” (74), but in the sepulchral city,
living in the midst of her illusions she can have no knowledge of the hollowness of Kurtz
and the barren darkness of his heart.

Conrad’s condemnation of imperialism is not free from problematic elements, as Achebe points out. For
a nuanced response to Achebe’s essay in light of Conrad’s critique of imperialism, see “Heart of Darkness
and Racism” by Hunt Hawkins.
48
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It is in this scene that the full sense of the horror takes hold. Just before he enters
her house Marlow “seemed to hear the whispered cry, ‘The horror! The horror!” (73),
when he sees the Intended for the first time and she says, “I have survived,” Marlow
“seemed to hear distinctly, mingled with her tone of despairing regret, the summing-up
whisper of his eternal condemnation” (74), and later her voice “seemed to have the
accompaniment of…the whisper of a voice speaking from beyond the threshold of an
eternal darkness” (75). At this point, the whisper only seems to be heard. There remains
the hope that the horror will remain a memory, an echo, a shade, but when she asks him
to repeat Kurtz’s last words Marlow says, “I was on the point of crying at her, ‘Don’t you
hear them. The dusk was repeating them in a persistent whisper all around us, in a
whisper that seemed to swell menacingly like the first whisper of a rising wind. ‘The
horror! The horror!’” (76). The threat of the horror has become utterly real once again.
As C. B. Cox argues, in entering the Intended’s house Marlow, “has journeyed once more
towards the heart of darkness” (43). He finds himself even more so than in his apathetic
struggle with death surrounded by the horror. It is here, at the heart of civilization that
Marlow recognizes that the horror is pervasive.
Marlow finds himself unwilling or unable—“I could not tell her” (77)—to reveal
the horror to the Intended.49 Even though he feels himself menaced and surrounded on all
sides by the darkness, Marlow preserves her illusion. He fails to communicate the horror.
But this lie is not unaccompanied by a sense of danger: “It seemed to me that the house

The Intended’s sex must play a role in Marlow’s lie. Asserting unconvincingly that the women are out of
it he claims, “We must help them to stay in that beautiful world of their own” (48). Marlow has claimed
that in work is “the chance to find yourself. Your own reality—for yourself—not for others—what no other
man can ever know” (29). Ian Watt notes European society denied leisure class women the chance to find
themselves in work. Perhaps Marlow is unwilling to destroy her world because she has no opportunity to
build a new one.
49
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would collapse before I could escape, that the heavens would fall upon my head. But
nothing happened. The heavens do not fall for such a trifle. Would they have fallen, I
wonder, if I had rendered Kurtz that justice which was his due?” (77). We move in these
sentences between two understandings of heaven, the first, the one that would fall on his
head, is the heaven that demands justice. The second, the heaven that would fall if he had
given Kurtz his due, is a constructed heaven, a crystal palace of illusion built up by the
illusory faith of humanity. But that destruction would be, Marlow tells us, “too dark—too
dark altogether” (77).
Joseph Conrad and the Failure of Communication
At the beginning of the novel Marlow characterizes civilization “like a flash of
lightning in the clouds” and observes “[w]e live in the flicker” (6). Ian Watt picks up on
Marlow’s characterization. He argues that “we are made to see civilization, not as a stable
human achievement, but as a brief interruption of the normal rule of Darkness” (79). But
Heart of Darkness goes deeper than that, for the light of civilization is itself suspect.50
The brutalities and unspeakable acts perpetrated in the darkness are not inconsistent with
civilization but lie just underneath the surface of the sepulchral city. It is the Intended, “a
soul as translucently pure as a cliff of crystal” (70), who brings the “echo of his
magnificent eloquence” (7). At the heart of European civilization we find the horror as
vital and pervasive as it was in the darkness of the wilderness.

Barrett writes near the end of his study on existentialism: “The realization that all human truth must not
only shine against an enveloping darkness, but that such truth is even shot through with its own darkness
may be depressing…But it has the virtue of restoring to man his sense of the primal mystery surrounding
all things, a sense of mystery from which the glittering world of his technology estranges him, but without
which he is not truly human” (275).
50
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The horror is crystalized for Marlow in the moment when he is face to face with
absolute and total faith in the moral righteousness of imperialism. The horror hits Marlow
because he has seen where the faith leads. In a pamphlet authored by Kurtz Marlow
discovers “the unbounded power of eloquence” (50) which had “no practical hints to
interrupt the magic current of phrases,” except “at the end of that moving appeal to every
altruistic sentiment it blazed at you luminous and terrifying like a flash of lightning in a
serene sky: ‘Exterminate all the brutes!’” (50). This is where the logic of empire leads.51
But the horror is not contained as a reaction to the brutalities of colonialism. Kurtz’s final
stare is “wide enough to embrace the whole universe, piercing enough to penetrate all the
hearts that beat in the darkness.” Borrowing from Sartre’s construction, the horror
precedes empire. It is not that imperialism leads to horror; it is that the horror undermines
the justification of imperialism.
In its denial of the horror underneath existence, civilization builds a city of light
that is also a city of death. In its blindness to the “primal mystery” of the darkness, the
wilderness, the horror, human truth is blind to the darkness at its heart. At the beginning
of his story Marlow remarks on the “conquest of the earth,” which he admits is “not a
pretty thing when you look into it too much” (7). But, he continues, “What redeems it is
the idea only. An idea at the back of it, not a sentimental pretence but an idea; and an
unselfish belief in the idea—something you can set up, and bow down before, and offer a
sacrifice to” (7). The entire narrative of Heart of Darkness undermines any attempt at

As Barrett concludes: “The centuries-long evolution of human reason is one of man’s greatest triumphs,
but it is still in process, still incomplete, still to be…But do we need to be persuaded now, after all that has
happened in this twentieth century, how precariously situated these reasonable ideals are in relation to the
subterranean force of life, and how small a segment of the whole and concrete man they actually
represent?...the rationalism of the Enlightenment will have to recognize that at the very heart of its light
there is also a darkness” (279).
51
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justifying colonialism. The ideas undergirding imperialism are illusory. It is the
realization that underneath all the beautiful trappings of European civilization lies an
empty void that Marlow describes as “too dark—too dark altogether.” The fact that the
heart of Europe is also a heart of darkness destroys any attempts to justify colonialism.
Marlow’s final interview transforms the story from a narrative about one man’s
existential crisis into an existential crisis about the project of empire and the narrative of
progress. Through Marlow’s failure to communicate, Heart of Darkness undermines us,
revealing that beyond the surface of things, in the corner of our eyes lies the horror. Our
contingent, absurd existence is “like a weary pilgrimage amongst hints for nightmares”
(14). We are cast adrift in a world that remains incomprehensible, isolated from one
another living as we dream—alone. Conrad, C. B. Cox argues, “is trying to suggest a
menacing force which encircles all forms of civilization, a presence of universal
destruction we acknowledge but cannot control or even properly understand” (54). It is in
the atmosphere of Heart of Darkness that we encounter the horror. And it is with this
existential horror we must reckon. Conrad has destroyed any shelter we may have had,
for existence is at its roots sick, touched by the darkness.
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Chapter III: G. K. Chesterton and Existential Joy

The Man Who Was Thursday seems at first a strange companion to Tess of the
D’Urbervilles and Heart of Darkness, and G. K. Chesterton a strange author to place
alongside Thomas Hardy and Joseph Conrad. But this strangeness is merely a reflection
of the strange origins of existential thought. Existentialism has origins in the radically
divergent voices of Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche, and thus has deep roots
in both Christian and atheistic thought. For Kierkegaard the existential struggle with
meaning, purpose, and dread were cast in relation to an authentic relationship with God.
Existentialism was for Kierkegaard a means to recovering an authentic existence through
faith. On the other hand, for Nietzsche, the rejection of German idealism also meant the
rejection of Christianity. Instead of leading to a leap of faith, existential inquiry was
meant to lead to the Übermensch, whose authentic existence is defined purely on his own
terms. As the contrast between the Christianity of Kierkegaard and the atheism of
Nietzsche illuminates the origins and goals of existentialism, the contrast between the
faith of Chesterton and the atheism of Hardy and Conrad reveals the way failure in
British existentialism can be positive and productive. While Chesterton shares Hardy and
Conrad’s concern with failure, unlike them this failure leads to joy at the sheer fact of
existence. The failure that lies at the center of The Man Who Was Thursday is not rooted
in horror but in wonder. Existence for Chesterton is beyond our comprehension not
because it is too evil but because it is too good.
Chesterton is driving at a similar conclusion that Camus strives for in The
Stranger. Both are trying to find happiness in existence, an attitude Chesterton found by
placing existence against the possibility of nothingness. Chesterton writes in his
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Autobiography, “mere existence, reduced to its primary limits, was extraordinary enough
to be exciting. Anything was magnificent as compared with nothing” (89-90). This quote
gives us a faint outline of Chesterton’s existentialism, which is founded in the belief that
existence in and of itself is good. This belief finds expression in Chesterton’s writings,
from his Father Brown series, to his brief articles, to his advocacy for Distributism.
Chesterton describes the implication of this belief: “At the back of our brains, so to
speak, there was a forgotten blaze or burst of astonishment at our own existence. The
object of the artistic and spiritual life was to dig for this submerged sunrise of wonder; so
that a man sitting in a chair might suddenly understand that he was actually alive, and be
happy” (90-91). The best indication of Chesterton’s success is in the anecdote where
Franz Kafka “pressed [Orthodoxy and The Man Who Was Thursday] on a friend saying
that they simply had to be read because the author seemed as happy and energetic as a
man who had actually found God” (Royal 86). Robert Royal comments, “Kafka’s reading
penetrated to a crucial point: Perhaps the most salient feature of Chesterton’s work is its
sheer exuberance and joy in existence” (86).
Chesterton’s ability to express joy often causes critics to accuse him of failing to
recognize the real pain and suffering of existence.52 This complaint responds to
Chesterton’s dedication to reframing our perspective to see more or less minor
annoyances in fresh and new light, to see them for the trivialities they are.53 This, his
critics argue, indicates Chesterton’s optimism relies on ignoring actual suffering.
However, Chesterton does not outright dismiss evil and pain. Indeed, his belief in the

See “Chesterton and the Problem of Evil” by Mark Knight for a response to these critics.
See, for instance, the essay “On Running After One’s Hat” where Chesterton invites his readers to see
floods, stuck drawers, and hats blown by the wind as opportunities for adventure instead of reason for
complaint.
52
53
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solidity of sin is one of the reasons he turned to orthodox Christianity in the first place.
But, furthermore, Chesterton recognized in the Book of Job a necessary response to the
problem of pain. The Man Who Was Thursday as a novel is Chesterton’s Book of Job
written in response to the harrowing intellectual experience of solipsism and skepticism.
Much like existence is all the more emphasized when contrasted by nonexistence, joy is
more fully recognized thrown into relief against a backdrop of pain.
Chesterton’s identification with existentialism is complicated by his identification
with Thomism. Chesterton’s book Saint Thomas Aquinas reveals sympathies with
existential themes. One of those being the rejection of Platonic theology and a desire to
recover the human element in Christian theology. Chesterton observes that Augustine’s
influence caused God to be thought of “too exclusively as a Spirit who purifies or a
Saviour who redeems; and too little a Creator who creates” (79). It is Aquinas, Chesterton
continues, “who saved the human element in Christian theology” (79). Chesterton’s book
emphasizes Aquinas’s use of Aristotle to correct the Platonic influence on Christianity
that led some to despise the body. Aristotle gave Aquinas ammunition to argue for the
acceptance of physical reality, and this led him to the concept of Ens, often translated
“being.” Chesterton writes, “St. Thomas Aquinas is concerned fundamentally with the
idea of Being” (140). This concern, which Aquinas shares with Heidegger and Sartre,
leads William Barrett to observe Thomists were “in the process of discovering St.
Thomas as the true and authentic existentialist” (101).54 While there is some debate
whether St. Thomas Aquinas ought to be considered existential,55 Chesterton’s book

54

See Existence and the Existent by Jacques Maritain and Being and Some Philosophers by Etienne Gilson.
William Barrett, while he recognizes certain similarities, ultimately expresses skepticism towards the
claim that Aquinas is an existentialist.
55
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reveals an understanding of Aquinas that supports rather than refutes Chesterton’s
existentialism.
In Chesterton’s existentialism, joy rests on recognizing the limits of reason. This
is a theme in The Man Who Was Thursday’s nonfiction counterpart Orthodoxy.
Comparing imagination and reason in “The Maniac,” Chesterton writes, “Imagination
does not breed insanity. Exactly what does breed insanity is reason” (219). He adds later,
“Poetry is sane because it floats easily in an infinite sea; reason seeks to cross the infinite
sea, and so make it finite” (220). At the conclusion of “The Maniac” Chesterton rejects
materialism and solipsism and sums up what he views as “the chief mark” of insanity,
which is “reason used without root, reason in the void” (230). What prevents one from
ending up in this prison of reason is mysticism: “Mysticism keeps men sane. As long as
you have mystery you have health; when you destroy mystery you create morbidity”
(230). Reason unfettered destroys freedom, especially the freedom to believe which is, in
Chesterton’s view, essential to joy. He writes, “The whole secret of mysticism is this: that
man can understand everything by the help of what he does not understand” (231).
Chesterton reveals his healthy skepticism towards the systematizers.56 Existence
is always larger than our attempts to understand it. Thus, the fin de siècle British
existentialists’ preoccupation with failure is expressed in Chesterton as a failure of
understanding. But in a typical Chestertonian reversal, the failure does not lead to

This does entail a rejection of reason, but rather a claim to the need to recognize reason’s limitations. In
the next chapter, “The Suicide of Thought,” Chesterton is concerned with the freedom of the human
intellect to destroy itself. “There is a thought that stops thought” (236), he writes, and it is this ultimate
skepticism that Chesterton sees as the ultimate danger. Recognizing reason’s limits allowed Chesterton to
retain reason.
56
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tragedy, as in Tess of the D’Urbervilles, nor does the failure lead to isolation, as in Heart
of Darkness, but the failure leads to faith.
The Man Who Was Thursday in Context
Unlike Tess and Heart of Darkness there is not a specific celebration that helps us
make sense of the historical situation that produced The Man Who Was Thursday.
Thankfully Chesterton, in various places, makes it very clear Thursday was written in
response to his experiences as a young man at the Slade School of Art. In the opening
dedicatory poem to The Man Who Was Thursday, Chesterton describes an atmosphere of
pessimism, where “Science announced nonentity and art admired decay” (n.p.). At that
time Impressionism was the dominant artistic school, and it was a style that Chesterton
found philosophically and spiritually distasteful. In his Autobiography Chesterton
observes, “I think there was a spiritual significance in Impressionism, in connection with
this age as the age of scepticism” (87). For Chesterton art for art’s sake was impossible;
art always revealed a philosophy, and the philosophic underpinnings of Impressionism
were a dangerous subjectivism. Chesterton argues Impressionism
naturally lends itself to the metaphysical suggestion that things only exist
as we perceive them, or that things do not exist at all. The philosophy of
Impressionism is necessarily close to the philosophy of Illusion. And this
atmosphere also tended to contribute, however indirectly, to a certain
mood of unreality and sterile isolation that settled at this time upon me;
and I think upon many others. (87-88)
The Man Who Was Thursday emerges out of this “mood of unreality and sterile
isolation”. It gives voice in narrative form to the experience of struggling with solipsism
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and metaphysical doubt. While Orthodoxy tells us where Chesterton’s philosophy ended
up, The Man Who Was Thursday paints a picture of what it felt like to reach there.
Michael Shallcross discusses Chesterton’s Slade School experience in
psychological terms. Arguing that Chesterton’s account of his solipsism is evidence
Chesterton suffered from derealization he writes, “Rather than a considered,
philosophical espousal of solipsism, this condition should be understood as an
involuntary psychiatric state in which the subject becomes unable to conceive of the
world as possessing a meaningful existence external to his or her consciousness”
(“Assimilation” 323). While Chesterton does not describe a “considered, philosophical”
argument for his Slade School solipsism, his Autobiography and Orthodoxy show a
stronger grasp of the philosophic concepts than Shallcross’s description of an
“involuntary psychiatric state” would suggest. It is more likely that Chesterton saw where
current philosophic trends would lead and his “mood of unreality and sterile isolation”
was his psychological response to the logical conclusions of those trends. In this,
Chesterton revealed himself to be a natural existentialist. Philosophy, the existentialist
argues, is a way of life. As H. J. Blackham writes, “The main business of this philosophy
therefore is not to answer the questions which are raised but to drive home the questions
themselves until they engage the whole man and are made personal, urgent, and
anguished” (151-152).
Chesterton’s description of his mental state at the time depicts a thinker who
made the questions raised by skepticism personal, urgent, and anguished.
At a very early age I had thought my way back to thought itself. It is a
very dreadful thing to do; for it may lead to thinking that there is nothing
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but thought. At this time I did not very clearly distinguish between
dreaming and waking; not only as a mood but as a metaphysical doubt, I
felt as if everything might be a dream. It was as if I had myself projected
the universe from within, with all its trees and stars; and that is so near to
the notion of being God that is manifestly even nearer to going mad. Yet I
was not mad, in any medical or physical sense; I was simply carrying the
scepticism of my time as far as it would go. And I soon found it would go
a great deal further than most of the sceptics went. (88)
It is the final two sentences that stand out. First, Chesterton followed the logic of
skepticism to its ultimate conclusions. Chesterton does not trace the outline of that logic
here, but we can imagine it was a similar process as that which Chesterton put down in
his book Heretics, where he follows to their conclusion the ideas of his contemporaries,
such as H. G. Wells and Bernard Shaw. Impressionism leads, as Chesterton writes in The
Man Who Was Thursday, to “that final skepticism that can find no floor to the universe”
(131). Second, Chesterton associates the metaphysical doubt with a mood, implying that
the two are related. In this, Chesterton reflects the existential attitude expressed by
William Barrett when he wrote that those who dismissed existentialism as a mood
“betrayed a curious blindness to the concerns of the human spirit, in taking the view that
philosophic truth can be found only in those areas of experience in which human moods
are not present” (10). Chesterton, like the existentialists, recognizes “philosophy should
be connected with the individuals own life and experience” (Roubiczek 10). What we
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believe should impact how we live. The conclusion to be drawn is to recognize that our
philosophy matters and matters greatly.57
The Man Who Was Thursday is a novel about the threat of nihilism. For
Chesterton, this threat was urgent, for philosophy itself was urgent. As Steven R. L. Clark
writes, “Chesterton was persuaded…that nihilism was a real and present danger—as
indeed it had been in living memory. If poets, philosophers, administrators, scientists, and
the decaying rich all agree that there is no true, objective standard of behavior, what
reason can there be to suffer or to labor on behalf of ordinarily life-loving people?” (52).
Chesterton communicates this urgency through the fictional department of philosophical
policemen, detectives whose job it is to “trace the origin of those dreadful thoughts that
drive men on at last to intellectual fanaticism and intellectual crime” (45). The
protagonist, Gabriel Syme, is one of these detectives, and his battle with anarchy is the
structure on which Chesterton’s existentialism is built.
Chesterton’s Literary Existentialism
Chesterton’s literary existentialism emerges from a dialogue with literature of
nonsense. The Man Who Was Thursday evokes this with the masquerade at the final
confrontation with Sunday which he describes “as absurd as Alice in Wonderland, yet as
grave and kind as a love story” (184). Chesterton’s use of formal elements of nonsense
literature does not mean The Man Who Was Thursday should be understood as nonsense
literature. While he recognized it was “a valuable contribution to culture” he also

At the beginning of Heretics, Chesterton laments “that people care less for whether they are
philosophically right” (39). He compares this to the Middle Ages, where people were set on fire for their
philosophy. While admittedly a foolish thing to do, Chesterton observes, “But there is one thing that is
infinitely more absurd and unpractical than burning a man for his philosophy. That is the habit of saying
that his philosophy does not matter” (39-40).
57
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described it as “humour that abandons all attempt at intellectual justification” or “folly
for folly’s sake on the same lines as art for art’s sake, or more properly beauty for
beauty’s sake” (“Humour” 29). The phrase “art for art’s sake” refers to a view, associated
with the aestheticism of the decadents, that art does not—and for some should not—serve
any political, didactic, or philosophic end. Chesterton’s view of “art for art’s sake” was
generally not a positive one,58 and his continual comparison leads Martin Shallcross to
argue that Chesterton distrusted nonsense literature. Yet, Chesterton did appreciate Lewis
Carroll’s writings, though he suspected “the very best of Lewis Carroll was not written
by a man for children, but by a don for dons” (“Both Sides of the Looking Glass” 68).
Chesterton reserves most of his criticism of Alice in Wonderland for those who insist on
taking it seriously. “It is only a lark, and no admirer of Lewis Carroll can outstrip me in
liking it as a lark” (“Lewis Carroll” 234).
A further understanding of Chesterton’s appreciation for nonsense literature
appears in his essay “A Defense of Nonsense,” where he draws a distinction between
nonsense that is satiric and the unmeaning nonsense of Edward Lear and Lewis Carroll.
But this unmeaning nonsense is “more than a mere aesthetic fancy” (47). Chesterton
argues, “Every great literature has always been allegorical—allegorical of some view of
the whole universe. The ‘Iliad’ is only great because all life is a battle, the ‘Odyssey’
because all life is a journey, the Book of Job because all life is a riddle” (47). Therefore,
nonsense literature must “have its own version of the Cosmos to offer” and it is this: “the

For example, in Heretics Chesterton wrote, “Now, in our time, philosophy or religion, our theory, that is,
about ultimate things, has been driven out, more or less simultaneously, from two fields which it used to
occupy. General ideals used to dominate literature. They have been driven out by the cry of ‘art for art’s
sake.’ General ideals used to dominate politics. They have been driven out by the cry of ‘Efficiency,’ which
may roughly be translated as ‘politics for politics’ sake’” (42).
58
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world must not only be tragic, romantic, and religious, it must be nonsensical also” (48).
Nonsense literature is for Chesterton the primary means by which we are reminded of the
wonder of creation. But it is difficult to remain sensitive to creation’s wonder when it is
sensible. Nonsense literature reminds us of the “simple sense of wonder at the shapes of
things, and at their exuberant independence of our intellectual standards and our trivial
definitions” (49). Chesterton concludes by connecting nonsense to faith:
Nonsense and faith (strange as the conjunction may seem) are the two
supreme symbolic assertions of the truth that to draw out the soul of things
with a syllogism is as impossible as to draw out Leviathan with a hook.
The well-meaning person who, by merely studying the logical side of
things, has decided that “faith is nonsense,” does not know how truly he
speaks; later it may come back to him in the form that nonsense is faith.
(49-50)
In The Man Who Was Thursday, nonsense is tempered by a desire to tell a story
where tearing off masks revealed not emptiness but benevolence. As Chesterton writes in
his Autobiography: “So far as the story had any sense in it, it was meant to begin with the
picture of the world at its worst and to work towards the suggestion that the picture was
not so black as it was already painted” (99). The gradual unveiling of a more benevolent
world shapes the fundamental structure of the story, as each of Gabriel Syme’s anarchist
antagonists is revealed to be a fellow detective in disguise until, finally, Sunday is
unmasked as both the head of the Central Anarchist Council and as the head detective
who, concealed in a pitch dark room, recruited each of the detectives in the fight against
anarchy. The plot progresses through a process of unmasking, with each detective serving
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as the immediate danger until his true nature is revealed. Throughout the story are
nightmarish evocations of nonsense, like when a decrepit old man chases a youthful
Syme through the snowy streets of London, or when a French Marquis does not bleed
when he is stabbed, or when Sunday hijacks a cab, an elephant, and finally a hot air
balloon as he leads the detectives on a merry chase.
Of course, the novel’s commitment to unmasking reveals these nonsensical things
have rather sensible explanations. For instance, the nonsense of a man being a day of the
week is explained by having all the members of the Central Anarchist Council be named
after days of the week. Although the surface of The Man Who Was Thursday looks a lot
like nonsense literature it is in service of an allegory about the universe and humankind’s
attempts to understand it. The purpose of The Man Who Was Thursday’s allegory
distinguishes the project of Chesterton’s novel from that of Lewis Carroll or Edward
Lear, whose nonsense was primarily a means of escape. The evocation of nonsense
literature serves to create the sense of being in a nonsensical world. By combining it with
allegory, Chesterton implies that from some vantage point the nonsense makes sense. The
Man Who Was Thursday functions more like a retelling of the Book of Job than either
detective fiction or nonsense literature. Instead of Job’s three friends, we have six
philosophers; instead of Satan we have an anarchist poet; instead of God, we have
whatever Sunday represents; and most importantly, instead of asking the question of why
must good men suffer, The Man Who Was Thursday asks why each man must go through
the nightmare of isolation and despair.
Significantly, while many of the nonsensical elements are explained, the novel
purposefully fails to explain certain details. The Man Who Was Thursday begins
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innocently enough with a debate in Saffron Park between two poets, one of anarchy and
one of order. Only when the novel is finished does it become clear that this debate
functions as a frame. In his Autobiography Chesterton observed “[H]ardly anybody who
looked at the title ever seems to have looked at the subtitle; which was ‘A Nightmare,’
and the answer to a good many critical questions” (98). While the subtitle does explain
the evocation of nonsense, it is not clear when the novel turns from the frame to the
dream. One possible point is right after Syme finishes talking with Lucian Gregory’s
sister Rosamond. After Syme loses his sense of time and takes his leave with “a sense of
champagne in his head, which he could not afterward explain,” the narrator concludes,
“what followed was so improbable that it might well have been a dream” (16). This begs
a few questions, the most significant of which is what do we make of Gabriel Syme’s
backstory? In Chapter 4 “The Tale of A Detective” we learn how Syme came to be in
Saffron Park that evening, and yet his backstory contains many elements that are implied
to be part of the nightmare from which Syme awakens at the end. This structural
problem, where the novel seems to undermine its own shape, fits thematically with the
goal of the novel. If a reader enters The Man Who Was Thursday with the intent of
making sense of it in its entirety, the reader will end up frustrated. The narrative structure
is designed to fail.
In retrospect, given how rapidly the novel turns to an anarchist threat to the entire
world, it can seem a bit odd that the novel begins with a debate about art. One need only
remember how seriously Chesterton took art to recognize how vital this framing debate is
to the rest of the novel. As is clear in his assessment of the philosophy of Impressionism,
Chesterton found art and the philosophy expressed by art to be of utmost concern. This is
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seen in Orthodoxy where Chesterton devotes a significant portion to the dangers of
certain philosophical perspectives. As amusing as a police force dedicated to going “to
artistic tea parties to detect pessimists” or discovering “from a book of sonnets that crime
will be committed” (45) is, there is a way in which Chesterton’s joke is at the same time
entirely serious.59 By recognizing how The Man Who Was Thursday and Orthodoxy
wrestle with the same questions, we can identify what the novel form allowed Chesterton
to do that his self-described “slovenly autobiography” of Orthodoxy could not.60 The rest
of the novel can be understood as an allegory meant to develop further the need to fight
against what Chesterton describes in Orthodoxy as the suicide of thought.
Anarchy of Thought
At first the allegory of The Man Who Was Thursday turns the attack of modern
thought on orthodoxy into a hidden battle between anarchists and detectives. But just like
the plot, eventually that allegory is unmasked and the novel is revealed to be an allegory
about humankind’s attempts to make sense of their world. The fusion of nonsense and
allegory allows Chesterton to create a productive failure. The one-to-one correspondence
that marks allegory breaks down. The “balance of apparent contradictions,” as he says in
Orthodoxy (231), creates the possibility of freedom. That being said, the original allegory
about the battle between chaos and order mapped onto a war between anarchists and
detectives is significant to the understanding of the book. The reemergence of the

59

Chesterton held the view that all jokes worth making were about serious subjects. In Heretics he wrote,
“It is not I; it is not even a particular class of journalists or jesters who make jokes about the matters which
are of most awful import; it is the whole human race” (157). He later adds that funny is not the opposite of
serious: “Funny is the opposite of not funny, and of nothing else…Whether a man chooses to tell the truth
in long sentences or short jokes is a problem analogous to whether he chooses to tell the truth in French of
German” (159-160).
60
In the first chapter of Orthodoxy Chesterton writes, “This is not an ecclesiastical treatise but a sort of
slovenly autobiography” (215).
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anarchist poet Lucian Gregory as the accuser at the end of the novel is significant. The
anarchist is the man who must be answered.
As previously stated, the novel begins with a debate between Gregory and Syme.
This debate sets up the dialectic of the novel. In typical Chestertonian fashion, this debate
turns on our looking at things the wrong way. At first, Gregory appears to be in the right,
and strangely traditional: “He put the old cant of the lawlessness of art and the art of
lawlessness with a certain impudent freshness that gave at least a momentary pleasure”
(11). Syme introduces himself by disagreeing with Gregory on the nature of poetry: “He
said that he (Syme) was a poet of law, a poet of order; nay, he said he was a poet of
respectability” (12). Thus, we have order on one side and chaos on the other; law on one
side, anarchy on the other.
Given literary history and the often subversive nature of art it seems at first as
though Syme is outmatched. As Gregory says, “An artist disregards all governments,
abolishes all conventions. The poet delights in disorder only” (13), and later, “The poet is
always in revolt” (14). Art often, and perhaps even usually, is written in protest against
the status quo. Furthermore, Chesterton is writing at the precipice of literary modernism,
which emphasized the experimental and innovative. The old forms of fiction and poetry
could no longer accommodate the artist. If we take stock of the literature produced since
this fictional debate was published it would be difficult to argue that the poetry of law,
order, and respectability has received the accolades. But this sense of the poet as rebel,
the artist as anarchist, rests on an assumption that Chesterton is keen on undermining.
And Chesterton does this through an argument on the poetic merits of the London
Underground.
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The misunderstanding rests on the view that chaos is a necessary disruption of an
overwhelming order. Gregory argues, “The poet delights in disorder only. If it were not
so, the most poetical thing in the world would be the Underground Railway” (13).
Syme’s response is to say simply, “So it is” (13). The point of contention is in the
predictability of the Underground. For Gregory this is an agony; if for some reason the
Underground Railway threw a person up at Baker Street when they expected Victoria,
that would be worthy of poetry. Syme has the opposite reaction. He replies:
The rare, strange thing is to hit the mark; the gross obvious thing is to miss
it. We feel it is epical when man with one wild arrow strikes a distant bird.
Is it not also epical when a man with one wild engine strikes a distant
station? Chaos is dull, because in chaos, the train might indeed go
anywhere, to Baker Street or Bagdad. But man is a magician, and his
whole magic is in this, that he does say Victoria, and lo! it is Victoria. (13)
Syme strikes a truth here, that chaos is only interesting if it is limited. Absolute chaos is
unmeaning. Even poetry that disrupts convention must still follow certain conventions if
it is going to mean anything. Otherwise gibberish is the equivalent of Paradise Lost, and
a monkey on a typewriter is no less a poet than John Milton, and maybe even a better one
for the monkey’s poetry would be truly anarchic. As Chesterton wrote in Orthodoxy:
Anarchism adjures us to be bold creative artists, and care for no laws or
limits. But it is impossible to be an artist and not care for laws or limits.
Art is limitation; the essence of every picture is the frame. If you draw a
giraffe, you must draw him with a long neck. If, in your bold creative way,
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you hold yourself free to draw a giraffe with a short neck, you will really
find that you are not free to draw a giraffe. (243)
The context of this quote is a disagreement with the will-worshippers, those who see
human will as the means of escaping rationalism. Chesterton’s argument against that
view is an effective commentary on Dostoevsky’s underground man. For all his praise of
human will and the necessity of free choice the underground man is stuck in inertia. His
paralysis prevents him from making the choice to love Liza. The underground man is
unable to make an act of will because the underground man is afraid of limitation; the
irony is that the underground man is therefore no longer free.
But Syme’s argument goes further. The appreciation for the Underground
Railway goes beyond the need for limitation, for the dullness inherent in an anarchic
world. It extends to a recognition of the wonder of existence, a further recognition of the
wonder of things going right. Syme continues:
I tell you…that every time a train comes in, I feel that it has broken past
batteries of besiegers, and that man has won a battle against chaos. You
say contemptuously that when one has left Sloane Square, one must come
to Victoria. I say that one might do a thousand things instead, and that
whenever I really come there, I have the sense of hairbreadth escape. And
when I hear the guard shout out the world ‘Victoria,’ it is not an
unmeaning word. It is to me the cry of a herald announcing conquest. (14)
Rather than seeing chaos as a disruption of an overbearing order, Syme pictures order as
a ballast against the overwhelming chaos of existence. There is a similarity here to
William Barrett’s description of Karl Jaspers as a man who “philosophizes in order to
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illumine human existence, but who sees this illumination as a tiny and flickering light set
against the encompassing darkness of the forces of night” (33). Later in the novel, the
narrator informs his readers Syme “always felt that government stood alone and
desperate, with its back to the wall” (43). Unlike Jaspers, however, Syme sees the
threatening chaos as a call to an adventure. It is a “battle,” a “hairbreadth escape,” a
“conquest.”
The call to see existence as an adventure emerges from Chesterton’s commitment
to restoring our wonder at existence. Even something as familiar as the Underground
Railway is worthy of our best defense. This attitude of finding proper perspective
permeated Chesterton’s thought. Alzina Stone Dale writes, “His sense that the world was
a moral battleground had helped him fight to keep the attitude that has been labeled his
‘facile optimism,’ so that he could recover the wonder and surprise at ordinary life he had
once felt as a child” (118). Christopher Hollis describes Chesterton’s reaction to Slade as
“a passionate and exuberant affirmation of the splendour of existence” (56). As we saw
Royal argue, “Perhaps the most salient feature of Chesterton’s work is its sheer
exuberance and joy in existence” (86). The philosophical danger posed by anarchism was
the rejection of a firm conviction in the goodness of existence.
If existence is the wonderful, joyful thing, then it makes sense that one ought to
fight against those who would devalue it at all cost. It is this battle to which Syme is
called. As Heretics and Orthodoxy make clear, this was not a battle Chesterton took
lightly. Chesterton’s transformation of this ideological battle into a real, physical one
with policemen on one side and anarchists on the other is not a mere poetical
exaggeration. When Syme is recruited as a detective he is told of a “service for those
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whose fears for humanity were concerned rather with the aberrations of the scientific
intellect than with the normal and excusable, though excessive, outbreaks of the human
will” (44). The true danger lay not with the common criminal who “accept the essential
ideal of man” and “merely seek it wrongly,” but with “the entirely lawless modern
philosopher” (46) who “is not trying to alter things, but to annihilate them” (47). From
his essays it is clear Chesterton truly did believe that modern philosophy led to dead ends.
While he does not attribute to his ideological opponents the sinister motives of his
fictional anarchists, he believed the results of their philosophy would be essentially the
same. It is thus absolutely essential for one to hold onto existence, to fight for good of
common humanity even if the fight is doomed.
The language the novel uses to describe this battle is apocalyptic. When Syme is
engaged as a detective he admits he has no experience. The man in the dark room replies,
‘No one has any experience…of the Battle of Armageddon” (49), and in response to
Symes objection, “I don’t know any profession of which mere willingness is the final
test,” the invisible chief responds, ‘I do…Martyrs. I am condemning you to death” (49).
When Syme steps onto the steam tug that will take him to the Central Anarchist Council
the atmosphere is described in terms of “dead daylight” on an “emptier planet” circling a
“sadder star” (50). When he sees the Anarchist’s Council for the first time the narrator
describes Syme’s state of mind using the imagery of an “old-world fable” where “if a
man went westward to the end of the world, he would find something—say a tree—that
was more or less than a tree, a tree possessed by a spirit; and that if he went east to the
end of the world, he would find something else that was not wholly itself—a tower,
perhaps, of which the very shape was wicked” (63). The anarchists “seemed to stand up,

152
violent and unaccountable, against an ultimate horizon, visions from the verge,” and
create the sense that “[t]he ends of the earth were closing in” (63). But this imagery
extends beyond the battle itself. At the beginning of the novel, before Syme is introduced,
the narrator describes a “strange sunset” that “looked like the end of the world” where the
“whole was so close about the earth, as to express nothing but a violent secrecy” (11).
The apocalyptic imagery establishes the allegorical mode of the novel. The novel feels
like a battle for the fate of humanity.
In the plot of the novel, however, the danger of Gregory’s anarchism at first goes
unrecognized. After Syme and Gabriel finish their first dialogue Rosamond asks Syme if
he and her brother mean what they say. Syme assures her that Gregory is quite safe. But
Gregory is in truth very serious about his anarchy; it is not merely a posture he takes
concerning art, but rather suggestive of his whole view of life. When Gregory reveals he
belongs to a secret anarchist organization the novel ceases to be a philosophical drama
that takes place in drawing rooms and becomes something more. This is the allegorical
turn, where the battle for the soul of the world becomes a literal battlefield where ideas
will lead to crossed swords.
It is a lonely and isolating battle. When Gregory sets out to reveal the hidden
counsel of anarchists, he extracts a promise from Syme not to go to the police. Once
Gregory has him in his secret underground base, Syme reveals, after receiving a similar
promise of secrecy from Gregory, that he too wears the garb of a poet as a disguise. The
result of this is a mutual checkmate. Syme tells Gregory,
I can’t tell the police you are an anarchist. You can’t tell the anarchists I’m
a policeman. I can only watch you, knowing what you are; you can only
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watch me, knowing what I am. In short, it’s a lonely, intellectual duel, my
head against yours. I’m a policeman deprived of the help of the police.
You, my poor fellow, are an anarchist deprived of the help of that law and
organization that is so essential to anarchy. (30)
Syme’s sense of isolation carries throughout the novel. Syme manages to supplant
Gregory as the newly elected Thursday on the Central Anarchist Council and is taken to
London for breakfast with the other days. The effectiveness of this scene rests on
Chesterton’s ability to evoke an atmosphere. He does this initially through Syme’s
introduction to the secretary of the council, Monday. The secretary is described as “pale,”
“intellectual,” “ascetic,” and even “noble,” but with an unnatural stillness broken
suddenly by a crooked smile: “There was the silent river and the silent man, a man of
even classic face. And there was the last nightmare touch that his smile suddenly went
wrong” (53). When Monday speaks it is with an “utterly dead voice…as if all friendly
words were to him lifeless conveniences” (54).
But whatever uncanniness Monday evokes pales in comparison with the
impression Sunday, the head of the council, produces. Sunday is “too large to see” (55), a
“mountain of a man” (55) “planned enormously in his original proportions, like a statue
carved deliberately as colossal” (55-56), and “enlarged terribly to scale” (56). The
narrator describes the effect Sunday has on Syme: “Twice already that night, little
unmeaning things had peeped out at him almost pruriently, and given him a sense of
drawing nearer and nearer to the headquarters of hell. And this sense became
overpowering as he drew nearer to the great president” (56). As Syme walks towards the
balcony “the large face of Sunday grew larger and larger; and Syme was gripped with a
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fear that when he was quite close, the face would be too big to be possible, and that he
would scream aloud” (56-57). Sunday’s largeness is unnerving; one is reminded of
Conrad’s wilderness, of the immense wilderness that looms over Marlow.
In comparison with Sunday the rest of the council at first appears “sufficiently
commonplace” (57). This, however, only lasts when the other anarchists are compared
with the president. Each one has “a demoniac detail somewhere” along the lines of the
secretary’s crooked smile; each one is “subtly and differently wrong” (58, 59). Monday
appears wasted away by thought. Tuesday is too hairy with “every diablerie that can
come from the utterly grotesque” (57). Wednesday carries with him “a rich atmosphere
that suffocated” (59). Friday expresses not “decrepitude merely, but corruption” as if
movement would cause an arm or a leg to fall off (60). Finally, Saturday wears dark
glasses that remind Syme of “half-remembered ugly tales, of some story about pennies
being put on the eyes of the dead” (61) and “Syme even had the thought that his eyes
might be covered up because they were too frightful to see” (61). Together, these
anarchists create a “sense of an unnatural symbolism” (63).
Each of the other members of the council have a touch of the inhuman, and this
heightens our sense of the danger Syme is in, as does the fact that Sunday appears to be
staring at Syme throughout the breakfast. The narrator informs us, “[I]t never occurred to
[Syme] to doubt that the president and his council could crush him if he continued to
stand alone” (65). And yet, because of Syme’s code of honor, he is unable to reach out to
the policeman below the balcony. He is severed from that source of help. He is, as Barrett
says, “solitary and unsheltered before his own death” (34). It is only by deciding that
common humanity, as symbolized in the music of a barrel organ, is worthy of defense
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that Syme able to gain the courage to maintain his course. To Syme, “The jingling music
seemed full of the vivacity, the vulgarity, and the irrational valor of the poor” and he felt
himself to be “the ambassador of all these common and kindly people in the street, who
every day marched into battle to the music of the barrel organ” (67). Syme is filled with
the conviction that “the president was wrong and that the barrel organ was right” (68),
and that on this horrible council it is Syme’s responsibility to fight for the common
people.
In spite of that decision the sense of isolation persists, especially throughout the
various chase scenes that make up the bulk of the middle portions of the novel. The first
of these is the Professor de Worms, or Friday, the decrepit old man who looks to be on
the brink of death. Unaccountably, the professor is somehow able to keep pace with a
fleeing Syme through the snowy streets of London. The literary atmosphere is built
through the scene’s weather. The narrator writes, “As he crossed the great market, the
snow increased, growing blinding and bewildering as the afternoon began to darken. The
snowflakes tormented him like a swarm of silver bees. Getting into his eyes and beard,
they added their unremitting futility to his already irritated nerves” (77). Later the
narrator describes the sky “loaded with the clouds of snow, leaving London in a darkness
and oppression premature for that hour of the evening” (78). Furthermore, “Under the
white fog of snow high up in the heaven, the whole atmosphere of the city was turned to
a very queer kind of green twilight, as of men under the sea. The sealed and sullen sunset
behind the dark dome of St. Paul’s had in it smoky and sinister colors—colors of sickly
green, dead red, or decaying bronze” (78-79). And yet, as with the barrel organ in his
time of trial, Syme sees the top of St. Paul’s cathedral lit with a singular splash of light
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and this symbol gives him the courage to face his pursuer. Chesterton’s existentialism is
marked by this courage; the bravery to maintain faith when all of existence seems to deny
it.
Syme’s experience is described in terms of sightlessness, confusion,
pointlessness, disease, and evil. This atmosphere evokes Syme’s fear of isolation, what
the novel identifies as his great fear: “Through all this ordeal, his root horror had been
isolation” (90). Even when Syme discovers that the Professor de Worms is in actuality an
actor in disguise as the German Nihilist, he is still prey to his fears of isolation. Though
the narrator asserts “there are no words to express the abyss between isolation and having
one ally” (90), Syme is still acutely aware of the threat of loneliness. Forgetting the secret
code of hand signals the professor taught him Syme is plagued by sudden fears. Syme
asks himself a series of questions:
His first thought was that the professor had gone mad, but his second
thought was more frightful. After all, what did he know about this queer
creature whom he had heedlessly accepted as a friend? What did he know,
except that the man had been at the anarchist breakfast and had told him a
ridiculous tale? How improbable it was that there should be another friend
there beside Gogol! Was this man’s silence a sensational way of declaring
war? Was this adamantine stare after all only the awful sneer of some
threefold traitor, who had turned for the last time? He stood and strained
his ears I this heartless silence. He almost fancied he could hear
dynamiters come to capture him shifting softly in the corridor outside. (99)
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Though Syme eventually realizes that the professor has been communicating to him all
along, the fact that so soon after discovering in the professor an ally Syme is immediately
thrown back into his doubts indicates that the feeling of isolation is a real and powerful
experience. Though Syme discovers his fears are unwarranted the fear is nevertheless
real. The actual reality or unreality of the fear’s object does not negate the reality of that
fear.
In each of the following confrontations with the anarchists, there is a fear that
must be faced and overcome. With Tuesday it is the fear of discovery. With Friday it is
the fear of nightmare, of the uncanny. Dr. Bull, or Saturday, is the next anarchist
encountered. There is to this scientist “a quality of cold sanity worse than the wild
adventures of the past” (100), a “murderous materialism” (100) and “unbearable reality”
(102) and the sense that Syme “was ascending the house of reason, a thing more hideous
than unreason itself” (100). Later the narrator explains the difference between the fear
inspired by Friday and that inspired by Saturday: “The first was the old fear that any
miracle might happen, the second the more hopeless modern fear that no miracle can ever
happen” (118). The fear Saturday represents is the destruction of freedom at the hands of
materialism.61 These two fears form the basis of a comparison before Syme’s duel with
the Marquis, who serves as Wednesday on the council. Syme remembers “how the fear of
the professor had been the fear of the tyrannic accidents of nightmare, and how the fear
of the doctor had been the fear of the airless vacuum of silence” (118). But these two
fears are reduced to “fancies” (118) when Syme duels Wednesday. At the clashing of
their swords Syme is struck with the “great fact of the fear of death, with its coarse and

61

See Chesterton’s comments on materialism in Orthodoxy, 225-228.
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pitiless common sense” (118). Gradually, however, this fear is replaced by another one:
the fear of the occult. When Syme stabs the Marquis and Wednesday does not bleed “the
heaven of Syme again grew black with supernatural terrors” (120) and “this new spiritual
dread was a more awful thing than had been the mere spiritual topsy-turvydom
symbolized by the paralytic who pursued him. The professor was only a goblin; this man
was a devil—perhaps he was the devil!” (120).
The fear Monday raises in the detectives is perhaps the worst, and that is the fear
of an entire world gone mad. As Syme, the professor, Dr. Bull, and the Marquis flee
through the French countryside they are helped on their way by good, solid Frenchmen.
Yet as they flee Monday’s mob those who help them are gradually turned against them. A
colonel, a peasant, an innkeeper, and a professional all help them along their way, and
then, in reverse order, are revealed to have turned against them.
Throughout this chase the detectives, apart from Wednesday, continue to express
disbelief at how rapidly and suddenly the world seemed to turn against them. At first,
when it is just the secretary and an unknown mob Syme says in disbelief that Sunday
“cannot have carried the world with a rush like that” (129) and objects that the anarchists
“can’t be running the real world in that way” (131). When it appears the innkeeper has
given the anarchists horses, Syme exclaims “I don’t believe he’d do it” (140). Reacting to
the pessimism of Wednesday—whose real name is Ratcliffe—Dr. Bull says, “If you
really think that ordinary people in ordinary houses are anarchists, you must be madder
than an anarchist yourself. If we turned and fought those fellows, the whole town would
fight for us” (143). Only when they see the representatives of the different classes of
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Frenchmen at the head of the mob after them do they admit along with Ratcliffe that the
world is indeed against them.
The fear is on one hand a fear of a mass of unthinking humanity—of man turned
into machine. While Syme can see them as distinct figures, “he was increasingly
surprised by the way in which they moved as one man” (134). There is something
unnatural about how they advanced. “They moved with a sort of dreadful and wicked
woodenness, like a staring army of automatons” (134). This fear is subordinating to a
more essential fear, and that is of humanity becoming inhuman. Ratcliffe vocalizes this
fear with the statement, “We are the last of mankind” (150). Despite revealing each
member of the anarchist council as a detective in disguise, the sense of isolation is never
quite dismissed. When Dr. Bull is revealed to be a buoyant, energetic young man of
commonplace goodness Syme observes “[W]e three are alone on this planet” (109); when
the Marquis is unmasked as Ratcliffe he says “there were just five people, perhaps who
would have resisted him” (126). But perhaps the best expression of the isolation that
plagued the detectives is immediately after they flee the secretary’s mob by entering a
nearby wood.
In the wood Syme experiences the solipsism that Chesterton identified with
Impressionism. When a trick of the light turns Ratcliffe’s face into a facsimile of the
black half-masks of their pursuers Syme begins to ask, “Was he wearing a mask? Was
anyone wearing a mask? Was anyone anything?” (130). The narrative continues:
This wood of witchery in which men’s faces turned black and white by
turns, in which their figures first swelled into sunlight and then faded into
formless night, this mere chaos of chiaroscuro (after the clear daylight
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outside), seemed to Syme a perfect symbol of the world in which he had
been moving for three days, this world where men took off their beards
and their spectacles and their noses, and turned into other people. (130)
As Christopher Hollis writes, in confronting Impressionism “Syme is left to face the last
and most awful of his fears, the fear that there is no reality, that all is mask” (57). Syme
begins to question the reality of existence itself.
Here, the narrative explains why it borrows from nonsense literature. After all,
nothing is so effective at communicating the sense of bewilderment that accompanies the
mental isolation of the existential crisis. One thinks of Kafka’s “Metamorphosis” or of
Sartre’s Nausea when Roquentin asks, “What if something were to happen?...And
someone else might feel something scratching in his mouth. He goes to the mirror, opens
his mouth: and his tongue is an enormous, live centipede, rubbing its legs together and
scraping his palate” (158-159). How do we react in such a universe? To what can we
cling?
He felt almost inclined to ask after all these bewilderments what was a
friend and what an enemy. Was there anything that was apart from what it
seemed? The marquis had taken off his nose and turned out to be a
detective. Might he not just as well take off his head and turn out to be a
hobgoblin? Was not everything, after all, like this bewildering woodland,
this dance of dark and light? Everything only a glimpse, the glimpse
always unforeseen and always forgotten. (Thursday 130-131)
This is an extraordinary description of the feeling of the existential crisis, of the radical
subjectivity that cannot see beyond appearances. At any moment anything might
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undermine the reality we have accepted. How can we know that the world is as we
perceive it?
Chesterton’s description of the world reduced to a “glimpse always unforeseen
and always forgotten” grasps the lack of certainty in this experience. In this world what
has come before can have no impact on what is, and what is cannot indicate what will be.
“For Gabriel Syme had found in the heart of that sun-splashed wood what many modern
painters had found there. He had found the thing that modern people call impressionism,
which is another name for that final skepticism that can find no floor to the universe”
(131). There is in this radical skepticism nothing that can be grasped, no foundation to
fall back on. Chesterton’s account of impressionism contains echoes of William Barrett’s
description of existential themes: “Alienation and estrangement; a sense of the basic
fragility and contingency of human life; the impotence of reason confronted with the
depths of existence; the threat of Nothingness, and the solitary and unsheltered condition
of the individual before this threat” (36). Syme is alienated and estranged, unsure “what
was a friend and what an enemy.” He senses the fragility and contingency in the “dance
of dark and light” that leaves everything a “glimpse unforeseen and always forgotten.”
The threat of Nothingness is contained in the question, “Was anyone anything?”
While Syme is able to escape his final skepticism, the novel describes as
“genuine” these doubts (131). This brings us to an important point of existentialism: it
can be easy to feel that the existential attitude is one of constant doubt, of total
skepticism. However, the novels The Stranger and Nausea do not end with Meursault and
Roquentin trapped in their doubt. Instead, they each have a moment of realization that
gives them the strength to move forward. In other words, the existential crisis must lead
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somewhere; otherwise, it is no different from nihilism. In this passage, a stunning account
of the doubts that accompany an existential crisis, The Man Who Was Thursday realizes
the threat of nihilism. The question becomes how can one go forward? How can one
answer these doubts?
The answer comes with another unmasking. For most of this novel we have
understood an allegory of a fight against anarchy as a fight for humanity against the
philosophies that would destroy it. Once we find out that Monday is like the rest of the
anarchist council, a detective in disguise, the allegory undergoes a metamorphosis. This
is summed up in an exchange that occurs just before the six detectives—including
Gogol—go to meet Sunday once again:
“This is more cheerful,” said Dr. Bull. “We are six men going to ask one
man what he means.”
“I think it is a bit queerer than that,” said Syme. “I think it is six men
going to ask one man what they mean.” (157)
For the majority of the story it has been the fate of the world that was in doubt. The
detectives themselves have had a sense of certainty that they were fighting the good fight.
The doubts extended outward; never inward. But here the doubts are turned back on
themselves. Syme’s reframing of their confrontation of Sunday turns the focus inward.
While at first it might sound like an echo of the Socratic charge to know thyself, it is
more that they understand themselves only when cast up against Sunday.
The Six Philosophers
When the original allegory is unmasked, the novel ceases to be about an intense
drama between order and anarchy and becomes instead an allegory about various
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philosophies’ attempts to solve the riddle of existence. The image of six detectives
chasing each other around while missing the entire point becomes an image of
philosophies engaged in heated debate while missing the most important question. By
bringing in these six allegorical figures into the realm of nonsense literature, Chesterton
turns the conflict from detectives against anarchists into characters against setting. As
existentialism asserts, the individual is embedded into a situation and must philosophize
out of that situation. The Man Who Was Thursday places the detectives in a situation that
actively resists their attempts at philosophy.
It might be tempting to treat each of the detectives only as he is revealed at the
end, but the novel itself indicates that the anarchist they pretend to be is a kind of
exaggeration of the detective. For instance, the professor de Worms describes Tuesday as
an “idealist” (90). This refers not only to his absurd disguise as an idealized figure of an
anarchist, it also describes Tuesday’s persona on the anarchist council. For example,
when Sunday accurately points out the idealist does not “seem to know anything about
mankind” (69), Gogol responds, “I die for zem…and I slay zare oppressors” (69). Like
Sartre’s humanist who is revealed as a pedophile, a man who loves humanity in the
abstract but cannot care for them in the concrete, Tuesday is ignorant of the men and
women he wishes to free. At the end of the novel, the narrator observes, “his simplicity
well symbolized” by being clothed as the division of the waters. There is a consistency to
Gogol that is maintained throughout his various guises.
This holds true for all the days of the week. As the title to the second to last
chapter “The Six Philosophers” indicates, each detective represents one means of
understanding and making sense of the world. As anarchists, these figures represent those
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philosophies run amok. This is indicated by the narrator when Syme first begins to note
each individual’s subtle wrongness: “Each figure seemed to be, somehow on the
borderland of things, just as their theory was on the borderland of thought. He knew that
each one of these men stood at the extreme end, so to speak, of some wild road of
reasoning” (62-63). Who they are as anarchists is who they would become if they
pursued their own personal philosophy to its bitter end. This implies that contained in
each philosophic temperament is the possibility of anarchy. As Chesterton writes in
Orthodoxy that the madman “is in the clean and well-lit prison of one idea: he is
sharpened to one painful point. He is without healthy hesitation and healthy complexity”
(225). Any one philosophy will ultimately suffocate.
The first of these philosophers is the secretary, Monday, the rationalist. At the
first breakfast Syme observes his face is emaciated and thinks at first that he suffers from
a disease. But the “distress of his dark eyes denied this” (59). Syme realizes, “It was no
physical ill that troubled him. His eyes were alive with intellectual torture, as if pure
thought was pain” (59). This intellectualism appears in the debate on how to kill the czar
and the French president. When the Marquis observes he would rather kill the president
with a knife the secretary disagrees. “The knife was merely the expression of the old
personal quarrel with a personal tyrant. Dynamite is not only our best too but our best
symbol…It expands; it only destroys because it broadens; even so, thought only destroys
because it broadens” (66). Monday refuses to allow his anarchism to be personal;
rationality does not allow for something as personal as revenge. Monday continues, “My
brain feels like a bomb, night and day. It must expand! It must expand! A man’s brain
must expand, if it breaks up the universe” (66). Monday is prey to the madness
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Chesterton warns of in Orthodoxy, of the logical completeness that drives a man insane.
It is not surprising then that Dr. Bull says of Monday he “is the most utterly unhappy man
that was ever human” (108). These words from Orthodoxy seem to be directed at
Monday: “How much larger your life would be if your self could become smaller in it”
(223).
Even when Monday ceases to play the role of the anarchist, he is still marked by
rationality. Dressed in robes representative of the creation of light out of darkness, “Syme
felt also how perfectly this pattern of pure white and black expressed the soul of the pale
and austere secretary, with his inhuman veracity and his cold frenzy…this man’s eyes
were still stern. No smell of ale or orchards could make the secretary cease to ask a
reasonable question” (182). A similar perspective infuses the secretary’s contribution to
their debate over the nature of Sunday.
[W]hen I first saw Sunday, he expressed to me, not your airy vitality, but
something both gross and sad in the nature of things…He sat there on a
bench, a huge heap of a man, dark and out of shape. He listened to all my
words without speaking or even stirring. I poured out my most passionate
appeals and asked my most eloquent questions. Then, after a long silence,
the thing began to shake, and I thought it was shaken by some secret
malady. It shook like a loathsome and living jelly. It reminded me of
everything I had ever read about the base bodies that are the origin of
life—the deep sea lumps and protoplasm. It seemed like the final form of
matter, the most shapeless and the most shameful. (170-171)
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To a rationalist who loves order and neatness the most unnerving thing would be the
shapelessness of matter. A rationalist wants the world to make sense, to be divided into
neat categories and neat definitions. The actual material of the universe is gross; it does
not compare to the cleanliness of pure thought. For Monday to come across something
“gross” and “shapeless,” something like a “living jelly” is to come across that aspect of
the world that disturbs his philosophy the most.
Tuesday’s reaction to Sunday is typical of the idealism described above. In
response to Syme’s query Gogol responds, “I don’t think of Sunday on principle…any
more than I stare at the sun at noonday” (172). Tuesday’s reaction to Sunday is to flee
back to his ideals. He avoids dealing with that which challenges his idealism. For this
reason Tuesday is the simplest, and the reason he is featured the least in the novel. He
lacks the complexity of the other detectives. The idealist’s perspective is a simple one. It
is also the easiest to break apart, and why Tuesday is the first detective outed on the
Central Anarchist Council.
It is fitting we move now to the most complex of the six philosophers,
Wednesday. The relationship between his disguise as the Marquis and his reality as
Inspector Ratcliffe is harder to recognize. At first Syme feels “that the man carried a rich
atmosphere with him, a rich atmosphere that suffocated. It reminded one irrationally of
drowsy odors and of dying lamps in the darker poems of Byron and Poe” (59). His mouth
is “sensual and scornful” and Syme is reminded of Persian tyrants. It is he who wants to
knife the French president because “it would be a new emotion to get a knife into a
French president and wriggle it round” (66). We have already discussed how he strikes
Syme as a devil. After he is revealed as Inspector Ratcliffe, the narrative describes him as

167
a pessimist (145), and his contributions during their flight from the secretary confirm this
description. He is attached to attitudes of gloom (129, 144), contempt (129), and scorn
(131). But instead of “drowsy odors” and a “rich atmosphere that suffocates” he is turned
in a figure of clear and placid pessimism with a “square, sensible face” of “not unfriendly
cynicism” (182). What is the connection? What wild road of reasoning leads a pessimist
to the poetry of Byron and Poe, to the violence of ancient Assyria?
It is substantially this: pessimism will lead to boredom, and boredom will lead to
decadence. Ratcliffe represents the darkest days of Chesterton’s Slade School doubt,
where he felt “a certain mood of unreality and sterile isolation” (Autobiography 88).
While Chesterton identifies as the primary cause a “moral anarchy within” (89), he
admits his mood in part “may have been due to the atmosphere of the Decadents, and
their perpetual hints of the luxurious horrors of paganism” (89). He describes being
“overpowered and oppressed with a sort of congestion of imagination” and having “an
overpowering impulse to record or draw horrible ideas and images; plunging in deeper
and deeper as in a blind spiritual suicide” (89). This Chesterton identifies as “the darkest
depths of the contemporary pessimism” (89). The idea that pessimism leads to decadence
is a logical one. If the world will always disappoint then the only logical conclusion apart
from suicide is to pursue pleasure. But the pursuit of pleasure will lead to ennui, and
ennui will lead to the diabolic.62 The individual’s only motivation will be the new. Thus
we have the Marquis’s reason for using a knife, because “it would be a new emotion.”

Chesterton’s essay “The Diabolist” is an interesting point of comparison. In this essay Chesterton recalls
a conversation he had with another student about the nature of morality. Chesterton expresses the idea that
“heresy is worse even than sin” and error “more menacing than a crime, for an error begets crime” (272)
and concludes “I hate modern doubt because it is dangerous” (273). This leads his companion replies, “You
mean dangerous to morality” (273) and then asks why Chesterton cares about morality. Chesterton
62
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Wednesday’s impression of Sunday is one of absentminded cruelty. He begins by
describing Sunday as “ordinary” and “neat” but “absentminded” (171). He continues:
For hours, he forgets that you are there. Now absentmindedness is just a
bit too awful in a bad man We think of a wicked man as vigilant. We can’t
think of a wicked man who is honestly and sincerely dreamy, because we
daren’t think of a wicked man alone with himself. An absentminded man
means a good-natured man. It means a man who, if he happens to see you,
will apologize. But how will you bear an absentminded man who, if he
happens to see you, will kill you? That is what tries the nerves, abstraction
combined with cruelty. Men have felt it sometimes when they went
through wild forests, and felt that the animals there were at once innocent
and pitiless. They might ignore or slay. How would you like to pass ten
mortal hours in a parlor with an absentminded tiger? (171)
While Monday’s fear is of that which lacks form, and Tuesday’s fear is of that which
blinds, Wednesday’s fear is of that which is careless. How can the pessimist expect the
worst and yet be terrified of those expectations being met? The pessimist fears evil that
lacks cause; the pessimist fears the cruel indifference of the world. This is what Thomas
Hardy expresses in “Hap,” that “Crass Casualty” dictates the arc of our lives (9). An
organized evil can be anticipated; a focused evil can be countered. A random evil, an

responds by saying, essentially, that what makes life good and beautiful is only good and beautiful because
it rests on a pyramid of virtues. Every act of evil extinguishes a bit of that goodness. The other man replies,
“But shall I not find in evil a life of its own? Granted that for every woman I ruin one of those red sparks
will go out: will not the expanding pleasure of ruin…” (275) but is interrupted by Chesterton, who says he
ought to be burned as a devil-worshipper. “Perhaps,” he replies, “Only what you call evil I call good”
(275). Chesterton concludes by observing that the man “committed suicide…with tools of pleasure” (276).
It would appear that the figure of the Marquis is, at least in part, inspired by this man, from his “pleasure of
ruin” to his association with the devil.
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unpredictable evil, cannot. One does not even have the pleasure of directing ire against
“some vengeful god” who enjoys causing suffering. Pain is purely coincidental. Perhaps
the pessimist’s fear makes more sense when connected with decadence: if all you are
living for is to experience something new, nothing could be as terrifying as facing the
possibility that the next experience could be your last.
The difference between the pessimist and the nihilist is that the former accepts the
world. The pessimist distrusts the world; the nihilist distrusts that there is a world.
Wednesday fears Sunday’s absentminded cruelty; Friday fears there is no Sunday.
The professor de Worms is complicated for similar reasons as Ratcliffe, for the
difference between man and mask is more stark than it is for the secretary, Gogol, Syme,
or Dr. Bull. The key difference between Wednesday and Friday is that the former does
remove his mask whereas Friday never does. Other than when he sprints after Syme the
actor playing the professor remains stuck in his role, like a method actor who never
finished his part. He tells Syme, “I acted the paralytic professor so well, that now I can’t
leave off” (96) and at the end acts “with the elderly manner that he could never
disconnect from his bleached beard and parchment face” (167). As a result, though we
know little about the actor before he became a living portrait, he becomes something of a
nihilist himself.
Friday’s tendency towards nihilism is exhibited when he and Syme discuss
stopping the marquis and Dr. Bull. When Syme question’s the professor’s courage, he
responds, “You think that it is possible to pull down the president. I know that it is
impossible and I am going to try it” (88). There is to the professor a sense of resignation;
that nothing he can do will make a difference. But he resists actual nihilism by deciding
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that it is worth doing anyway. Later the professor admits he is “afraid of asking Sunday
who he really is” out of “fear he might tell me” (156). This comment reveals how deeply
doubt has penetrated. The professor doubts whether he wants his doubts answered.
However, it is his experience of Sunday that most strongly reveals his nearness to
nihilism. Answering Syme’s prompting the professor says, “[W]hen I saw Sunday’s face,
I thought it was too large—everybody does, but I also thought it was too loose. The face
was so big that one couldn’t focus it or make it a face at all. The eye was so far away
from the nose that it wasn’t an eye. The mouth was so much by itself that one had to
think of it by itself” (172). For the professor, Sunday resists comprehension. Friday fears
a world without connection. In Heretics Chesterton argues, “The human brain is a
machine for coming to conclusions” (196). The professor is one whose doubts prevent
him from reaching conclusions. He compares Sunday to those occasional impressions of
a human face that appear as a result of an accident of perspective. He continues,
“Sunday’s face escaped me; it ran away to right and left, as such chance pictures run
away. And so his face has made me, somehow, doubt whether there are any faces” (172).
The professor’s impression of Sunday is like Syme’s experience of impressionism in the
wood.
In his Autobiography, Chesterton’s own struggle with impressionism is described
as a taking of skepticism to its ultimate end. He describes thinking his “way back to
thought itself” (88) He observes, “It is a very dreadful thing to do; for it may lead to
thinking that there is nothing but thought” (88). He concludes, “While dull atheists came
and explained to me that there was nothing but matter, I listened with a sort of calm
horror of detachment, suspecting that there was nothing but mind…The atheist told me so
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pompously that he did not believe there was any God; and there were moments when I
did not even believe there was any atheist” (88).
It is this view that frightens the professor. “Oh, the doubts of a materialist are not
worth a dump. Sunday has taught me the last and the worst doubts, the doubts of a
spiritualist…My poor dear Bull, I do not believe that you really have a face. I have not
faith enough to believe in matter” (172-173). The professor represents the horrors of
solipsism. He represents doubt taken to its absolute extreme. He represents skepticism
taken as far as it can go. As a result, the professor represents the threat of nihilism. He is
not a nihilist himself, but the doubts Friday struggles with are the doubts that, if left
unchecked, lead to nihilism. The man has come to resemble the mask.
Amidst all these figures Saturday sticks out. This is in part due to his being the
optimist in the group; however, Saturday is better understood as the scientist. With his
glasses on Dr. Bull represents science unrestrained by humanity. The narrator emphasizes
Saturday’s virility and vitality, and before he is revealed as a detective is the one Syme
and the professor fear the most. It is his “brutal sanity” that makes Saturday so
frightening (97). As Syme ascends the interminable stairs that lead to Dr. Bull’s residence
he is struck with “a quality of cold sanity worse than the wild adventures of the past”
(100). When he was chased by the professor it had the quality of a nightmare, but with
Dr. Bull there is no escape of waking up. Rather than dreamlike, the stairs’ “infinity was
more like the empty infinity of arithmetic, something unthinkable, yet necessary to
thought. Or it was like the stunning statements of astronomy about the distance of the
fixed stars. He was ascending the house of reason, a thing more hideous than unreason
itself” (100). Before he is unmasked Dr. Bull represents the worst of the materialists. As
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Chesterton writes in Orthodoxy, “Now it is the charge against the main deductions of the
materialist that, right or wrong, they gradually destroy his humanity…They may well call
their law the “chain” of causation. It is the worst chain that ever fettered a human being”
(228).
Once he is unmasked Dr. Bull represents the man who finds joy in finding out the
mysteries of material things. It is not that Dr. Bull is truly a materialist, in that he believes
there is nothing but matter, but rather Dr. Bull is so fascinated with the material he
forgets the immaterial. Thus, while every other detective is demanding answers from
Sunday, Dr. Bull, though he understands nothing, is happy and simply goes to sleep
(186). Metaphysical questions bear no interest for him.63 Bull departs from the others in
liking Sunday. He says, “Moderate strength is shown in violence; supreme strength is
shown in levity” (170). But Bull is not Nietzsche, who admires strength for being strong.
“No, it’s not an admiration of force, or any silly thing like that. There is a kind of gaiety
in the thing, as if he were bursting with some good news. Haven’t you felt it on a spring
day? You know nature plays tricks, but somehow that day proves they are good natured
tricks” (170). He concludes, ‘Why do I like Sunday? How can I tell you?...because he’s
such a bounder” (170). As a scientist Bull is not plagued with the doubts of the
rationalist, principles of the idealist, distrust of the pessimist, or the fears of the nihilist.
This leaves only Thursday left. In addition to being named after an arcangel,
Gabriel Syme is the artist. His poetic sensibility informs his approach to the battle with

Bull shares Chesterton’s view of the boundaries of science. In the essay “Science and Religion”
Chesterton argues that science should be scientific. “To mix science up with philosophy is only to produce
a philosophy that has lost all its ideal value and a science that has lost all its practical value. I want my
private physician to tell me whether this or that food will kill me. It is for my private philosopher to tell me
whether I ought to be killed” (142-143). Bull’s lack of concern at the end of the novel is reflective of his
interest in science and result disinterest in philosophy.
63
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the anarchists, and it is the artist unchecked that we find at the end of Syme’s own “wild
road of reasoning.” Before he is recruited the narrator notes, “As he paced the Thames
embankment, bitterly biting a cheap cigar and brooding on the advance of anarchy, there
was no anarchist with a bomb in his pocket so savage or so solitary as he” (43).
Imagination if twisted can lead to isolation. But Syme is not an anarchist; his poetry is
too democratic for that. As the more balanced reality Syme reveals an attitude
characterized by a healthy indulgence in imagination. He has poetic intuitions that turn
out to be correct (103, 116). It is his artistic temperament that causes him to characterize
his doubt as impressionism instead of spiritualism as the professor does. He has a
continual impulse to turn things into symbols, such as the cross at the top of St. Paul’s
Cathedral or on the lamp Dr. Renard gives to the detectives when they borrow the car.
Twice, Syme invokes St. George to describe his situation. The first time is when he is
being taken by tug to the anarchist’s breakfast. The second occurs when the professor is
chasing him and Syme waits “as St. George waited for the dragon” (79). Syme derives
courage from thinking himself as part of a medieval romance. The narrator even
describes his defense of order as “quixotic” (43).
Syme represents those who are imaginative. The narrator describes “a spot on his
mind that was not quite sane” (42). But it is his imagination that keeps him sane. In the
chapter “The Maniac” Chesterton argues that imagination does not lead to insanity. So
while Syme’s sanity is a revolt (42), his poetry keeps him grounded. Yet Syme’s
imagination also allows him to understand insanity, as the similarly named poet Gabriel
Gale does in Chesterton’s novel The Poet and the Lunatics. Gabriel Gale’s power of
imagination enables him to think like a criminal, resembling Chesterton’s most famous
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figure Father Brown, whose familiarity with human evil enables him to understand those
who engage in wickedness. In The Man Who Was Thursday Syme’s imaginative, poetic
nature allows him the strongest grasp of who Sunday is. It is Syme, after all, who
recognizes their confrontation of Sunday not as six men going to ask one man what he
means, but six men going to ask one man what they mean.
Once everyone else has offered his understanding of Sunday, Syme notices “each
man of you can only find one thing to compare him to—the universe itself” (173). But
Syme is the only one of them to grasp most completely Sunday’s apparent dual nature.
“When I first saw Sunday,” he begins, “I only saw his back; and when I saw his back I
knew he was the worst man in the world” (173). He goes on to describe Sunday as an
animal, as a beast in human dress. He continues, “Then I entered the hotel and coming
round the other side of him, saw his face in the sunlight. His face frightened me, as it did
everyone; but not because it was brutal and not because it was evil. On the contrary, it
frightened me because it was so beautiful, because it was so good” (173). Later he
clarifies, “[W]hen I saw him from behind, I was certain he was an animal, and when I
saw him in front, I knew he was a god” (174).
While Syme gets nearer than the others his imagination still falls short of making
sense of who Sunday is. In fact, this is the point of having identifying the detectives as
the six philosophers. The rationalist, idealist, pessimist, artist, nihilist, and scientist
represent different ways of understanding the world, and yet each fails to make sense of
Sunday. Left to their own devices the detectives are idiots “running after each other like a
lot of confounded babies playing blind man’s bluff” (126). Even when they are no longer
working against each other the detectives are no nearer to making sense of Sunday; or, as
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Syme says, making sense of themselves. The novel emphasizes the detective’s failure to
understand.
This explains one of the more confusing passages of the book. After Sunday
reveals to the detectives that he was not only the head of the Central Anarchist Council
but also the man in the dark room who recruited them all to the fight against anarchy, he
leaps into a cab and leads the detectives on a reckless chase through the streets of
London. During this chase, Sunday throws notes at each of the six detectives. While the
novel gestures to nonsense literature throughout, this is the only time in which the
narrative does not provide an explanation.64 These notes therefore play an important role
in the narrative. The reader’s instinctual reaction is to assume that these notes mean
something, and that if one were only to discover the key these ridiculous notes would
make sense. Yet this would be an exercise in futility. These notes resist any attempts to
make sense of their content. Instead, the notes only make sense only in their nonsense.
These notes exist outside of any meaning. They are pure absurdity. These notes represent
the failure to understand. The only way for the reader to move forward is to accept that
she cannot make sense of them. Chesterton demands from his readers something like the
mysticism he discusses in Orthodoxy: “The whole secret of mysticism is this: that man
can understand everything by the help of what he does not understand” (231). In The Man
Who Was Thursday, the interpretation of novel is understood by what cannot be
interpreted.

While there is much in Chesterton’s novel that is confusing and remains unexplained—for instance, the
fight against anarchy seems to be a dream, yet Syme’s backstory contains most of the elements of that fight
before presumably Syme enters his nightmare. But in terms of the nonsense elements, like fleet-footed old
professors and marquises who do not bleed, those are explained in the course of the narrative.
64
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While a classic example of the Chestertonian paradox, this epigram has an
epistemological point: Chesterton’s fondness for limits. As he says in his Autobiography,
“All my life I have loved edges; and the boundary-line that brings one thing sharply
against another. All my life I have loved frames and limits; and I will maintain that the
largest wilderness looks larger seen through a window” (25-26). In this case our
understanding is brought up sharply against all that we do not understand. By introducing
these nonsensical notes Chesterton forces his readers to accept there are things to
existence that exist beyond our ken. And if we cannot accept that our ability to
comprehend existence is limited, we cannot comprehend Sunday; if we cannot admit that
our human understanding will always come up short, we cannot understand Sunday; if we
never realize our own failure to understand, we will never realize how Sunday is the
Peace of God.
Chesterton’s development of a literary form that combines nonsense and allegory
allows him to create the experience of running against limitations of our logic, our
perspective, and our interpretative schemas. This matters to both the plot of the novel and
for the larger vision of the world The Man Who Was Thursday realizes. As Kierkegaard,
Conrad, Sartre, and Camus all emphasize, the world resists our attempts to understand
it.65 By extension, then, existence itself is beyond human knowledge and beyond human
thought. From our limited, human perspective truth sometimes appears contradictory and

Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling describes the necessity of, through faith, the “teleological suspension
of the ethical” (128). In Conrad, this is most vividly seen in his use of the “incomprehensible” and similar
language to describe the wilderness. In Nausea, two of the more powerful diary entries focuses on
language’s inability to describe the world (124-135). Finally, Camus in The Myth of Sisyphus discusses
how the world “evades us because it becomes itself again” (14)
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we are forced to hold together and accept as true that with logic or reason would deny.66
In the plot of the novel, the need to accept the contradiction finds its representation in the
figure of Sunday.
The Paradox of Sunday
This question—who is Sunday?—is the question, what does it mean for your
greatest enemy to also be your greatest friend? This is the central paradox of the novel,
and the hinge for the narrative. Chesterton’s existentialism circles around who Sunday is
and what he represents. When Monday asks Sunday who he is Sunday answers, “I am the
Sabbath…I am the peace of God” (185). Yet, most of the detectives are unsatisfied. How
can Sunday be peace when he the detectives each had to endure his own dark night of the
soul?
Monday reacts with anger, befitting his rationalism.
“I know what you mean,” he cried, “and it is exactly that that I cannot
forgive you. I know you are contentment, optimism, what do they call the
thing, an ultimate reconciliation. Well, I am not reconciled. If you were
the man in the dark room, why were you also Sunday, an offence to the
sunlight? If you were from the first our father and our friend, why were
you also our greatest enemy?” (186)
The Peace of God makes no sense. It makes even less sense given the terror each of the
detectives lived under. How can Sunday be the Peace of God when he has caused the
detectives to suffer?

In Orthodoxy, Chesterton writes, “The ordinary man…has always cared more for truth than for
consistency. If he saw two truths that seemed to contradict each other, he would take the two truths and the
contradiction along with them” (230).
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The other detectives are similarly confused, though their reactions are different as
befits their temperament. Syme is not angry like the secretary, but he is unsatisfied. He
says, “My soul and heart are as happy and quiet here as this old garden, but my reason is
still crying out. I should like to know” (186). Ratcliffe observes, “It seems so silly that
you should have been on both sides and fought yourself” (186). Bull admits, “I
understand nothing, but I am happy. In fact, I am going to sleep” (186). The professor
disagrees, “I am not happy…because I do not understand. You let me stray a little too
near to hell” (186). Finally, Gogol sums up “with the absolute simplicity of a child” the
true cause for the detectives’ ache: “I wish I knew why I was hurt so much” (186).
Tuesday’s simple statement identifies the core of the problem: how can God have his
peace if existence is inundated with so much pain?
Syme’s description of Sunday as being brutish when seen from behind and benign
when seen from the front traces the beginnings of an answer for the detectives’ questions.
After his initial explanation Syme describes his impressions as they chased Sunday across
London:
I was suddenly possessed with the idea that the blind, blank back of his
head really was his face—an awful, eyeless face staring at me! And I
fancied that the figure running in front of me was really a figure running
backward, and dancing as he ran…It was exactly the worst instant of my
life. And yet ten minutes afterward when he put his head out of the cab
and made a grimace like a gargoyle, I knew that he was only like a father
playing hide-and-seek with his children. (174)
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While at times Sunday evokes the world in its worst horror, Syme believes that the horror
is a result of a trick of perspective. The eyeless face is merely an impression, not the way
things really are.
“Listen to me,” cried Syme with extraordinary emphasis. “Shall I tell you
the secret of the whole world? It is that we have only known the back of
the world. We see everything from behind, and it looks brutal. That is not
a tree, but the back of a tree. That is not a cloud, but the back of a cloud.
Cannot you see that everything is stooping and hiding a face? If we could
only get round in front—” (174).
Syme offers an explanation for the detective’s experience of horror. The brutality of
existence is a result of only seeing the back of the world. Our limited perspective as
individuals bound by time, space, and understanding prevents us from seeing beyond the
brutality of existence. It is Syme’s final expression here that brings to the forefront the
theme of the novel’s allegory. It is an expression of longing, an expression that admits to
not seeing the path to getting round in front. Syme recognizes his failure to understand,
the way in which his limited human perspective keeps him from seeing things as they
really are.67 However, there are no neat answers here, and Chesterton avoids falling into
easy Christian sentimentality. Syme does not see his way to seeing the face of the world.
If Syme is to find peace it will not be by means of his own philosophy.

The sentiment expressed by Syme here is similar to Father Brown’s in “The Sins of Prince Saradine.”
Explaining his comment about the final judgment Father Brown tells his host, “I mean that we here are on
the wrong side of the tapestry…The things that happen here do not seem to mean anything; they mean
something somewhere else” (161).
67
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In fact Sunday tells them this. When Syme asks Sunday what he is, Sunday
answers,
Bull, you are a man of science. Grub in the roots of those trees and find
out the truth about them. Syme, you are a poet. Stare at those morning
clouds and tell me or anyone the truth about morning clouds. But I tell you
this, you will have found out the truth of the last tree and the topmost
cloud before the truth about me. You will understand the sea, and I shall
be still a riddle; you shall know what the stars are and not know what I
am. Since the beginning of the world, all men have hunted me like a
wolf—kings and sages, poets and lawgivers, all the churches, and all the
philosophies. But I have never been caught yet. (159)
Science, poetry, politics, religion, and philosophy come up short. The mysteries of the
universe are more easily understood than who Sunday is. It is worth noting that this
response precedes Sunday telling the detectives he is the peace of God. However, the
statement still holds even after Sunday gives Syme and the other detectives an answer.
The detectives might know that Sunday is the peace of God, but they do not know what
that means. Indeed, they cannot know what that means because the peace of God is
beyond our understanding.
Chesterton’s characterization of the peace of God is based on the apostle Paul’s
letter to the Philippians. As Paul closes his letter, he tells his readers to not be anxious but
to let their requests be made known to God. Were they to do this, “[T]he peace of God,
which surpasses all understanding, will guard your hearts and your minds in Christ Jesus”
(4:7 ESV). The peace of God, then, is characterized in the Bible as something that exists
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beyond our comprehension. It reveals the limits of human understanding; none of the
detectives’ philosophies can make explain it. But if Sunday is the peace of God, why is
the peace of God both an anarchist and a policeman? Why does Chesterton make God’s
peace both the detectives’ enemy and their friend?
Syme begins to feel his way towards an answer when the anarchist poet Lucian
Gregory appears to lodge his complaint against Sunday. Gregory’s complaint is not
unlike Monday’s inability to forgive God his peace and not unlike Syme’s inability to
forgive the police their calm. Gregory claims, “The only crime of the government is that
it governs. The unpardonable sin of the supreme power is that it is supreme” (187). But
ultimately what Gregory finds offensive is their safety: “I do not curse you for being
cruel. I do not curse you (though I might) for being kind. I curse you for being safe!”
(187). He goes on, accusing them of never having had any trouble, for never having
suffered any real agony when he is interrupted by Syme who proclaims, “I see
everything” (188).
Why does each thing on earth war against each other thing? Why does
each small thing in the world have to fight against the world itself?...For
the same reason that I had to be alone in the dreadful council of the days:
so that each thing that obeys law may have the glory and isolation of the
anarchist; so that each man fighting for order may be as brave and good a
man as the dynamiter; so that the real lie of Satan may be flung back in the
face of this blasphemer; so that by tears and torture we may earn the right
to say to this man, ‘You lie!’ No agonies can be too great to buy the right
to say to this accuser, ‘We also have suffered.’ (188)
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It is no accident that before Gregory speaks Dr. Bull quotes The Book of Job, for
this is the inspiration for Chesterton’s answer to the anarchist. At the beginning of The
Book of Job, Satan appears before God. God asks him if he has noticed Job, who is
“blameless and upright” (1:8). Satan’s response is to say that Job only fears God and
abstains from evil because he is blessed. But, if God were to take away all that Job has,
Job would curse God to his face. And so Satan takes everything from Job, all his
possessions and all his children. The majority of the book is devoted to conversations
between Job and his three friends, who represent (like the six detectives) different
philosophies, different attempts at answering the question: why do we suffer? Each one
fails, and even though eventually God gives Job a hearing, Job is never told why he
suffers. Job is never told of the bet between God and Satan. The readers of The Book of
Job, however, do know, and this frame clarifies Syme’s answer.
The Book of Job is generally understood as an answer to the question why good
people suffer. In The Man Who Was Thursday, Chesterton picks up on a different
question, one asked not by the people of God but by those who view the people of God as
those for whom life has been easy. Faith is easy, this accusation says, when life is easy.
People who believe in God and trust him are those who have never understood the depths
of existence. They live on the surface of reality, ignorant of the pain and suffering that
occurs. It is an accusation which Chesterton would find himself accused of as his career
continued: an accusation of a false optimism originating from a blindness to the agonies
of existence. This is why Gregory curses the detectives for their safety. It is an accusation
that echoes Satan’s rhetorical question, “Does Job fear God for no reason? Have you not
put a hedge around him and his house and all that he has, on every side” (1:10). In other
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words, of course Job fears God, for God has made Job safe. Of course the detectives are
on the side of order, for they have never “suffered for one hour a real agony” (188).
Syme’s answer is to fling the accusation back. They have suffered. And in Syme’s
mind simply being able to say “We also have suffered” is worth the pain they have gone
through. But why is that? Why is that worth it? Why, we might ask, does Syme talk about
“the glory and isolation of the anarchist” and talk about being “as brave and good a man
as the dynamiter”? The answer is found by connecting Chesterton’s novel to
Kierkegaard’s meditation on faith in Fear and Trembling. In this work Kierkegaard
interrogates the phrase “Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him as
righteousness,” which appears in different forms in Genesis, Romans, Galatians, and
James. Kierkegaard observes the when Abraham left his homeland “he left his earthly
understanding behind and took faith with him” (58). Kierkegaard emphasizes that
Abraham’s belief was unreasonable; Abraham is considered the father of faith because he
believed even when that belief made no sense. Even as he grew old and his wife passed
the age of childbearing he believed that Yahweh would provide him with a son. Even
when Yahweh commanded him to sacrifice his son he believed. Kierkegaard writes:
There was many a father who lost his child; but then it was God, it was the
unalterable, the unsearchable will of the Almighty, it was His hand took
the child. Not so with Abraham. For him was reserved a harder trial, and
Isaac’s fate was laid along with the knife in Abraham’s hand. And there he
stood, the old man, with his only hope! But he did not doubt, he did not
look anxiously to the right or to the left, he did not challenge heaven with
his prayers. He knew that it was God the Almighty who was trying him, he
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knew that it was the hardest sacrifice that could be required of him. But he
knew also that no sacrifice was too hard when God required it—and he
drew the knife. (56)
How does this relate to Syme’s comment about the anarchist and the dynamiter?
It is that Abraham is left alone and without help. There is nothing to which he can appeal.
Abraham believed despite every piece of human wisdom telling him to doubt. From this
emerges Kierkegaard’s knight of faith who resembles the detectives, who “in the solitude
of the universe never hears any human voice but walks alone with his dreadful
responsibility” (150). This describes the detectives, especially in their most isolated but
even at the end when the entire world seems to fight for the anarchists. The detectives
fought for good when every human wisdom demanded despair. Sunday himself
recognizes this, even from the beginning when he recruits them into the great battle. He
tells the detectives, “I sat in the darkness, where there is not any created thing, and to you
I was only a voice commanding valor and an unnatural virtue. You heard the voice in the
dark, and you never heard it again. The sun in heaven denied it, the earth and sky denied
it, all human wisdom denied it. And when I met you in the daylight, I denied it myself”
(185). Chesterton’s “valor and unnatural virtue” resembles Kierkegaard’s “dreadful
responsibility.” Like the knight of virtue, the detectives are isolated, but their isolation is
exacerbated by denials from every source. Yet, like Abraham, the detectives kept the
faith. As Sunday says, “You did not forget your secret honor, though the whole cosmos
turned an engine of torture to tear it out of you. I knew how near you were to hell. I know
how you, Thursday, crossed swords with King Satan, and how you, Wednesday, named
me in the hour without hope” (185). As Abraham “believed by virtue of the absurd; for
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there could be no question of human calculation” (75), so the detectives had to suspend
human wisdom and believe “by virtue of the absurd” in the man in the dark room.
Furthermore, in this final quote Sunday recognizes Syme and Ratcliffe’s
experiences as having veracity despite being the result of mistaken beliefs. The fact that
Wednesday was actually an ally does not negate Syme’s subjective experience and the
very real fear he felt when faced with a man who does not bleed. Syme affirms this when
he responds to Gregory’s description of them as safe. He says, “It is not true that we have
never been broken. We have been broken upon the wheel. It is not true that we have
never descended from these thrones. We have descended into hell. We were complaining
of unforgettable miseries even at the very moment when this man entered to accuse us of
happiness. I repel the slander; we have not been happy” (188). As Abraham had to endure
waiting and then giving up his promised child, so the detectives had to endure isolation
and to ignore human wisdom. They had to recognize the limits of their philosophy and
step out in faith. They had to fight despite everything turning against them because they
believed their fight was right, because they believed their fight was just.
Syme claims for the detectives the glory of the anarchist because the anarchist’s
glory resides in fighting for what he believes is right despite all of human society
repudiating him. For Kierkegaard and Chesterton, faith envelops the rational. As William
Barrett writes, “Faith is an abyss that engulfs the rational nature of man” (28). Chesterton
says in Orthodoxy “Mysticism keeps men sane” (230). Recalling Gogol, Chesterton adds,
“Like the sun at noonday, mysticism explains everything else by the blaze of its own
victorious invisibility” (231). The mysticism is this: that God made the world, and “in
making it, He set it free” (282). This allows us to be “both happy and indignant” (282), to

186
both “heartily hate and heartily love” the world (275). Chesterton identifies the
explanation for this paradox as the fall. In other words, the world is good, for it was
created by God; but the world is simultaneously broken, for man disobeyed. In the terms
of The Man Who Was Thursday, the world is both brutal and beautiful. That the world is
set free at creation explains how “one could fight all the forces of existence without
deserting the flag of existence. One could be at peace with the universe and yet be at war
with the world” (282). The fact that the world has rebelled against God explains why one
finds oneself fighting against the world; the fact that the world was created by God
explains why one finds oneself fighting for the world.
In this realization Syme turns to Sunday to ask “[H]ave you also suffered?” (188).
After the question is asked Sunday’s face grows immense, filling the whole sky until
everything goes black. But just before the blackness destroys Syme’s consciousness he
hears a voice quoting Christ, “Can ye drink of the cup that I drink of?” (189). What is the
significance of this response? The answer to that is the answer to the question posed at
the beginning of this section: What does it mean for your greatest enemy to be your
greatest friend?
In the context of the Gospels, the “cup” Jesus refers to is his impending death on
the cross, most apparent in the Garden of Gethsemane when Jesus prays, “My Father, if it
be possible, let this cup pass from me” (Matt. 26:39 ESV). Chesterton is deliberately
connecting the peace of God as represented in the figure of Sunday to the cross. The
cross functions in Chesterton’s thought as a collision extending outward toward infinity
in contrast with the fixed, finite circle of logic. As he writes in Everlasting Man, “The
cross has become something more than a historical memory; it does convey, almost as by
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a mathematical diagram, the truth about the real point at issue; the idea of a conflict
stretching outwards into eternity. It is true, and even tautological, to say that the cross is
the crux of the whole matter” (154). In Orthodoxy he observes the cross “has at its heart a
collision and a contradiction” (231) and, “Because it has a paradox in its centre it can
grow without changing” (231). Chesterton does not define what this paradox is, but
several spring to mind: How can Jesus be both God and man? How can God the Father
forsake God the Son? The paradox relevant to The Man Who Was Thursday is found in
what Monday calls “an ultimate reconciliation” (185). In other words, the paradox of the
cross is found in its impact on the relationship between God and man.
The cross is the ultimate expression of humankind’s enmity with God. After all,
the story of the cross is the story of mankind’s rebellion against God and the dreadful
payment that rebellion demands. This leads to mankind’s rejection of God’s son and His
death by crucifixion. In this moment Jesus and all of humanity are in opposition to one
another. As Paul writes in Romans, Christ’s death occurred “while we were enemies”
(5:10 ESV). Mankind was so bitterly opposed to the Son of God that He was put to death
violently. It is difficult to imagine a stronger expression of animosity, a more poignant
picture of hostility than an execution. The cross is a symbol of our being enemies of God.
Yet at the same time the cross is a symbol of God extending friendship to us. As
Jesus says, “Greater love has no one than this, that someone lay down his life for his
friend” (John 15:13 ESV). In Christian theology, Christ’s death on the cross was him
laying down his life in order to bring about salvation. While the crucifixion is the result
of our enmity with God, it also brings about the necessary reconciliation needed for our
friendship with God. Thus the cross is both the ultimate act of enmity and the ultimate act
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of friendship. Those familiar with Chesterton’s thought will see how this paradox fits
Chesterton’s view of Christianity,68 which combines “furious opposites, by keeping them
both, and keeping them both furious” (299). As he writes, “Paganism declared that virtue
was in a balance; Christianity declared it was in a conflict: the collision of two passions
apparently opposite” (297). Out of this emerges Chesterton’s romance for the symbol of
two lines crossing each other and extending to infinity. The cross symbolizes our status
as enemies of God, emphasizes it to the point of us killing his Son. The cross also
symbolizes our status as friends of God, emphasizes it to the point of God’s Son laying
down his life for us. Instead of one diluting the other, both are held simultaneously in
extremity.
This connection between Sunday and the cross explains the significance of
Sunday identifying himself as the Peace of God. The peace of God is a contradiction. It is
something that emerges out of a paradox. It emerges out of death and life. Sunday
realizes the paradox by being the detectives’ greatest enemy and their greatest friend. But
it goes further than that, for while the cross can be accepted the cross cannot be
understood. As Chesterton says in Orthodoxy “it breaks out” (231). The cross can hold
together furious opposites. It is not striking a balance but holding together ideas
apparently in conflict. In The Man Who Was Thursday these opposites are unbearable
suffering and unaccountable joy. It is this joy that defines Chesterton’s existentialism.
Existential Joy
The phrase “existential joy” might strike some readers as odd. Existentialism has
a reputation for being a morbid philosophy, overly concerned with death, dread, and the

68

See “The Paradoxes of Christianity” in Orthodoxy, pp. 285-306.
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meaninglessness of our existence. Even Kierkegaard, who shared Chesterton’s belief in
the God of the Bible, wrote books titled Fear and Trembling and The Sickness Unto
Death. The other two novels addressed in this dissertation fit better into the popular
conception of existentialism. These books are dark, depressing, and paint a picture of the
universe without hope. So how does Chesterton fit within this framework?
There is one existentialist who shares a similar impulse towards happiness as
Chesterton: Albert Camus. In his essay The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus compares human
existence to the mythical figure Sisyphus, who was punished in the underworld by having
to push a rock up a hill for all eternity. For Camus this was a picture of the human
condition. Our instinct would be to see this as a reason to despair, but Camus says this is
not so. “Sisyphus teaches the higher fidelity that negates the gods and raises rocks. He
too concludes that all is well. This universe henceforth without a master seems to him
neither sterile nor futile. Each atom of that stone, each mineral flake of that night-filled
mountain, in itself, forms a world. The struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill
a man’s heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy” (123). Camus argues that accepting
the absurdity of our existence leads to happiness, not despair, to joy, not pain.
This view is dramatized in Camus’s novel The Stranger. The protagonist
Meursault seems disconnected and alienated from his existence. He observes others
around him trying to find meaning in things like family, love, plans, work, the law, or
religion. But Meursault rejects these as having any meaning. They merely distract people
from the void. They are as absurd as the stone Sisyphus must roll up the hill. But it is not
until the final conversation with the priest that Meursault finally comes to this
understanding. The inevitable death that waits for us all negates everything.
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Nothing, nothing mattered, and I knew why. So did he. Throughout the
whole absurd life I’d lived, a dark wind had been rising toward me from
somewhere deep in my future, across years that were still to come, and as
it passed, this wind leveled whatever was offered to me at the time, in
years no more real than the ones I was living. What did other people’s
deaths or a mother’s love matter to me; what did his God or the lives
people choose or the fate they think they elect matter to me when we’re all
elected by the same fate, me and billions of privileged people like him
who also called themselves my brothers? (121)
We are, Meursault later says, both privileged and condemned by existence and its end.
This flattens the world; what does anything matter in such a world? But instead of
leading Meursault to despair this realization leads him instead to happiness: “As if that
blind rage had washed me clean, rid me of hope; for the first time, in that night alive with
signs and stars, I opened myself to the gentle indifference of the world. Finding it so
much like myself—so like a brother, really—I felt that I had been happy and that I was
happy again” (122). As Camus writes in The Myth of Sisyphus “Happiness and the absurd
are two sons of the same earth. They are inseparable. It would be a mistake to say that
happiness necessarily springs from the absurd discovery. It happens as well that the
feeling of the absurd springs from happiness” (122). Camus’s Meursault and Sisyphus
come to similar realizations as Chesterton’s Syme. At the end The Man Who Was
Thursday Syme is left feeling “an unnatural buoyancy in his body and crystal simplicity
in his mind that seemed to be superior to everything that he said or did. He felt he was in
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possession of some impossible good news, which made every other thing a triviality, but
an adorable triviality” (189).
There is a similarity in the feeling, in the absurd joy each figure feels. There is a
similarity in how their realization makes every other thing seem unimportant. There is a
similarity in the recognition that existence as existence matters; and furthermore, that the
privilege of existence is sharpened by the threat of nonexistence. In his autobiography,
Chesterton wrote:
I have also a pretty taste in abysses and bottomless chasms and everything
else that emphasizes a fine shade of distinction between one thing and
another; and the warm affection I have always felt for bridges is connected
with the fact that the dark and dizzy arch accentuates the chasm even more
than the chasm itself…I believe that in feeling these things from the first, I
was feeling the fragmentary suggestions of a philosophy. (26)
This philosophy’s vague outline is made more explicit in The Man Who Was Thursday.
During Syme’s duel with Wednesday. The fear of death makes other fears mere fancies
(118). This dramatizes the existentialist claim that only in the face of death can one truly
live. This leads Syme to the following realization: “He felt a strange and vivid value in all
the earth around him, in the grass under his feet; he felt the love of life in all living
things…He had the feeling that if by some miracle he escaped, he would be ready to sit
forever before that almond tree, desiring nothing else in the world” (118-119). There is in
Camus an echo of this when he writes, “Each atom of that stone, each mineral flake of
that night-filled mountain, in itself forms a world.” Both Chesterton and Camus are
striving to realize joy in existence as existence. It is not a claim of meaning but it is a
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claim of value. Existence qua existence has value. This is the legacy of Chesterton’s
grandfather who claimed “he would thank God for his creation if he were a lost soul”
(Autobiography 90). Or, as Chesterton formulates it himself, “[E]ven mere existence,
reduced to its primary limits, was extraordinary enough to be exciting. Anything was
magnificent as compared with nothing” (89). It is this contrast, of being with nonbeing,
that informs Chesterton’s existential vision.69
Camus and Chesterton might share a goal of reaching existential joy but they
differ greatly in how one achieves that joy. The difference is that Chesterton accepts a
God who revealed himself in the person of Jesus Christ and Camus does not. This
difference reveals itself in Chesterton and Camus’s radically different views of hope.
Camus rejects hope. He writes, “Eluding is the invariable game. The typical act of
eluding, the fatal evasion that constitutes the third theme of this essay, is hope. Hope of
another life one must ‘deserve’ or trickery of those who live not for life itself but for
some great idea that will transcend it, refine it, give it a meaning, and betray it” (8). For
Camus the realization of the absurd is “a privileged and bitter moment in which hope has
no further place” (27) and “implies a total absence of hope” (31) asserting “the absurd is
the contrary of hope” (35). He expresses frustration with other existentialists who
“without exception suggest escape” and “find reason to hope in what impoverishes them”
(32).70 He continues, “That forced hope is religious in all of them” (32). In contrast, the
absurd man “has forgotten how to hope” (52). He “catches sight of a burning and rigid,

Gary Willis writes that, for Chesterton, “Being is an exception in each of its manifestations. It appears
only in definite shapes drawn in the hardest lines against the background of nonexistence.” (44).
70
This is an important point, as it shows that this discussion isn’t over whether to consider Chesterton an
existentialist if he accepts and promotes faith and hope. Rather this section of the dissertation is intended to
develop two different conceptions for existential joy.
69

193
transparent and limited universe in which nothing is possible but everything is given, and
beyond which all is collapse and nothingness. He can then decide to accept such universe
and draw from it his strength, his refusal to hope, and the unyielding evidence of a life
without consolation” (60).
Chesterton in contrast believes that hope is a good thing. When Syme is fleeing
Friday he catches sight of the top of St. Paul’s Cathedral, the cross and orb at the top
illuminated by the final rays of sunshine. The narrator observes, “It seemed a symbol of
human faith and valor that while the skies were darkening, that high place of the earth
was bright. The devils might have captured heaven, but they had not yet captured the
cross” (79). The importance of the cross to Chesterton’s imagination has already been
discussed, but it is important to recognize that the novel is not saying hope is good in
itself. The novel implies that hope in itself is not enough; it matters where our hope is
placed. Later, when it appears the world has gone completely over to the anarchists,
Syme asks Ratcliffe if he is hopeless. Ratcliffe responds, “No; oddly enough, I am not
quite hopeless. There is one insane little hope that I cannot get out of my mind. The
power of this whole planet is against us, yet I cannot help wondering whether this one
silly little hope is hopeless yet” (151). This “insane little hope” is, of course, the man in
the dark room. These two objects of hope are connected in the logic of the novel: the
Peace of God emerges out of the cross. But the novel also emphasizes this hope is
irrational. Ratcliffe calls his hope “insane” and “silly.” In response to Ratcliffe’s
profession of hope in the man in the dark room the professor says, “I also am holding
hard onto the thing I never saw” (152).
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While both Chesterton and Camus are seeking a means to find joy in existence,
they differ greatly in how that joy is achieved. It is not even enough to say that they differ
because in one hope is available while in the other hope must be rejected. This would
ignore how for Camus hope is a selfish emotion while for Chesterton it is a selfless one.
For Camus hope is always cast in relation to one’s own death or to one’s own life. For
Chesterton, hope is cast in relation to the universe. For Camus existential joy is found
when one accepts the absurd and holds it without attempting to elude it. For Chesterton
existential joy is found when one recognizes an error in perspective. In Chesterton’s
thought this means the need to come at things from a different angle, let go of
assumptions and find a means of seeing things as if for the first time.
In The Man Who Was Thursday the need to change our vantage point is expressed
in the idea of seeing the back of the world. In the Father Brown story “The Sins of Prince
Saradine” Chesterton uses the image of being on the wrong side of the tapestry, where
“The things that happen here do not seem to mean anything; they mean something
somewhere else” (161). A different image, used for much the same purpose, is of the
world turning upside down. In The Poet and the Lunatics the poet Gabriel Gale, after
being observed standing on his head, echoes the similarly named Gabriel Syme, “Shall I
tell you a secret?...The world is upside down. We’re all upside down” (14). This image
appears in The Man Who Was Thursday after Friday reveals himself as a fellow detective.
The novel reads, “Syme had for a flash the sensation that the cosmos had turned exactly
upside down, that all trees were growing downward and that all stars were under his feet.
Then came slowly the opposite conviction. For the last twenty-four hours, the cosmos
had really been upside down but now the capsized universe had come right side up again”
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(84). Chesterton concludes Orthodoxy with the same image. Modern man, he says, has
been “born upside down” (365). He writes, “Christianity satisfies suddenly and perfectly
man’s ancestral instinct for being the right way up; satisfies it supremely in this; that by
its creed joy becomes something gigantic and sadness something special and small”
(365).
Together these two images, being upside down and seeing only the back of things,
do not mean that Chesterton denies the existence of pain or the sense of isolation and
alienation one feels. Reflecting on the dual nature of Sunday, who seems both animal and
god, both brutal and beautiful, Syme reflects:
Then, and again and always…that has been for me the mystery of Sunday,
and it is also the mystery of the world. When I see the horrible back, I am
sure the noble face is but a mask. When I see the face but for an instant I
know the back is only a jest. Bad is so bad that we cannot but think good
an accident; good is so good that we feel certain that evil could be
explained. (174)
Our limited perspective and limited understanding prevent us from seeing the other side
of the tapestry, or from seeing the world the right way up. Whether we’re looking at pain
or looking at joy it tends to expand in our vision and block out our view. Christopher
Hollis explains, “Existence itself was good. One’s own existence was good…Other
existence was good. The excitement of life arose from the fact that there were other
separate objects—not just a totality of reality…The good of the world proved that there
was a God, the evil of the world that He was not always easily apparent—that He had to
be discovered” (32). Chesterton’s commitment to holding onto both the good and the evil
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in the world emerges out of his view of the cross. Chesterton wanted a philosophy that
combined furious opposites, recognizing how the world itself seems to run in two
directions simultaneously. The cross, as two bisecting lines extending outward,
symbolized this for Chesterton. The doctrine of the fall provided a theological
explanation for this combination of furious good and furious evil. In this one begins to
see how Chesterton’s thought orbits around the cross. The idea that man was created for
good and yet through freedom made a choice that has led to so much bad fits
Chesterton’s existentialism. Armed with the doctrine of the Fall, “One could be at peace
with the universe and yet be at war with the world” (Orthodoxy 282).
Chesterton blends humankind’s limited understanding with the doctrine of the
Fall to explain why we feel at odds with the universe. Unable to be a pessimist and
finding optimism “false and disheartening” because “it had always been trying to prove
that we fit into the world” (283), Chesterton found a third option in what he calls
Christian optimism, which “is based on the fact that we do not fit in to the world” (283).
In this Chesterton recognizes the absurd, the divorce between man and his setting. But
Chesterton has available to him something Camus does not, and that is an explanation for
why man is alienated from the world in which he exists. Chesterton’s existentialism
recognizes alienation, but instead of seeing that as a reason for despair, it is an
opportunity for joy.
The Christian cosmology allows Chesterton to recognize the sense of
meaninglessness without having to accept that as a final judgment. The world might at
times seem to lack meaning or sense, but that is more a result of the limitations of our
perspective than any actual lack of meaning. Chesterton develops this idea further in
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Orthodoxy, where he writes “The vault above us is not deaf because the universe is an
idiot; the silence is not the heartless silence of an endless and aimless world. Rather the
silence around us is a small and pitiful stillness like the prompt sickness in a sick-room”
(365). Chesterton recognizes that the universe seems silent, but does not accept the
silence as an indication of emptiness. The universe is not a void. Instead the apparent
indifference emerges out of human limitations, limitations of both understanding and
perspective.
Chesterton’s existentialism consists of recognizing these limitations and then
responding to these with joy. He writes of a strong feeling “that life was as precious as it
was puzzling. It was an ecstacy it was an adventure; it was an adventure because it was
an opportunity” (258). Out of this emerges out of gratitude for the fact of existence, the
“sense that life is not only a pleasure but a kind of eccentric privilege” (267). He explains
what he means more fully by comparing existence to a perilous escape:
But it is a better exercise still to remember how all things have had this
hair-breadth escape: everything has been saved from a wreck. Every man
has had one horrible adventure: as a hidden untimely birth he had not
been, as infants that never see the light. Men spoke much in my boyhood
of restricted or ruined men of genius: and it was common to say many a
man was a Great Might-Have-Been. To me it is a more solid and startling
fact that any man in the street is a Great Might-Not-Have-Been. (267)
In this quote, Chesterton identifies the mystery of human consciousness. In his adroit way
Chesterton takes the contingency also recognized by Thomas Hardy and reframes it in a
way that draws attention to its wonder and surprise. Instead of the Durbeyfield children
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being brought into the world against their will, dependent on their parents for the quality
of life, Chesterton imagines each individual human coming into existence as a “horrible
adventure” and a “hair-breadth escape.” Out of the realization that our existence is
accidental emerges a thankfulness that he exists at all. It is not unlike Syme coming face
to face with death, or Meursault facing the objective reality of his impending execution.
The contrast of being with nonbeing heightens our recognition of the value of existence.
But instead of facing death, Chesterton asks his readers to face the improbability of their
individual existences. Instead of focusing on how existence could be snuffed out,
Chesterton forces us to focus on the insane fact that we exist at all. He writes in
Orthodoxy, “The world was a shock, but it was not merely shocking; existence was a
surprise but it was a pleasant surprise” (258). In Chaucer Chesterton goes further: “There
is at the back of all our lives an abyss of light, more blinding and unfathomable than any
abyss of darkness; and it is the abyss of actuality, of existence, of the fact that things truly
are, and we ourselves are incredibly and sometimes incredulously real” (36). As Gary
Willis observes, “The real oddity is that there are things at all. How is one to speak of
tricks or types of paradox in the face of such a vision? Chesterton did not deal in many
types of paradox; not in paradoxes at all. He saw one exception—Being—and it colored
his talk about all beings” (39).
As a result of this Chesterton could hardly find fault with the limitations of his
understanding. As he writes in Orthodoxy, “And it seemed to me that existence was itself
so very eccentric a legacy that I could not complain of not understanding the limitations
of the vision when I did not understand the vision they limited” (260). Because of
Chesterton’s view that the world means something somewhere else he is able to accept
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his limited understanding. But that acceptance is couched in faith. It is this view that
informs the end of The Man Who Was Thursday. As a narrative about coming up against
the limitations of perspective and understanding the novel allegorically dramatizes the
existential crisis. But Chesterton’s view of existence leads the novel to suggest that the
response to this crisis is not one of stoic acceptance or suicidal despair, but one of
existential joy.
At the conclusion of Orthodoxy Chesterton writes, “Everything human must have
in it both joy and sorrow; the only matter of interest is the manner in which the two things
are balanced or divided” (363). In Chesterton’s view it is only Christianity that allows joy
to be “the fundamental thing in him, and grief the superficial” (364). This leads him to
conclude that joy “is the gigantic secret of the Christian” (365). This joy is only possible
when one accepts his or her own limited vision and chooses faith. In The Man Who Was
Thursday this moment of acceptance is not explicitly described. Nor is what Syme
accepts spelled out. Instead, his acceptance is like the acceptance of Job. Logically Job’s
response does not make a lot of sense. As Chesterton observes, “Verbally speaking the
enigmas of Jehovah seem darker and more desolate than the enigmas of Job; yet Job was
comfortless before the speech of Jehovah and is comforted after it. He has been told
nothing, but he feels the terrible and tingling atmosphere of something which is too good
to be told” (99). Like the Jehovah of the Book of Job, Sunday of The Man Who Was
Thursday does not answer Syme’s questions. Yet Syme is comforted. He feels “an
unnatural buoyancy in his body and a crystal simplicity in his mind that seemed to be
superior to everything that he said or did” (189). After enduring his nightmare Syme has
found joy. It is “unnatural” not because it is false or deviant, but it is unnatural because it
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is not natural but supernatural. As Chesterton writes, “The optimist’s pleasure was
prosaic, for it dwelt on the naturalness of everything; the Christian pleasure was poetic,
for it dwelt on the unnaturalness of everything in light of the supernatural” (284). Syme’s
buoyancy is unnatural because existence is unnatural. Unnatural like green grass; not
because it is green but because it exists at all.
Chesterton makes us feel the wonder that leads to joy through a narrative where
enemies are revealed to be friends in disguise. The plot creates this feeling of wonder and
surprise through the staggered revelation that the world is not so dark as it at first
appears. The combination of nonsense and allegory leads us to recognition that while we
might not know what existence means, we can know that it has value. Indeed, the
conviction that existence is valuable in itself is the starting point of Chesterton’s
existentialism. The failure of understanding is, for Chesterton, not a moment of despair,
but a moment of possibility.
G. K. Chesterton and the Recovery of Wonder
The Man Who Was Thursday leads readers to joy. Like Job, Syme is comforted,
“He felt he was in possession of some impossible good news, which made every other
thing a triviality, but an adorable triviality” (189). This final phrase, “adorable triviality,”
is worth closer attention. There exists a similarity between Chesterton and the other
existentialists when he calls the world a triviality. The sense that the world lacks meaning
or importance is characteristic of the existential perspective. But there is a world of
difference contained in the modifier “adorable.” Instead of Syme adopting an attitude of
boredom or indifference, he adopts the attitude of someone who recognizes the relative
unimportance of everything yet never loses his appreciation for it. It is not that everything
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is in actuality a triviality, just that in comparison with the “impossible good news” it is
trivial. In light of the what Syme has seen, the universe has become adorable.
This is for Chesterton, paradoxically, a means for recapturing one’s sense of
wonder and delight. As he writes at the end of Orthodoxy, “For actually and in truth I did
feel that these dim dogmas of vitality were better expressed by calling the world small
than by calling it large. For about infinity there was a sort of carelessness which was the
reverse of the fierce and pious care which I felt touching the pricelessness and the peril of
life. They showed only a dreary waste; but I felt a sort of sacred thrift” (267).
Chesterton’s decision to call the universe small is not a denial of its immensity. It is,
instead, an expression of affection. He writes, “When one is fond of anything one
addresses it by diminutives” (266). Syme’s sense of everything being an “adorable
triviality” is an indication of his fondness for the universe. His excruciating journey has
led him to a place of joy and pleasure at existence.
It would be easy to assume that Chesterton’s sense of the value of existence
emerges from his Christianity. In fact, the opposite is true. Chesterton’s belief in the
value of existence was only satisfied by Christianity. Orthodoxy gave Chesterton the
necessary explanation for the vague feelings he’d had his whole life. Chesterton was
already struck with wonder at existence. As he explains in his autobiography, “But as I
was still thinking the thing out by myself, with little help from philosophy and no real
help from religion, I invented a rudimentary and makeshift mystical theory of my own. It
was substantially this; that even mere existence, reduced to its primary limits, was
extraordinary enough to be exciting. Anything was magnificent as compared with
nothing. Even if the very daylight were a dream, it was a day-dream; it was not a
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nightmare” (89). The second to last sentence here is key to understanding Chesterton’s
existentialism. As Gary Willis observes, “Being is an exception in each of its
manifestations. It appears only in definite shapes drawn in the hardest lines against the
background of nonexistence” (44). Faced with the horror of nonbeing, Chesterton found
himself grateful for existence. All he lacked was someone to be grateful to. This was
satisfied by the Christian belief in a personal God. That God made the world separate
from himself was the missing piece that allowed Chesterton to love the world without
trusting it (Orthodoxy 282). It was the Christian doctrine of the Fall that allowed
Chesterton to understand why he felt “homesick at home” (284). It allowed Chesterton to
satisfy his fierce love for the world without denying the existence of evil.
What Chesterton could not abide was “the refusal to take an interest in existence;
the refusal to take the oath of loyalty to life” (276). If Chesterton often emphasized the
joy and wonder of existence and overlooked sorrow and suffering, it is because he saw in
his day far too much of the opposite. As a result, Chesterton’s existentialism feels like a
breath of fresh air, like the breeze at the end of The Man Who Was Thursday “so clean
and sweet, that one could not think that it blew from the sky; it blew rather through some
hole in the sky” (189). While many other existentialists are fascinated with being and
nonbeing, only Chesterton seems to emphasize wonder and surprise at being. Chesterton
inspires his readers to hold on to the good in the world as something precious, to defend
the commonplace, or as he says in Heretics, to defend “something more incredible still,
this huge impossible universe which stares us in the face” (207).
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Conclusion: A Productive Failure
The narrative crises of Thomas Hardy’s Tess of the D’Urbervilles, Joseph
Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, and G. K. Chesterton’s The Man Who Was Thursday reveal
the anxieties of British society at the end of Queen Victoria’s reign. In this period of
burgeoning prosperity and promise, Hardy, Conrad, and Chesterton wrote warnings—that
the dramatic strides in science, in empire, and in philosophy were not strides towards an
inevitable perfection of humanity but were themselves limited. And if those limits were
ignored then these were a danger to humanity. These fin de siècle novels serve as a preemptive warning against the industrialization, imperialism, and nationalism that
eventually led to the World War I and World War II.71 Hardy, Conrad, and Chesterton
recognized that if left unchecked these impulses would lead down dangerous paths. As
Laurence Lafore writes of late-Victorians in The Long Fuse, “They thought that mankind
had progressed in enlightenment, humanity, in reason…They understood that the means
to untold affluence were at hand. They believed that with it the planet might ultimately
produce a civilization of perpetual peace and progress, guided by the light of exact
knowledge that was rapidly being revealed to mankind” (15-26). Thomas Hardy’s novels
reveal a skepticism towards this enlightenment. Many of his narratives dramatize
tragedies based on the changing social order of mid-19th century Britain and feature men
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According to Hew Strachan, in order to create a unified Germany the Kaiser developed a more nationalist
and imperialist foreign policy. This was motivated by the language of social Darwinism, which held,
“States were dynamic entities, rising or declining according to fitness” (9) As a result the Germans adopted
Weltpolitik, and imperialist foreign policy emerging out of a need for markets for its growing
manufacturing industry. The tension between European powers created by imperialism, industrialization,
and nationalism helped ignite World War I.
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of science, men of education bringing tragedy to the people of Wessex.72 Hardy’s
warnings about the project of industrialization is matched in Conrad’s profound distrust
about the project of empire. In Heart of Darkness Conrad unmasks the lie of “civilizing
work” that imperialists use to justify the violence done to indigenous people. Finally,
Chesterton’s writings, especially Heretics and Orthodoxy, display a keen eye for the
logical endpoints of popular ideologies. He warns against the confidence late-Victorian
thinkers had in their ability to theorize and then build a more perfect world. According to
Chesterton, a rational world was an insane world.
Hardy, Conrad, and Chesterton join the other existentialists in warning against too
firm a faith in humanity. In the introduction to this study I defined existentialism as the
crisis that occurs when the individual human subject is confronted with their limitations.
The existential novel, then, is a narrative that dramatizes this crisis. There is something
the protagonist is unable to do, something they are unable to control, something they are
unable to understand. Their narratives reveal the need to reckon with our own, human
limitations. Hardy, Conrad, and Chesterton do differ on where that reckoning leads. For
Hardy and Conrad, the human limitation leads at best to humility and at worst to despair.
For Chesterton, on the other hand, accepting our limitations leads to joy. We are, the
British existentialists claim, all failures. And that is all right. Our human existence does
not depend on the perfectibility of humankind or a historical narrative of progress. Our
human existence depends on our ability to navigate human relationships, to recognize the
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In The Mayor of Casterbridge, the major conflict is between Henshaw, a remnant of an older order, and
Donald Farfrae who brings new technology to Casterbridge and upsets the order establish by Henshaw. In
The Return of the Native, the educated Clym Yeobright’s end is in tragedy. The Woodlanders similarly
features an educated man, in this case the doctor Edred Fitzpiers, moving to a small village and disrupting
the lives of the people living there.
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importance of that which we cannot express, and to find joy in our own inability to make
sense of the world.

Fictional Philosophy
As the arc of this dissertation shows, the form of the novel is significant to the
development of existential philosophy. This is unique, as Amy M. Kleppner wrote in
1964, “it is the only contemporary philosophy whose exponents have employed the
literary medium as a significant medium of expression” (207). The appeal to the novel
rests in part in its ability to affect the reader in ways that philosophy cannot. Amy
Klepper writes, “Both Sartre and de Beauvoir place considerable emphasis on the
reader’s experience as he responds to the work of literature” (209). The experience of the
reader who reads Tess of the D’Urbervilles, Heart of Darkness, or The Man Who Was
Thursday is essential to understanding the philosophy those novels present. As Simone de
Beauvoir writes in “Literature and Metaphysics:”
Bewitched by the tale that he is told, the reader here reacts as if he were
faced with lived events. He is moved, he approves, he becomes indignant,
responding with a movement of his entire being before formulating
judgments that he draws from himself and that are not presumptuously
dictated to him. That is what gives a good novel its value. It allows one to
undergo imaginary experiences that are as complete and disturbing as
lived experiences. The reader ponders, doubts, and takes sides; and this
hesitant development of his thought enriches him in a way that no teaching
of doctrine could. (270)
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In her 2018 book The Art of Being Yi-Ping Ong argues the aesthetics of the novel
allow the creation of the illusion of characterological freedom. The ability of the novel to
present life as it is lived enables the form to explore the nature of human existence in a
manner unavailable to other forms. By convincing the reader “of the illusion of an open
future,” the novel form “recalls the indeterminacy, possibility, and freedom of her own
existence” (67).73 It is the ability of the novel to represent existence from the viewpoint of
the one who lives it that makes it the ideal form for existential thought. As Beauvoir
writes, “the novel will permit us to evoke the original upspringing [jaillissement] of
existence in its complete, singular, and temporal truth” (274) and “provides a disclosure
of existence in a way unequaled by any other mode of expression” (276).
And yet the sense that the novel serves as a highly effective means of illustrating
philosophic ideas remains. Hardy’s novel illustrates what is meant by contingency;
Conrad’s what is meant by the absurd; Chesterton’s what is meant by being and
nonbeing. As Ong argues, the novel is a paradox which combines “on the one hand, the
pedagogical reflection and shaping of the author, and on the other hand, the spontaneous
unfolding of concrete life that resists and bewilders the author’s attempt to anticipate”
(238). She concludes that for the existential philosophers the novel is “an engagement
with the problem of existence in its very form” (239), and that The Art of Being “belongs
to a larger project that seeks to reveal the potential of literary form to shape the methods
and aim of philosophy” (239). It is to this larger project that this dissertation belongs.
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Ong spends quite a bit of her book discussing the importance of aesthetic achievement to the success of
the novel. If the reader becomes aware of herself as a reader, the illusion of characterological freedom is
shattered and the novel ceases to mimic the unfolding of life.
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Unlike The Art of Being, my dissertation is interested in the limits of the novel
form and the need for experimentation and innovation. The Victorian realist novel was
ultimately inadequate to the needs of the British existentialists. The shrinking space for
Tess Durbeyfield’s subjectivity in Tess of the D’Urbervilles reveals the limits of the
realist novel. These limitations led Conrad and Chesterton away from the realist novel.
Conrad used a frame narrative and a complex linguistic style mimicking oral storytelling
to create the affective experience of the existential crisis. Chesterton used a unique blend
of nonsense and allegory to create a sense of exuberance and joy emerging from a lack of
understanding. Like Dostoevsky before them, Conrad and Chesterton found that playing
with the novel form allowed them the ability to adequately give voice to their philosophy.
Simone de Beauvoir writes, “The novel is justified only if it is a mode of communication
irreducible to any other” (270). The significance of these novels’ forms to the existential
ideas they express confirms Beauvoir’s claim. Hardy’s narrative on the harm myths cause
real women loses its power if we do not feel with Tess. Conrad’s narrative on the
experience of the existential crisis loses its impact if we do not experience the confusion,
uncertainty, and danger that characterizes Marlow’s experience. Chesterton’s narrative on
the joy that emerges out of a failure understand loses its effect if we do not find our
expectations continuously reversed.
My readings of Hardy, Conrad, and Chesterton confirm Ong’s assertion that “the
philosophical significance of the novel lies in its very form” (239). While her argument
focuses on an existential poetics of the realist novel, my dissertation reveals that the goals
of existentialist philosophy are ultimately limited by the realist novel. While Ong
discusses how existentialism offers a powerful means of understanding of the novel, the
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development of existential philosophy in the novel required distinctive novelistic forms
that have significance in how we understand these novels’ existential visions. The impact
of myths on female subjectivity emerges out of the way the narrative voice of Tess begins
mythologizing its protagonist. The meaning of the horror surfaces through distance
created by the frame narrative. The experience of existential joy grows out of the tension
between nonsense and allegory. The philosophical significance of each novel depends on
the distinctive formal features they utilize.
The form of a novel, thus, ceases to be simply an useful means of illustrating
philosophical concepts or the expression of existence beyond the scope of philosophy,
but instead becomes itself a philosophical statement. In the same way that existentialism
emphasizes the individual’s engagement with philosophic inquiry from the perspective of
the individual, the intersection of literature and philosophy demands critical attention be
given to the individual characteristics of a novel’s form. Fiction is not, then, an awkward
attachment to philosophy, but instead becomes a significant part of understanding the
history of ideas.
The French Existentialists
This dissertation’s contribution to our understanding of literary history lies in the
reconsideration of traditional narratives of the development of existentialism. Rather than
seeing Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky as preceding a primarily French reaction to the
horrors of World War II, my dissertation reveals that we see the development of
existentialism earlier, with a number of novelists anticipating the articulation of
existential philosophy in the 1930s and 1940s. Existentialism is a philosophy that
attempts to deal with the experience of the individual who has been forced to face her
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own limitations. This confrontation impels the individual to reevaluate her individual,
subjective, contingent existence. My dissertation shows that the challenges existential
philosophy poses cannot be contained to a post-World War II France, but rather describe
questions that have motivated and continue to motivate many generations of thinkers.
The French existentialists, far from being a unique and unprecedented moment in
literary and philosophical history, are participating in a larger, transnational tradition of
the existential novel. The question becomes what do we gain by identifying a broader
legacy of the existential novels? How does understanding Hardy, Conrad, and Chesterton
as existential novelists impact our understanding fiction of the French existentialists? If
we take the concept of failure central to the British existentialists and apply it to Camus’s
novel The Stranger, what happens? If we recognize the importance of the novel form to
the British existentialists, what do we learn by paying attention to Camus’s formal
choices? While Hardy’s novel emphasizes the failure of representation, Conrad’s the
failure of communication, and Chesterton the failure to understand, Camus’s novel is
about the failure to find meaning and the freedom and joy that results from realizing and
accepting this failure.
Formally Camus, like the other existentialists, uses characters to represent
different ways of being, emphasizes Meursault’s subjective experience, and has a plot
lead to an existential choice. The distinctive formal choices are structural, narrative
perspective, and narrative voice. Camus divides his book into two sections, one which
focuses on the lead up to the murder and the second on the fallout of the murder. The
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story is a first-person narrative but features a dispassionate voice and lacks the selfreflection common to that narrative style and to the existential novel in particular.74
Where Hardy uses representative figures to interrogate men’s treatment of
women, Conrad to elucidate ways of facing the darkness, and Chesterton to represent
philosophical viewpoints, Camus uses representative figures to investigate ways which
people attempt to cover up the abyss of nonmeaning that lies at the center of existence.
As mentioned the novel is split into two sections. In terms of plot the break happens as a
result of the murder. Thematically, in the first section we are introduced to means by
which we find meaning on an individual or personal scale. In the second section we are
shown methods society uses in order to impose meaning on existence. I will first focus on
the novel’s rejection of attempts to define meaning on an individual scale.
The Stranger begins famously with the opening lines, “Aujourd’hui, mama nest
morte. Ou peut-être hier, je ne sais pas” (9).75 These lines, where Meursault focuses on
temporal uncertainty instead of on the loss of his mother, have unsettled readers since the
novel was published in 1942. When I taught the novel to undergraduates in the Spring of
2019, my students reacted with disgust. Many of my students expressed the idea that one
ought to care about the death of one’s mother. Meursault’s lack of grief bothered them
because the relationship between mothers and their children ought to mean something.
Meursault’s indifference challenges this cultural assumption about finding meaning in
family. After all, if meaning is defined by family, what does that mean for those who
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Compare, for instance, how Marlow speaks in Heart of Darkness to how Meursault narrates his life.
Similar contrasts can be drawn between the narrator of Notes from Underground and Jean Paul Sartre’s
Nauseau, which feature protagonists who use writing to reflect on their experiences and their lives.
75
“Maman died today. Or yesterday maybe, I don’t know.”
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have no family? Or those who are in abusive or toxic families? Family proves to be an
inadequate means of defining the meaning of existence.
As the novel continues, Meursault continues to reject other methods of
determining meaning. When Marie asks him if he loves her, he says, “I told her it didn’t
mean anything but that I didn’t think so” (35). When Raymond discusses discovering that
his mistress is cheating on him and what he should do about it, Meursault tells him, “I
didn’t think anything” (32). When his boss offers him a job in Paris he says, “it really
was all the same to me” (41). Meursault rejects romance, revenge, and relocation as
offering any kind of meaning. Not only does he reject these on their personal, individual
level but also rejects the social signs of success. Meursault lacks ambition. Building a
career does not mean anything. When Marie asks him if he wants to marry, he tells her
they could if she wants to, but that “it didn’t make any difference to me” (41). Almost
systematically Meursault rejects various ways individuals attempt to find meaning. Love
is rejected; relocation is rejected; career achievements are rejected; retributive justice is
rejected; marriage is rejected.
After Meursault rejects these attempts to create meaning, the novel then focuses
in on two different ways people avoid seeing the void at the center of existence. The first
is a robotlike woman who meticulously plans out her existence so she does not have to
face the emptiness. The second is Meursault’s neighbor Salamano who has lost his dog.
Salamano does not like his dog, but he is used to it. He’d gotten it after his wife died. He
hadn’t liked her much, but he was used to her. Salamano represents those who are not
looking for meaning but, unlike the robotic woman, do not plan out their days so they do
not have to face their lives’ lack of meaning. Instead, they go on living out of habit.
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When life disrupts them—their wife dies, or their dog runs away—they do not know
what to do with themselves.
After the murder Meursault is transformed into a kind of celebrity. As Meursault
rejects attempts to make meaning on a personal scale, as a public figure he proceeds to
reject societal institutions’ attempts to define meaning. The first of these is the law.
Throughout the trial it is clear that while the law is correct at identifying Meursault as the
murderer, it cannot explain why he killed the Arab. While judicial system is intended to
identify truth, what we find throughout the trial is the truth not fitting within the judicial
system’s framework for making sense of the world. The trial concludes with a coherent
narrative, but it is not a true narrative. The meaning of events remains unexplained.
The second societal institution which attempts to define meaning is religion. The
confrontation with the chaplain leads to Meursault’s moment of existential vision. During
this conversation Meursault rejects religion’s claims to authority over the meaning of
existence. Meursault tells the chaplain that the existence of God is unimportant (116).
The chaplain refuses to accept this answer and continues to pressure Meursault to turn to
God. This leads Meursault to snap and lose control in his only emotional outburst in the
novel. Meursault observes, “I was pouring out on him everything that was in my heart,
cries of anger and cries of joy” (120). Meursault’s outburst concerns the nature of
existence in the light of the inevitable. Meursault continues:
I was sure about me, about everything, surer than he could ever be, sure of
my life and sure of the death I had waiting for me. Yes, that was all I had.
But at least I had as much of a hold on it as it had on me. I had been right,
I was still right, I was always right. I had lived my life one way and I
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could just as well have lived in another. I had done this and I hadn’t done
that. I hadn’t done this thing but I had done another. And so? It was as if I
had waited all this time for this moment and for the first light of this dawn
to be vindicated. Nothing, nothing mattered, and I knew why. So did he.
(120-121)
In this passage Meursault holds in tension his life and death. Neither exists without the
other, and the nature of existence means that life is filled with choice, with opportunities
taken and opportunities missed, with decisions that went one way which could have gone
in another. Yet none of this means anything. He continues, “Everybody was privileged.
There were only privileged people. The others would all be condemned one day. And he
would be condemned too” (121). The reality that we are privileged with existence and yet
condemned to die levels life.
What Meursault realizes is that the reality of death renders any and all attempt to
find meaning pointless. Instead the human subject is meant to recognize their existence in
light of their eventual nonexistence. After this outburst Meursault reflects that his “blind
rage had washed me clean, rid me of hope” (122). Standing before death, that one, final,
ultimate limitation, Meursault says, “I opened myself to the gentle indifference of the
world. Finding it so much like myself—so like a brother, really—I felt that I had been
happy and that I was happy again” (122-123). Accepting the tension between existence
and nonexistence, between life and death; accepting that it renders life meaningless
allows Meursault to embrace the world and his place within it. The failure of individual
and societal methods of defining meaning leaves him free to be content with existence.
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Meursault’s kinship with “the gentle indifference of the world” explains the
narrative voice. Even his outburst of passion directed at the chaplain is related almost
unemotionally. When Meursault observes at the end of his speech that “All the shouting
had me gasping for air” it comes as a surprise. We readers have grown used to
Meursault’s narrative detachment. This formal feature, however, is key to understanding
the novel.
Meursault’s dispassionate voice and lack of self-reflection undermines our
empathetic responses to emotionally charged methods of determining the meaning of
existence. Meursault’s lack of emotional investment in the world in which he exists is a
foil to the way in which human emotions are unreliable at determining meaning.
Emotions trick us into thinking things life family, justice, or faith indicate meaning and
purpose. Using language devoid of the normal linguistic cues for attachment leaves the
reader unable to form emotional bonds. We are kept at a distance. Meursault’s
indifference infects our own reading experience.
But this narrative voice serves a second purpose. Meursault’s lack of selfreflection throughout the novel establishes the failure of the final method of finding
meaning: philosophy. At the origins of Western philosophy Plato’s Socrates famously
instructs his students to first follow the Delphic maxim “Know Thyself.” The Stranger
presents a figure who is utterly uninterested in knowing himself. Camus uses the
narrative form of the novel to signal the rejection of philosophy as a method of finding
meaning. Philosophy, too, fails to establish the meaning of existence.
By placing The Stranger within a broader tradition of existential novelists we
understand the novel as a narrative of failure. The failure, however, leads to freedom. In
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The Stranger, accepting that individual and institutional attempts to establish meaning
will end in failure enables Meursault to recover his agency, his freedom to choose
independent of any individual, institutional, or communal determinations. Like the other
existential novels, the narrative arc reaches a point where the apparent goal of the
narrative implodes: the presentation of Tess’s subjectivity fails; the communication of
Marlow’s experience fails; the understanding of Sunday fails; the attempt to define
meaning fails. Yet, like the other existential narratives, this failure reveals the novel’s
existential vision. Instead of imploding into a nihilistic void, the collapse leads instead to
means to move forward in this dense, incomprehensible universe.
The End Is Not The End
I see three main threads for further research. The first is to continue analyzing the
philosophy embedded in the novel form. The second is to identify other moments in
literary history where a concentration of existential novels emerges. The third is to
identify the connections between this fin de siècle existential moment and the
development of British literary modernism. While this project is more concerned with
understanding these novels in their immediate historical context and in relation to
existential theory, the implications of this study extend to other areas of literary studies.
In the first of these threads Yi-Ping Ong has begun the important work of
describing the philosophy inherent in the form of the novel. As she herself says at the
conclusion of her study, her book “belongs to a larger project that seeks to reveal the
potential of literary form to shape the methods and aims of philosophy” (239). While my
dissertation begins the work of understanding the implications of the novel form on
existential philosophy, there is potential in the novel form for exploring different
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philosophical concerns. It is for future scholarship to determine what these philosophies
are and how form impacts our understanding of those philosophies.
The second of these threads asks us to recognize the existential novel as a
broader, transnational tradition. These studies will enable us to better understand the
situatedness of existential philosophy. As the French existentialists responded to World
War II, the British existentialists responded to Victorian optimism, so too other
existential novels respond to their cultural and historical situation. By recognizing how
existentialism emerges out of specific contexts will enable us to better understand
existential philosophy and the tension between the individual, particular characteristics of
each existential thinker and the emergence of general themes that carry from one
existentialist to another. Doing so will allow us to identify the ways in which
existentialism is a productive philosophy in the quest for understanding, the growth of the
individual, and the fight for justice.
The last thread involves modifying our understanding of literary modernism.
Rather than seeing modernism as a break with the past and a rejection of tradition,
recognizing this existential moment at the tail end of the Victorian and the beginning of
the Edwardian period allows us to understand better the emergence of modernism and the
formal experimentation that defined that period. Existentialism prefigures the
fragmentation of form, the collapse of individual significance, and the falling apart of
realism that occurs in modern literature. Teasing out these connections will enable us to
understand better what cultural, social, and political forces led to the modernist literary
movement.
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Finally, I see in this study a call to take up the existential admonition to make
philosophy personal, to place myself on trial before the questions these novels ask. The
existential novel challenges us to recognize our own limits, our limits as readers and
thinkers. These novels ask us to wrestle with how their failures challenge our
assumptions about the project of interpretation. How should the failure of representation,
communication, and understanding be understood in relation to literary study? What are
we to do with novels that resist us? With novels that challenge literary interpretation?
With novels that question our ability to make them cohere? Rather than seeing these
failures as undermining the entire project of making meaning, instead, I argue, we ought
to see these limitations instead as productive. Their incompleteness creates possibility,
and in that possibility we find space to speak.
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